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MEDDLING WITH THE MULLAHS: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE IRAN AND LIBYA
SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996
LUCIEN J. DHOOGE*
"As the dominant power, [the United States] can afford to add the
legitimizing carrot of negotiations to the punitive stick of sanctions."'
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 5, 1996, President William J. Clinton signed the Iran
and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 into law.2 This statute, dubbed by some
as the D'Amato-Kennedy Act after its two chief legislative sponsors, 3
was introduced in the United States (U.S.) Senate as Senate Bill 1228
on September 8, 1995 and in the U.S. House of Representatives as
House Bill 3107 on March 19, 1996. 4 The bill received little attention
until the summer of 1996 when two events combined to bring its enact-
ment to fruition. On June 25, 1996, a truck bomb was detonated outside
of Khobar Towers, a U.S. military housing compound located near
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, resulting in the death of nineteen American
servicemen. 5 One month later, on July 17, 1996, Trans-World Airlines
Assistant Professor of Business Law, University of the Pacific; LL.M., International and
Comparative Law, 1995, Georgetown University Law Center; J.D., 1983, University of
Denver College of Law; B.A., 1980, University of Colorado; Member, Colorado and District
of Columbia Bars. The author wishes to thank his family and friends for their constant
encouragement and inspiration.
1. Richard W. Murphy, It's Time to Reconsider the Shunning of Iran, WASH. POST,
July 20, 1997, at C1. Murphy served as U.S. Ambassador to Syria and Saudi Arabia and
as Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from 1983 to
1989.
2. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541 (1996)
[hereinafter ILSA].
3. The chief legislative sponsor of ILSA was United States Senator Alfonse M.
D'Amato (Republican, New York). See Clay Chandler, U.S. Expects Furor Over Trade
Sanctions at Summit, WASH. POST, June 27, 1996, at A20. See also Urgent Paris Warns
Washington over Sanctions Law, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Sept. 29, 1997, available in 1997
WL 13404030.
4. H.R. REP. No. 104-523(I), at 13-14 (1996).
5. See Saudis Finish Bomb Probe, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 31, 1998, at 7, available in 1998
WL 2840770. See also Chandler, supra note 3, at A20. Initial optimism that responsibil-
ity for the bombing could be attributed to Iranian-sponsored terrorists based in Saudi
Arabia has faded as the investigation has proceeded. See Toni Locy, Informant in Bomb-
ing has a Change of Heart, HOUS. CHRON., July 31, 1997, at 5, available in 1997 WL
6570713. Saudi Arabia closed its investigation of the attack on March 30, 1998. See
Saudis Finish Bomb Probe, supra at 7. The U.S. Military now doubts whether it will ever
be able to "establish a 'solid line' tying Iran to the terror attack." Charles J. Hanley, Un-
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Flight 800 inexplicably exploded in mid-air and crashed off the coast of
Long Island, New York resulting in the loss of 230 lives.6 In the atmos-
phere of outrage and panic over the perceived threat of international
terrorism stirred by these incidents, the bill was quickly passed by the
Senate on July 16, 1996 and the House of Representatives on July 23,
1996. 7 In response to the national outcry for retaliatory action - and
perhaps not wishing to appear weak on the issue of international ter-
rorism in an election year - President Clinton endorsed its provisions
two weeks later.8 The U.S. trade embargo against Iran escalated to a
new level at the stroke of the President's pen.
At its core, the Act has four purposes. Initially, ILSA purports to
address the threat to U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives
posed by Iranian and Libyan attempts to acquire weapons of mass de-
struction and sponsorship of acts of international terrorism. 9 However,
the sponsors of ILSA acknowledged that unilateral efforts by the United
States were insufficient to adequately address these threats.10 As a re-
sult, ILSA attempts to multilateralize U.S. efforts to isolate Iran. Ini-
tially, ILSA urges the President to commence diplomatic efforts through
the United Nations and consultation with U.S. allies in order to estab-
lish a multilateral sanctions regime against Iran, including provisions
limiting the development of its petroleum resources. 1 ILSA also
authorizes the imposition of economic sanctions upon persons deter-
mined by the President to have made investments in Iran of at least
$40 million in any one year that directly contributed to Iran's ability to
develop its petroleum resources. 12 Persons subject to sanctions must
have actual knowledge or reason to know that their investment would
answered Questions, Unending Delays in Saudi Bombing Investigation, Assoc. PRESS,
Mar. 1, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4857484. Responsibility for the attack remains unde-
termined as of the time of preparation of this article.
6. Michele Salcedo, Tape Shows Other Pilots Saw TWA 800 Explode, AUsTIN AM.-
STATESMAN, Jan. 15, 1998, at A10, available in 1998 WL 3593269. See Paul Blustein,
House Passes Measure Against Foreign Firms Investing in Iranian, Libyan Oil, WASH.
POST, July 24, 1996, at A25. Despite initial speculation that a terrorist bomb brought the
airliner down, an exhaustive investigation by several U.S. agencies including the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and the National Transportation Safety Board eliminated this
possibility. See TWA Flight 800 Explained, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1997, at A18, available
in 1997 WL 164. The investigation is now focused on mechanical explanations for the ex-
plosion. Id. The cause of the explosion remains undetermined as of the time of prepara-
tion of this article.
7. H.R. REP. NO. 104-523(I), at 1.
8. See Eric Pianin, Clinton Approves Sanctions for Investors in Iran, Libya, WASH.
POST, Aug. 6, 1996, at A8, available in 1996 WL 10724877.
9. See ILSA, Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 2(1), 110 Stat. 1541, 1541 (1996). See also H.R.
REP. NO. 104-523(11), at 3 (1996).
10. See H.R. REP. No. 104-523(f), at 3. See also H.R. REP. NO.104-523(11), at 2.
11. See ILSA § 4(a). See also H.R. REP. No. 104-523(11), at 3.
12. See ILSA § 5(a). See also H.R. REP. NO. 104-523(1), at 12.
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directly contribute to Iran's ability to develop its petroleum resources. 13
The President is required to impose at least two sanctions from a list
set forth in ILSA against persons deemed to have violated the invest-
ment prohibition.14 This sanctions regime is designed to discourage for-
eign investment in Iran's petroleum industry, thereby denying it the fi-
nancial means to sustain its nuclear, chemical, biological and missile
weapons programs and sponsorship of international terrorism.' 5 Fi-
nally, ILSA purports to place additional pressure upon the Libyan gov-
ernment to comply with United Nations Security Council Resolutions
731, 748, and 883 by demanding the cessation of Libyan sponsorship of
international terrorism and efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruc-
tion, 16 and by demanding the surrender of two Libyan intelligence
agents implicated in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 on December
21, 1988.17 Furthermore, all provisions of ILSA applicable to Iran are
equally applicable to investments in Libya.' 8 The President must report
to Congress on a regular basis on his efforts to accomplish the purposes
set forth in ILSA.19
13. See id.
14. See ILSA § 5(a). See also H.R. REP. NO. 104-523(1), at 2.
15. See ILSA § 2(2). See also H.R. REP. NO. 104-523(I1), at 3.
16. See S.C. Res 731, S/RES/731 (1992). See also S.C. Res. 748, S/RES/748 (1992).
17. See S.C. Res. 883, S/RES/883 (1993). Flight 103 exploded over Lockerbie, Scot-
land on December 21, 1988, killing all 259 people on board as well as eleven people on the
ground. See Khomeini Ordered Bombing Over Lockerbie, Report Says, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, July 6, 1997, at 17A, available in 1997 WL 11502927.
18. See ILSA § 5(1)(B). See also H.R. REP. NO. 104-523(1), at 7. The effects of ILSA
upon Iran and its trading partners are more controversial than those relating to Libya
due to the prior imposition of economic sanctions upon Libya by the Security Council and
the pledge of United Nations members to enforce those sanctions. See Thomas W.
Lippman, Panel Approves Sanctions for Foreign Firms Investing in Iran, WASH. POST,
June 14, 1996, at Al. As a result, this article will focus on the effects of ILSA upon Iran
and its trading partners. For its part, Libya's official news agency JANA condemned
ILSA as a "flagrant injustice" arising from "satanic designs... designed as a veto on the
independence, freedom and development of nations." Agency Editor Comments on Re-
newal of Sanctions Against Libya, BRITISH BROAD. CORP., Jan. 26, 1996.
19. See ILSA §§ 4(b), 4(d)(2), 4(e), 9(a)(4), 9(c)(1), 10(a) and 10(b). See also H.R. REP.
NO. 104-523(I), at 7; H.R. REP. NO. 104-523(1), at 3. The summary of the purposes set
forth in the text are those of the U.S. Congress. In signing ILSA into law, President
Clinton described Iran and Libya as "two of the most dangerous supporters of terrorism in
the world." Pianin, supra note 8, at A8. According to President Clinton, the legislation
was designed to accomplish two purposes with regard to the terrorist threats posed by
Iran and Libya. Initially, ILSA would deny Iran and Libya resources necessary to finance
international terrorism and the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. Id. Sec-
ondly, ILSA would place the issue of international terrorism upon the agenda of every
state engaging in trade with Iran and Libya by requiring "every advanced country ... to
make up its mind whether it can do business with people by day who turn around and fuel
attacks on their innocent civilians by night." Id. See also Muriel Dobbin, Clinton Signs
Libya, Iran Sanction Bill, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Aug. 6, 1996, at A3, available in 1996
WL 7042186. President Clinton may also have been motivated by U.S. outrage over the
execution of a contract between the Iranian government and the French petrochemicals
firm Total SA for the development of two large Iranian oil and gas fields located in the
1998
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The Act attempts to accomplish its purposes with three specific
methods. Initially, Section 4(a) of the Act urges the President to imme-
diately commence diplomatic efforts in appropriate international fo-
rums and in bilateral negotiations to establish a multilateral sanctions
regime against Iran including limitations upon foreign investments in
Iran's petrochemicals industry. 20
The second method by which the Act accomplishes its purposes is
through increased consultation between the President and Congress re-
garding U.S. policy toward Iran. Sections 4(b) and 10(a)(1) require the
President to report to Congress on a periodic basis regarding his efforts
to establish a multilateral sanctions regime against Iran.21 ILSA also
requires the President to report to Congress on whether the European
Union, the Republic of Korea, Australia, Israel and Japan have legisla-
tive or administrative standards providing for the imposition of trade
sanctions against persons doing business or having investments in
Iran.22 The President is additionally required to report to Congress on
Iran's military capabilities and support of international terrorism in-
cluding the extent to which the International Atomic Energy Agency
has established regular inspections of all nuclear facilities in Iran and
Iran's use of its diplomats and representatives to promote acts of ter-
rorism. 23
Finally, ILSA provides for the imposition of economic sanctions
upon persons who, with actual knowledge, make an investment of $40
million or more in any twelve month period which directly and signifi-
cantly contributes to the enhancement of Iran's ability to develop its pe-
troleum resources. 24 These sanctions include prohibitions upon transac-
tions between the sanctioned person, U.S. financial institutions and the
Export-Import Bank of the United States, procurement sanctions, and
import and export sanctions. 25 Sections 4(c), 5(f), 9(a) and 9(c) grant the
President broad authority to grant exceptions and waivers as well as
delays in the imposition of sanctions. 26 In any event, sanctions imposed
pursuant to ILSA must remain in effect for a period of two years or un-
til either Iran or the sanctioned person modifies their objectionable be-
Persian Gulf. This contract was executed on July 13, 1995, four months after President
Clinton barred Conoco and other American companies from participating in the project.
See Exec. Order No. 12,957, 3 C.F.R. § 332 (1995). Executive Order No. 12,957 prohibited
the financing, management or supervision by U.S. persons of the development of Iranian
petroleum resources. See id. at § 1(a)-(c). See also International Emergency Economic
Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(A) and (B)(1994) [hereinafter IEEPA].
20. See ILSA § 4(a).
21. See id. §§ 4(b) and 10(a)(1).
22. See id. § 4(e).
23. See id. §§ 10(a)(3)-(4) and 10(b)(1)-(2).
24. See id. § 5(a).
25. See id. § 6(1)-(6).
26. See id. §§ 4(c), 5(f), 9(a), and 9(c).
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International reaction to the adoption of ILSA was universal, im-
mediate and unequivocally hostile. Canada, the largest trading partner
of the United States, amended its Foreign Extraterritoriality Act to
provide for fines and prison terms for company managers who comply
with orders entered pursuant to the Act.28 The European Union filed a
formal protest to ILSA with the United States on August 8, 1996.29
European Union officials objected to ILSA as "an extreme case of extra-
territorial legislation" 30 and an inappropriate and ineffective means of
combating international terrorism.3 1 European Union officials warned
the United States that the imposition of sanctions against European
firms transacting business in Iran would seriously damage relations
and would lead to the enactment and enforcement of retaliatory meas-
ures against American business interests.32 The European Union also
threatened to initiate a challenge to ILSA before the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) as a violation of the Uruguay Round of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).33
Even U.S. Persian Gulf allies living directly under the threat of
Iranian expansionism expressed doubts about further American at-
tempts to isolate Iran as exemplified by ILSA. A statement issued at
the conclusion of the eighth summit of the Organization of the Islamic
Conference, 34 held in Tehran in December 1997, criticized U.S. attempts
to penalize countries doing business with Iran. 35 This criticism was ech-
27. See id. §§ 8(a) and 9(b).
28. See Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, R.S.C., ch. F-29, §§ 5, 7 (1984) (Can.).
29. See EU Protests Law on Iran, Libya Sanctions, HOUS. CHRON., Aug. 9, 1996, at
30, available in 1996 WL 11558085.
30. Blustein, supra note 6, at A25. See also France Defends Firm's Gas Pact with
Iran, BUFF. NEWS, Sept. 30, 1997, at A2, available in 1997 WL 6464384; U.S. Frustrated
Over French-Iranian Gas Deal, XINHUA ENG. NEWSWIRE, Oct. 1, 1997, available in 1997
WL 11202513; U.S. Investigating Iranian Gas Deal, Assoc. PRESS, Sept. 29, 1997, avail-
able in 1997 WL 4885712.
31. See EU Protests Law on Iran, supra note 29, at 30.
32. Blustein, supra note 6, at A25. See also Raf Casert, EU Warns U.S. Relations
Will Suffer if French Iran Deal Challenged, ASSOC. PRESS, Sept. 30, 1997, available in
1997 WL 4885966; Bill Mintz, EU Tells Washington not to Meddle, HouS. CHRON., Oct. 1,
1997, at 3, available in 1997 WL 13071837; Urgent Paris Warns Washington Over Sanc-
tions Law, supra note 3.
33. Raf Casert, EU Nations "100 Percent" Behind France in Iran Oil Deal, ASSoc.
PRESS, Oct. 6, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4886682. See also Jana Byron, Sanctions Cor-
ner, France's Total Ignores ILSA, EXPORT PRACTITIONER, Oct. 15, 1997, at 13, available in
1997 WL 8530724; EU Protests Law on Iran, Libya Sanctions, supra note 29, at 30; U.S.
to Investigate Total's Deal with Iran, XINHUA ENG. NEWSWIRE, Oct. 6, 1997, available in
1997 WL 11203425.
34. See John Lancaster, Iran Seeks New Image at Summit, WASH. POST, Dec. 22,
1997, at A23. The Organization of the Islamic Conference was created in 1969 and meets
every three years. See id. The Conference consists of representatives of Islamic countries
located in Europe, the Middle East and Africa. The eighth summit was the first hosted by
Iran and drew representatives from fifty-five Islamic countries. See id.
35. See Phil Chetwynd, Moslem Leaders Condemn Terrorism, Israel as Summit Ends,
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oed in a statement issued at the end of the annual summit of the Gulf
Cooperation Council 36 in December 1997 welcoming Iranian overtures
to lessen tensions in the Persian Gulf 37 The leader of one of the U.S.
closest Gulf allies, Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani of Qatar, called
for dialogue between Iran and the U.S.,38 and Saudi Arabian Crown
Prince Abdullah offered to act as an intermediary in such discussions. 39
This article examines the provisions of ILSA and its consistency
with the U.S. international and national interests. This article first ex-
amines in detail the history preceding the adoption of ILSA with spe-
cific concentration on diplomatic and economic relations between the
U.S. and Iran since 1979 and the resultant imposition of U.S. trade
sanctions against Iran. It then examines the specific provisions of ILSA
with emphasis on its most controversial element - the imposition of
unilateral economic sanctions upon persons who invest in Iran's petro-
chemicals industries. Finally, this article analyzes ILSA in light of the
U.S. international and national interests. This article concludes that
ILSA is inconsistent with the promotion of the international and na-
tional interests of the United States.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE IRAN AND LIBYA SANCTIONS ACT
Although a complete history of the volatile relationship between the
United States and Iran is beyond the scope of this article, a brief review
of the recent highlights of this relationship is in order to place ILSA in
its proper context. Modern Iranian history began in 1921 when Reza
Khan, an Iranian officer of the Persian Cossack Brigade, engineered a
coup d'6tat against the government of Ahmad Shah of the Qajar dy-
nasty.40 Reza Khan ousted Ahmad Shah and gained complete control of
the government in 1925.41 Reza Khan subsequently declared himself
Shah, ruling as Reza Shah Pahlavi until his forced abdication following
AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Dec. 11, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13452786.
36. The Gulf Cooperation Council consists of the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the
United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman and Bahrain. See Ashraf Fouad, Gulf Arabs Cau-
tiously Positive Toward Iran, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 1997, at A23.
37. See id.
38. See Rejecting Advice, U.S. Stands Firm on Iran, ASSOC. PRESS, June 12, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 4870452.
39. See Anthony Shadid, Despite Hope for Moderation, Iran's Leader Blasts West, Is-
rael, Assoc. PRESS, Dec. 9, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4895949.
40. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTES: IRAN 2 (1994), (visited Sept. 12, 1998)
<http:www.state.gov/www/backgroundnotes/iran_794_bgn.html> [hereinafter IRAN:
STATE DEP'T NOTES]. Reza Khan became minister of war as a result of the 1921 coup
d'6tat. Iran's History in Brief, at 10 (visited Sept. 12, 1998) <http://www.salamiran.org/
IranInfo/General/History.html> [hereinafter Iran's History].
41. Iran's History, supra note 40, at 9.
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the occupation of Iran by British and Soviet forces in September 1941.42
Reza Shah Pahlavi was succeeded by his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi,
who ruled Iran until January 1979.43
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's regime faced two serious threats to its
existence during its thirty-eight year tenure. The first threat occurred
in 1951 when Premier Mohammed Mossadeq, an advocate of the na-
tionalization of British petroleum interests in Iran,44 briefly assumed
power and forced the Shah to flee the country. 45 The Shah returned to
Iran after his supporters succeeded in ousting Mossadeq in a coup d'6tat
in August 1953.46 Mossadeq's ouster remains a contentious issue in pre-
sent-day American-Iranian relations due to the role of the Central In-
telligence Agency in leading and financing the coup. 47 Shortly after his
return to power, the Shah agreed to a new charter that granted Ameri-
can and British oil interests forty percent each of Iranian oil revenues. 48
The Shah also received $85 million in American economic aid. 49
In 1978, domestic turmoil swept Iran as a result of religious and
political opposition to the Shah's increasingly autocratic rule. One ex-
ample of the Shah's tendencies in this regard was his utilization of
SAVAK - the internal security and intelligence service - which con-
ducted operations against political dissidents utilizing summary execu-
tion, disappearance, torture and other human rights violations. 50 Mass
demonstrations against the Shah's regime occurred throughout Iran,
and strikes became more widespread and frequent.5 1 The Shah fled Iran
on January 16, 1979 as confrontations between his supporters and
demonstrators became more violent.52 On February 10, 1979, Shapur
Bakhtiar, the Shah's last prime minister, declared martial law in an at-
tempt to maintain order until a provisional government could be
42. IRAN: STATE DEP'T NOTES, supra note 40, at 3. Reza Shah Pahlavi was forced to
abdicate by the British military force occupying Iran due to his refusal to permit the Al-
lies to supply the Soviet Union through his country. See Iran's History, supra note 40, at
9. Reza Shah Pahlavi died in exile in South Africa in 1944. Id.
43. IRAN: STATE DEP'T NOTES, supra note 40, at 3. See also Iran's History, supra note
40, at 10.
44. Under Mossadeq's leadership as prime minister, the Iranian government expro-
priated the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and formed the National Iranian Oil Company
[hereinafter NIOC] to operate the industry. See The Oil and Gas Industry in Iran (vis-
ited Sept. 12, 1998) <http://www.salamiran.orgtIranInfo/State/Government/Energy/ in-
dex.html>.
45. IRAN: STATE DEP'T NOTES, supra note 40, at 3.
46. See id.
47. JAMES T. PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS 284 (1996).
48. See id. at 284-85.
49. See id.
50. IRAN: STATE DEP'T NOTES, supra note 40, at 3.
51. Iran's History, supra note 40, at 10.
52. See id. The Shah subsequently went into exile in Panama, and later Egypt where
he died in July 1980. See Key Dates in Iran's History and Dealings With the United
States, Assoc. PRESS, Feb. 9, 1998, available in 1998 WL 6641041.
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formed.5 3 However, Bakhtiar's attempt failed in the rising tide of Is-
lamic fervor which swept the country upon the return of its spiritual
leader, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.
On February 1, 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran from
exile in France. 54 Khomeini's opposition to the Shah's regime had re-
sulted in his arrest in June 1963 and exile in April 1964. 55 While in ex-
ile in Turkey, Iraq and France, Khomeini continued to actively oppose
the Shah's regime and developed the principles of Islamic governance
which were to sweep Iran upon the Shah's abdication.5 6 Upon his re-
turn, Khomeini quickly assumed leadership of the revolutionary move-
ment and replaced the Bakhtiar regime with a new theocratic republic
guided by Islamic principles.57 A new constitution enshrining the prin-
ciples of Islamic governance was approved in a general referendum in
December 1979,58 and Khomeini assumed the role of national religious
leader and titular head of state. 59 The president of the Islamic republic,
Ayatollah Sayyed Ali Khamenei, succeeded Khomeini as national relig-
ious leader upon Khomeini's death on June 3, 1989.60 The speaker of
the national assembly, Ali Akbar-Hashemi Rafsanjani, was elected to
the presidency in August 1989 to replace the outgoing Khamenei. 61 Raf-
sanjani was subsequently re-elected in June 1993.62
The December 1979 constitution defines Iran's political, economic
and social order. The constitution declares Shi'a Islam of the Twelver
Ja'fari sect as Iran's official religion.63 Governance in Iran is based upon
"[d]ivine revelation and its fundamental role in setting forth the laws."64
As a result, all laws, regulations and constitutional interpretations
must be based upon Islamic criteria. 65 These criteria include the elimi-
nation of imperialism and prevention of foreign influence in Iran66 as
well as the political, economic and cultural unification of all Moslems in
a single nation. 67
Political power in post-revolutionary Iran is divided amongst four
branches of government. The highest authority is the leader who exer-
53. See Iran's History, supra note 40, at 11.
54. IRAN: STATE DEP'T NOTES, supra note 40, at 4.
55. Biography of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (visited Sept. 12, 1998)
<http://www.salamiran.orglIranInfo/StateALeadershipflmamlImamBiography.html>.
56. See id. at 2-3.
57. IRAN: STATE DEP'T NOTES, supra note 40, at 4.
58. Iran's History, supra note 40, at 11.
59. IRAN: STATE DEP'T NOTES, supra note 40, at 4.
60. See id.
61. See id. See also Iran's History, supra note 40, at 10.
62. IRAN: STATE DEP'T NOTES, supra note 40, at 4.
63. IRAN CONST. § 1, art. 12 (1992). Zoroastrianism, Judaism and Christianity are
the only other religions permitted to be practiced in Iran. Id. § 1, art. 13.
64. Id. § 1, art. 2(2).
65. See id. § 1, art. 4.
66. See id. §§ 1, art. 3(5) and 10, art. 152.
67. See id. § 2, art. 11.
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cises the combined supreme political and religious power.68 The position
of leader embodies the doctrine of vali-efaqih which provides that the
leader is God's vice-regent on Earth.69 The leader is selected by the As-
sembly of Experts whose members are selected by universal suffrage. 70
The leader is responsible for delineation of the general policies of the
country, appointment of the Guardian Council, the supreme judicial
authority, commanders of the armed forces, and resolution of disputes
between the other branches of government. 71 The leader is also the
commander-in-chief of the armed forces and retains control over foreign
policy and the interior and intelligence ministries.
72
After the leader, the president is the highest official in the coun-
try.73 The president is elected by universal suffrage to a four year term
and may be reelected once. 74 The president appoints and supervises the
Council of Ministers which acts as his cabinet and is responsible for na-
tional planning and budgetary matters.7 5 Additionally, the president
prepares and submits legislation to the legislative branch through the
Council of Ministers.7 6 The president is also empowered to execute trea-
ties and contracts on behalf of the Iranian government and is obliged to
sign legislation approved by the Islamic Consultative Assembly. 77
Legislative power is exercised through the Islamic Consultative As-
sembly.78 Members of the Assembly are elected to four year terms by
universal suffrage. 79 The Assembly is competent to establish laws on all
matters as long as such laws are not contrary to Islam or the constitu-
tion.8 0 Most legislation is submitted to the Assembly by the Council of
Ministers although bills sponsored by at least fifteen members may be
introduced independent of the Council.81 All legislation passed by the
Assembly must be submitted to the Guardian Council to ensure its
compatibility with Islamic teachings and the constitution.8 2 All legisla-
68. See id. §§ 5, art. 60, 8, art. 107 and 9.1, art. 113.
69. See id. § 1, art. 5.
70. See id. § 8, art. 107. The qualifications for selection as leader are scholarship, jus-
tice, piety and "adequate capability for leadership." Id. § 8, art. 109.
71. See id. § 8, arts. 110(2),(6) and (8).
72. See id. § 8, arts. 110(3) and (4).
73. See id. § 9.1, art. 113.
74. See id. § 9.1, art. 114. In order to be eligible for election, a presidential candidate
must possess Iranian origin and nationality, administrative capacity and resourcefulness,
a good past record of accomplishments, trustworthiness, piety and belief in the fundamen-
tal principles of Islamic governance as manifested in Iran. Id. § 9.1, art. 115.
75. See id. §§ 9.1, art. 126 and 9.2, arts. 133-34.
76. See id. § 6.2, art. 74.
77. See id. § 9.1, arts. 123 and 125.
78. See id. § 5, art. 58.
79. See id.
80. See id. § 6, arts. 71-72.
81. See id. § 6, art. 74.
82. See id. § 6.2, art. 94. The Guardian Council consists of twelve members. Six of
the Council members are lawyers selected by the Islamic Consultative Assembly from
nominations submitted by the head of the judicial branch. These members determine the
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tion approved by the Guardian Council is fully enforceable and must be
submitted to the president for signature.8 3 The Assembly also has the
right to investigate the affairs of the country and must approve all in-
ternational treaties, contracts and agreements. 84
Judicial authority is constitutionally vested in the Supreme Court,
the head of the judicial branch and the minister of justice.85 The Su-
preme Court's primary responsibility is supervision of the lower
courts.8 6 The chief judicial officer of the Supreme Court is nominated by
the head of the judicial branch for a period of five years in consultation
with the Court's judges.8 7 The head of the judicial branch is appointed
to a five year term by the leader and is responsible for the appointment
and dismissal of lower court judges.88 The Minister of Justice is selected
by the president from candidates proposed by the head of the judicial
branch.8 9 The Minister's primary responsibility is the coordination of
relations between the executive, legislative and judicial branches. 90 The
constitution guarantees the independence of the judiciary, due process,
the right to counsel, the presumption of innocence in criminal cases and
the right to a public trial before a jury.91 In any event, all judicial deci-
sions must conform with Islamic principles.92
The conflict created by the Iranian constitution between the offices
of national religious leader and president has resulted in considerable
political ferment. 93 Ayatollah Khamenei remains the national religious
leader. A former student of Khomeini and president under his regime,
Khamenei remains hostile to the United States and opposes to any re-
sumption of dialogue between the countries. In recent speeches,
Khamenei has castigated the United States for its "global arrogance 94
and accused it of seeking to destabilize the Iranian government at the
constitutionality of proposed legislation. The remaining six members of the Council are
religious scholars selected by the leader to consider the conformity of all proposed legisla-
tion to Islamic principles. Id. § 6.2, art. 91.
83. See id. §§ 6.2, art. 94 and 9.1, art. 123.
84. See id. § 6.1, arts. 76-77.
85. See id. § 11, arts. 157, 160 and 161.
86. See id. § 11, art. 161.
87. See id. § 11, art. 162.
88. See id. § 11, arts. 157-58.
89. See id. § 11, art. 160.
90. See id.
91. See id. §§ 3, arts. 32, 35 and 11, arts. 156, 165 and 168.
92. See id. § 5, art. 61.
93. See John Rossant, The Stakes are Huge as President Khatami Wages a Bitter Bat-
tle Against Hardline Mullahs for the Soul of Iran, BUS. WK., Dec. 8, 1997, at 16, available
in 1997 WL 14814621. See also Iran: Pro-Khatami Backers Clash with Vigilantes, Dow
JONES INT'L NEWS SERV., Mar. 2, 1998.
94. See Iran Opens Summit with a Vengeance: 'Poisonous Breath'of U.S. Threatens
Gulf Security and Islamic Values, Khamenei Charges, GLOBE & MAIL, Dec. 10, 1997, at
A15.
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behest of a "Zionist network" controlled by Israel. 95 According to
Khamenei, such measures have only served to strengthen Iranian re-
solve to actively oppose American policies in the Middle East.96 Khame-
nei is strongly supported by the speaker of the parliament, Ali Akbar
Nateq-Nouri, and the head of the judicial branch, Ayatollah Mohammad
Yazdi. 97 Khamenei also has strong support from most of Iran's major
institutions such as the military, the media, the intelligence community
and religious foundations which remain firmly under the control of re-
ligious conservatives. 98
However, the grip of religious conservatives upon the reins of power
in Iran have not gone unchallenged. In an unprecedented statement in
December 1997, former Khomeini ally Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri
openly questioned the legitimacy of Khamenei's role in the government
as national religious leader. 99 Of particular concern to Montazeri was
Khamenei's paramount role in governmental affairs in the absence of
popular election by the Iranian citizenry.100 Montazeri's statement led
to accusations of treason and a crackdown against his supporters by re-
ligious conservatives. 10 1
A greater threat to the conservative's grip upon power was the se-
lection of a religious moderate as president in Iran's recent elections.
Moderate cleric Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, the former Minister of
Culture and Islamic Guidance from 1982 until his ouster in 1992,102
swept to an overwhelming victory in Iran's May 23, 1997 presidential
election. Running on a platform of economic centralization and relaxa-
tion of the rigid Islamic social code,' 0 3 Khatami easily defeated three
95. See Afshin Valinejad, Hardline Cleric Says U.S. is Intent on Destabilizing Iran,
Assoc. PRESS, Jan. 2, 1998, available in 1998 WL 6635779. See also Afshin Valinejad,
Iran Cleric Opposes U.S. Ties: Ayatollah's Sermon Contrasts Sharply with Tone of Na-
tion's President, PEORIA J. STAR, Jan. 3, 1998, at A3, available in 1998 WL 5749472;
Iran's Khamenei Says U.S. Gov't Controlled by Zionists, Dow JONES INT'L NEWS SERV.,
Dec. 24, 1997.
96. See Khamenei Carps at Idea of Iran-U.S. Talks, FLA. TIMES UNION, Jan. 17, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 6180823
97. See Rossant, supra note 93, at 17.
98. Id.
99. See John Lancaster, Iranian Cleric Disputes Ayatollah's Right to Rule, WASH.
POST, Dec. 23, 1997, at A10. Montazeri served as deputy religious leader and Khomeini's
heir apparent until his resignation in 1989 in protest of the perceived despotic tendencies
of the regime. See Rossant, supra note 93, at 17.
100. See Lancaster, supra note 99, at A10.
101. See id. See also Iranian Leader Asserts His Authority to End Political Unrest,
AGENcE FR.-PRESSE, Nov. 27, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13442988.
102. Khatami is a hojatoleslam or middle-ranking cleric. Khatami was removed as
minister by conservative clerics in 1992 for lifting strict state controls on entertainment
such as the prohibition upon live concerts and women singing in public. See President-
Elect of Iran Not Your Typical Mullah, TAMPA TRIB., May 25, 1997, available in 1997 WL
10788898. See also John Daniszewski, Moderate Wins by a Landslide in Iran's Presiden-
tial Race, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, May 24, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4175518.
103. See Anwar Faruqi, Iran's Election Shaping Up as a Real Contest, ASSOC. PRESS,
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other candidates by capturing 20.7 million of the 29.7 million votes
cast. 104 Khatami's chief rival, Nateq-Nouri, running on a platform of
economic decentralization and strict enforcement of the Islamic social
code, 10 5 was able to garner 7.2 million votes. 10 6 The ease and size of
Khatami's victory constituted a shocking and firm rejection of the sti-
fling rule of the conservative clerics. 107
Khatami was inaugurated on August 3, 1997 and immediately be-
gan to steer a moderate course for the Iranian presidency. 108 Instructive
in this regard was his selection of candidates for his twenty-two person
cabinet. Included in the new president's selections was Kamal Kharrazi,
Iran's ambassador to the United Nations, as the new foreign minis-
ter. 109 Kharrazi was educated in the United States and was instrumen-
tal in securing the release of foreign hostages by pro-Iranian militias in
Lebanon in the early 1990s. 110 At the intelligence ministry, Khatami
replaced Ali Fallahian, who had been linked to anti-Western attacks,
Apr. 20, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4862793.
104. See John Lancaster, Iranians Voted for New Ideas, Not a New System, WASH.
POST, May 26, 1997, at Al. See also John Lancaster, Moderate Iranian Wins; Khatami
Swamps Hardliner, Captures Presidency, WASH. POST, May 25, 1997. Two-hundred
thirty-eight candidates registered to run for the presidency including nine women. See
Iran Selects 4 Candidates for Election, CHINA DAILY, May 9, 1997, available in 1997 WL
8259214. However, the Guardian Council certified only four candidates for inclusion on
the ballot as recognized statesmen committed to the Islamic principles underlying the
Iranian constitution. See Council Sets Guidelines for Iranian Presidential Candidates,
Assoc. PRESS, Apr. 28, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4863995. All women candidates were
eliminated as the Iranian constitution does not permit women to run for the presidency.
Id. Ninety percent of the 33 million eligible voters cast ballots in the general election.
See Anwar Faruqi, Moderate Cleric Wins Iranian Presidency: The New President's Sup-
porters Hope He Can Restrain the Conservative Faction Within the Clergy, Fr. WORTH
STAR TELEGRAM, May 25, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4843997. See also Khatami Prom-
ises More Democracy, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, May 25, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2121502..
Men and women over the age of fifteen years are eligible to vote in Iran. See Facts, Fig-
ures on Iran's Elections, ASSOC. PRESS, May 22, 1997, available in 1997 WL 486 7865.
105. See Faruqi, supra note 103.
106. See Faruqi, supra note 104. The other two candidates, former intelligence minis-
ter Mohammad Mohammadi Reyshahri and deputy head of the judiciary Syed Reza
Zavareie, garnered less than one million votes apiece. Id.
107. See Faruqi, supra note 104, at Al. See also Iran's Khatami Proclaims New Era
for Islamic Nation, ASSOC. PRESS, May 26, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4844415. Iranian
dissident Abdolkarim Soroush characterized Khatami's electoral victory as "a flood
[against clergy rule] that has been released after years of building up." Iran's Vote Sends
Unusual Message for Political Islam, ASSOC. PRESS, May 25, 1997, available in 1997 WL
2528506.
108. Iran Swears in New President, ASSoc. PRESS, Aug. 4, 1997, available in 1997 WL
2164293.
109. Iran Set to Debate Cabinet: Leader's Picks Draw Ire of Hard-Liners, BOSTON
GLOBE, Aug. 13, 1997, at A2, available in 1997 WL 6265411. See Iran's President Faces
Hard-liner Opposition, GLOBE & MAIL, Aug. 15, 1997, at A12.
110. Iran's President Faces Hard-liner Oppostion, supra note 109, at A12.
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with the less ideological Qorbanali Dorri Najafabadi."' Most controver-
sial of all, Khatami named Ayatollah Mohajerani as head of the Cul-
tural and Islamic Guidance Ministry. 112 Mohajerani ignited a firestorm
of criticism in 1991 when he called for the restoration of diplomatic re-
lations with the United States. 113
Under Khatami's leadership, Iran's dismal human rights record
has improved slightly. Khatami advocates equal rights for women 14
and has appointed women to the judiciary as well as his cabinet. 1 5
Khatami has also called for the loosening of strict governmental con-
trols on individual liberty including freedom of speech and the press.1 6
Khatami's election improved the United Nations' most recent assess-
ment of human rights in Iran which had noted slight improvements in
its report completed immediately before the presidential election. 117
Of perhaps greater concern to religious conservatives is Khatami's
proposed resumption of dialogue with the United States. At the eighth
summit of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, Khatami called
for understanding of western civilization which he characterized as the
preponderant culture of the late twentieth century. 1 8 Khatami also
111. Id.
112. Id. See Iranian President Loads Cabinet with Pragmatists, Moderates: Some U.S.
Experts See Chance for Warmer Relations, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1997, available in 1997
WL 2237614.
113. See Iran Set to Debate Cabinet: Leader's Picks Draw Ire of Hard-Liners, supra
note 109, at A2.
114. Iran Leader Backs Women's Rights, COM. APPEAL, Dec. 1, 1997, at A2, available
in 1997 WL 14521183. See President Backs Women, SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 1, 1997, at
A13, available in 1997 WL 15807433.
115. See Iran Appoints Women Judge, Its First Since '79, SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCE,
Dec. 26, 1997, at A10, available in 1997 WL 15960953. See also First Woman Appointed
to Iranian Cabinet, WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 1997, at A20. Appointed to the office of vice
president for environmental protection, Masoumeh Ebekar is the first woman to serve in
an Iranian cabinet position since the Islamic revolution.
116. See Faruqi, supra note 104, at Al. See also Carla Hall, Iranians Are Going
Against the Old System, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1998, at B1, available in 1998 WL 2410998;
Iranians Go to Polls Today to Choose President: Race Pits Hard-line Cleric Against Mod-
erate, PATRIOT LEDGER, May 23, 1997, at 3, available in 1997 WL 8178738; Journalists
Criticize Senior Iranian Official in Rare Protest, ASSOC. PRESS, Jan. 5, 1998, available in
1998 WL 6636160; President Backs Women, supra note 114, at A2.
117. See U.N. Commission Censures Iran, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Apr. 22, 1998, avail-
able in 1998 WL 2266925. Khatami's dedication to improving human rights protections
has earned him the title of "Ayatollah Gorbachev" amongst some Iranians. See John Lan-
caster, Khatami: Iran's 'Ayatollah Gorbachev" Election Winner Schooled in Islamic Revo-
lution, Western Culture, WASH. POST, May 25, 1997, at A29.
118. See John Lancaster, Iran's Top Leaders Differ on Relations with West; Clashing
Views Air as Islamic Summit Opens, WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 1997, at Al. By contrast, at
the same summit meeting, Khamenei characterized western civilization as "directing eve-
ryone toward materialism, while money, gluttony, and carnal desires are made the great-
est aspirations." Excerpts of Speeches by Khamenei, Khatami, ASSOC. PRESS, Dec. 9, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 4895959.
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called for "thoughtful dialogue" with the American people.119 Although
Khatami called only for dialogue amongst the American and Iranian
peoples rather than their governments, his remarks suggested that it
was a matter of when rather than if relations between the two govern-
ments would be restored. 120 The United States welcomed Khatami's
calls for dialogue although it preferred public discussions between
authorized governmental representatives.1 21 Additionally, the United
States called for positive action in support of Khatami's conciliatory
statements such as discontinuation of Iranian support for terrorism and
efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction as well as its opposition
to the Middle East peace process.122
President Khatami's overtures progressed further in televised re-
marks addressed to the American people on January 8, 1998. In an ex-
traordinary interview, Khatami "declared his solidarity with the 'es-
sence of American civilization"' 123 and expressed hope that Iran and the
United States could eliminate the causes of the estrangement existing
between the countries. 124 Furthermore, Khatami expressed regret for
the "unorthodox" seizure of American hostages in 1979 which stemmed
from excessive "revolutionary zeal" and American provocation.1 25 How-
ever, Khatami stopped short of calling for diplomatic dialogue and only
endorsed unofficial contacts between educators, writers, artists and
tourists.1 26 The Clinton Administration accepted Khatami's offer of un-
119. See John Lancaster, Khatami Seeks U.S. Dialogue; Iranian Leader Takes Concila-
tory Tone, Praises American People, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 1997, at Al. See also Anwar
Faruqi, Iranian President Calls for Dialogue with Americans, ASSOC. PRESS, Dec. 14,
1997, available in 1997 WL 4896721. By contrast, in his address to the summit, Khame-
nei characterized the United States as "the political designers of arrogance ... breathing
their poisonous breath to make our neighbors in the Persian Gulf fearful of Islamic Iran
which holds the banner of unity and brotherhood." Anthony Shadid, Despite Hope for
Moderation, Iran's Leader Blasts West, Israel, Assoc. PRESS, Dec. 9, 1997, available in
1997 WL 4895949. Khatami has not referred to the United States as "the Great Satan"
since he assumed office in August 1997. See Iran President Seeks U.S. Dialogue,
COLUMBIAN, Dec. 15, 1997, available in 1997 WL 16400146.
120. See Iranian Leader Opens Door, CHI. SUN TIMES, Jan. 8, 1998, available in 1998
WL 5560892.
121. See Lancaster, supra note 119, at Al. See also U.S. Warming to Dialogue,
SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 10, 1997, available in 1997 WL 1650638.
122. See Iran Gets Clinton's Attention: President Welcomes Call for Dialogue; Clinton
Would Welcome Talks with Iran, SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec. 16, 1997, at A1, available in 1997
WL 15241930. See also Iran Says Clinton Statement May Signal Change in U.S. Position,
ASSOC. PRESS, May 31, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2528985.
123. Iranian Leader Urges Exchanges with U.S.; Khatemi Expresses Regret for 1979
Hostage Taking, Suggests Negotiations, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 1998, at Al.
124. See Journalists Criticize Senior Iranian Official in Rare Protest, supra note 116.
125. See Iran's Leader Backs Closer Ties to U.S., ASSOC. PRESS, Jan. 8, 1998, available
in 1998 WL 6165601. See also Iran's New President Extends Olive Branch, SEATTLE POST
INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 4, 1997, at A2, available in 1997 WL 3203372.
126. See Iranian Leader Urges Exchanges with U.S., supra note 123, at Al; see also
Iran's Leader Backs Closer Ties to U.S., supra note 125; Iranian Leader Opens Door, su-
pra note 120, at A12. By contrast, Ayatollah Khamenei branded the United States as an
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official contacts 127 but also reiterated its call for government-to-
government dialogue.128 The United States also announced it would re-
view its visa process for Iranians as a means of encouraging further
dialogue between the countries. 129 Perhaps most importantly, Under-
Secretary of State Stuart Eizenstat announced the creation of a com-
mittee to review the Clinton Administration's sanctions policies on
Iran.130
Regardless of these recent hopeful developments, relations between
enemy of Iran and Islam. See Iranian Leaders Denounce U.S., Urge Closer Ties With
Europe, ASSOc. PRESS, Apr. 5, 1998, available in 1998 WL 6649257. See also John Lan-
caster, Head Iranian Cleric Rejects Talks with U.S., WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 1998, at A18;
Iran Sprititual Leader Condemns U.S., Rejects Dialogue, DOw JONES NEWS SERV., Jan.
16, 1998. Khamenei ruled out any resumption of dialogue with the United States. Id.
See also Ayatollah Rejects Proposal For Talks With U.S., ASSOC. PRESS, Jan. 17, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 4115665. Khamenei also defended the seizure of the American Em-
bassy and subsequent hostage crisis as necessary to eliminate American conspiracies to
defeat the Islamic revolution. See Iran Leader Condemns U.S., DOw JONES NEWS SERV.,
Jan. 16, 1998. Perhaps in response to pressure from conservative clerics, Khatami subse-
quently accused the United States of having "damaged [Iranian] freedom, independence,
interests and glory." U.S. Brushes Aside Critical Comments By Iran's President, DOw
JONES NEWS SERV., Jan. 20, 1998. The U.S. State Department chose to ignore these re-
marks and renewed its call for government-to-government dialogue. Id. For its part, For-
eign Minister Kharrazi stated that Khatami's remarks did not constitute a repudiation of
his previous positive statements and that Iran still seeks "relations [with the United
States] based on d6tente and mutual interests." Iranian Official Says Khatami Still
Wants Dtente with U.S., Dow JONES INT'L NEWS, Jan. 24, 1998. However, Kharrazi em-
phasized that the resumption of relations between the two countries is dependent upon
"positive deeds and a change of behavior by the United States." Iran Minister: "Positive
Deeds" Needed For U.S. Opening, Assoc. PRESS, Jan. 31, 1998, available in 1998 WL
6639595. See also Iranian Says the Ball is in U.S. Court, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 1998, at
A20.
127. See Thomas W. Lippman, More Signs of Thaw in Icy U.S.-Iran Relations, WASH.
POST, Mar. 27, 1998, at A28. See also Clinton Backs More Contact with Iranians, WASH.
POST, Jan. 30, 1998, at A28; Clinton Makes Holiday Overture to Iranian People, ASSOC.
PRESS, Jan. 29, 1998, available in 1998 WL 6639463; U.S., Iran Move Cautiously Toward
Better Relations, Dow JONES NEWS SERV., Mar. 27, 1998; With People-to-People Ex-
changes, U.S.-Iranian Ties Improving, ASSOC. PRESS, Mar. 25, 1998, available in 1998 WL
6647772.
128. See Ben Barber, Iranian Overture Is Met With Doubt, State Dept. Urges Govern-
ment Dialogue, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1998, at All. See also Mending Ties With U.S., Ira-
nian President Calls For Dialogue, ASsoc. PRESS, Jan. 7, 1998, available in 1998 WL
6179987; U.S. Looking for Deeds To Back Up Conciliatory Words from Iran, ASSOC.
PRESS, Jan. 8, 1998, available in 1998 WL 7374756.
129. See U.S. to Review Visa Process for Iranians, ASSOC. PRESS, Jan. 12, 1998, avail-
able in 1998 WL 2461535.
130. See David S. Cloud, U.S. Uncertain How To Respond to Khatami's Overture,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 10, 1998, available in 1998 WL 5224974. Citing the
moderate tone of President Khatami's remarks, the European Union called upon the
United States to abandon its unilateral sanctions policy with regard to Iran. See EU To
Press For Less Rigid U.S. Stance On Iran, ASSOC. PRESS, Jan. 12, 1998, available in 1998
WL 6637201.
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the United States and Iran have been confrontational since the Islamic
revolution. On November 4, 1979, Islamic militants occupied the U.S.
embassy in Tehran and held fifty-two Americans hostage until January
20, 1981.131 Ten days after the seizure of the Embassy, President
Jimmy Carter declared a national emergency with respect to Iran which
has been renewed every year since 1979.132 On April 7, 1980, the United
States broke diplomatic relations with Iran, and, on April 24, 1981, the
Swiss government assumed representation of U.S. interests in Iran. 133
Iranian interests in the United States are represented by the Pakistani
government.134
U.S.-Iranian relations have also been strained as a result of other
events. Iran remains on the list of countries which, according to the
United States, sponsor international terrorism. 135 Iran was first placed
on the list of state sponsors of international terrorism on January 19,
1984 after the Reagan administration determined the existence of Ira-
nian complicity in the October 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in
Beirut, Lebanon.136 Iran has also been implicated in the bombing of Pan
Am Flight 103 in December 1988,137 and the attacks upon the U.S. mili-
tary housing complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia in June 1996138 and
131. IRAN: STATE DEP'T NOTES, supra note 40, at 8.
132. See Exec. Order No. 12,170, 3 C.F.R. 457 (1980). See also H.R. REP. No. 104-
523(1), at 9 (1996).
133. See IRAN: STATE DEP'T NOTES, supra note 40, at 8-9.
134. See id. at 9.
135. See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, TERRORISM 1
(1996) (visited Oct. 18, 1998) <http://www.treas.gov/ofac/tl 1ter.pdf> [hereinafter
TERRORISM]. The list is complied pursuant to Section 2405(o) of the Export Administra-
tion Act of 1979. Section 2405(o) provides, in part, that "[tihe Secretary [of Commerce]
shall establish and maintain.., a list of any goods or technology subject to export con-
trols under this section, and the countries to which such controls apply." Export Admini-
stration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(o) (1998). The countries currently designated
as supporting international terrorism are Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan
and Syria. See TERRORISM, supra, at 1.
136. See H.R. REP. No. 104-523(I), at 9. Placement upon this list disqualified Iran
from receiving U.S. foreign aid, goods on the U.S. munitions list, Export-Import Bank
credits and U.S. support for foreign loans and required strict licensing requirements for
any U.S. exports of controlled goods or technology. See id. The bombing of the Marine
barracks resulted in the death of 298 members of the American/French multinational
force in Lebanon.
137. See Khomeini Ordered Bombing Over Lockerbie, Report Says,, supra note 17. Ac-
cording to the German magazine Der Spiegel, Abolghassem Mesbahi, the co-founder of the
Iranian intelligence service, informed the German Federal Criminal Police Office and the
Frankfurt prosecutor's office that Khomeini ordered the bombing as retaliation for the
downing of an Iranian passenger jet over the Strait of Hormuz by a U.S. warship in July
1988. See id. The explosion of Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland on December 21, 1988
killed all 259 people on board and 11 on the ground. See id.
138. See Suspects in Saudi Bombing Belong To Iran-Inspired Group, ASSOC. PRESS,
Nov. 2, 1996, available in 1996 WL 4447279. The alleged mastermind of the bombing,
Ahmed Ibrahim Ahmad Mughassil, is believed to have fled to Iran after the attack. See
Iran Denied Saturday It Was Harboring Bombing Suspect, ASSOC. PRESS, Mar. 29, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 4859695. Iran was directly implicated by Hani Abdel Rahim al-
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foreign tourists in Egypt in November 1997.139 Additionally, Iran is al-
leged to be the principal supplier of armaments, money and logistical
support to terrorist groups such as Hizballah, Hamas, the Palestinian
Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. 140
Iran is further believed to have supported attempts to destabilize the
governments of its Arab neighbors including a failed 1981 coup d'6tat in
Bahrain and the attempted assassination of Egyptian President Hosni
Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in June 1995.141 Finally, Iran has
been accused of attacks upon Iranian dissidents abroad including the
assassination of Iranian Kurdish leader Sadiq Sarafkindi in Berlin,
Sayegh who allegedly conducted surveillance on the target, drove the bomb to the housing
complex and assisted in the bombers' escape. See Pierre Thomas, Saudi Suspect May Co-
operate in Bomb Probe, WASH. POST, June 17, 1997, at A10. See also Canada To Deport
Suspect In Saudi Terror Blast, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 6, 1997, at A18, available in
1997 WL 3131680. However, despite initial optimism that responsibility for the bombing
could be quickly determined, as of the time of the preparation of this article, attribution of
the attack to Iran remains unresolved. See Saudis Still Stymie FBI, WASH. POST, May 1,
1997, at A26. Iran has denied any involvement in the attack. See Iranian Minister: U.S.
Can't 'Divide and Rule,'WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 1997, at C4. The June 25, 1996 bombing re-
sulted in the death of 19 U.S. military personnel. See Howard Schneider & Pierre Tho-
mas, Canada Ties Hezbollah to Saudi Attack, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 1997, at Al.
139. See Report: U.S. Envoy Says Iran Behind Luxor Massacre, ASSOC. PRESS, Dec. 24,
1997, available in 1997 WL 4898297. Edward Walker, the U.S. ambassador to Israel, ac-
cused Iran of responsibility for the November 17, 1997 attack which resulted in the death
of 58 tourists in Luxor, Egypt. Id.
140. See IRAN: STATE DEP'T NOTES, supra note 40, at 8. See also John Lancaster, Iran
Has Strong Links to Anti-West Terror, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 1996, at A28; Iranian Arms
Shipments to Allies Reported On Rise, SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 13, 1996, at A25, available
in 1996 WL 14032467. Iran claims only to provide humanitarian support to such groups.
See Iranian Minister: U.S. Can't 'Divide and Rule,' supra note 138, at C4. Iran also joined
in the statement issued at the conclusion of the eighth summit of the Organization of the
Islamic Conference in December 1997 condemning terrorism and denying asylum to sus-
pected terrorists. See Chetwynd, supra note 35. See also Conferees Lash Out At Terror-
ists Extremists, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Dec. 10, 1997, at 52A, available in 1997 WL
14975038. Khatami reiterated Iran's condemnation of terrorism in his address to the
American people on January 8, 1998. See Iran's Leader Backs Closer Ties to U.S, supra
note 125. See also Mending Ties With U.S. Iranian President Calls For Dialogues, supra
note 128. However, it bears noting that Iran excludes from its definition of terrorists
those groups "supporting peoples who fight for the liberation of their land" such as the
Palestinians. Iranian Leader Urges Exchanges with U.S.; Khatemi Expresses Regret for
1979 Hostage Taking, Suggests Negotiations, supra note 123, at Al. Additionally, the
U.S. Department of State identified Iran as the most active state sponsor of terrorism in
the world in its annual report on international terrorism in 1997. See Stanley Meisler,
Iran Top Terrorist Nation, U.S. Says, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 1, 1998, at A17, available in
1998 WL 8820737. Nevertheless, Iran's statements condemning acts of international ter-
rorism led Central Intelligence Agency Director George J. Tenet to recently conclude that
the Khatami administration is "sincerely lobbying for an end to government support of
terrorism." R. Jeffrey Smith, Khatami Wants to End Terrorism, Officials Say, WASH.
POST, May 5, 1998, at A9.
141. See IRAN: STATE DEP'T NOTES, supra note 40, at 8. See also Lancaster, supra note
140, at A28.
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Germany in September 1992.142
Relations have also been strained as a result of Iranian attempts to
acquire weapons of mass destruction. Iran is alleged to be actively pur-
suing development of nuclear weapons primarily with equipment and
technology supplied by the Peoples' Republic of China. 14 3 Iran's first nu-
clear power plant, located in Bushehr in southern Iran and constructed
with Russian assistance, is nearing completion. 144 Iran is also alleged to
have purchased chemical weapons technology and materials from
China. 145 Finally, Iran has purchased billions of dollars of conventional
142. See Iranian Students Clash with Troops, ASSOc. PRESS, Apr. 14, 1997, available
in 1997 WL 6519887. The U.S. State Department estimates that Iran is responsible for
more than fifty murders of political dissidents overseas since 1979. See State Department
Again Lists Iran as Chief Terrorism Sponsor, WASH. POST, May 1, 1997, at A26. A Ger-
man court convicted four men of the assassination of Sarafkindi and specifically found
that the Iranian leadership ordered the murder. See Court Says Iran's Leaders Ordered
Killings, Assoc. PRESS, Apr. 10, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4861347. See also German
Court: Tehran Ordered Exile Killings, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 1997, at Al.
143. See Edward J. Markey, et al., China and Nuclear Trafficking, WASH. POST, Oct.
29, 1997, at A23. See also Leaders Reach Accord To Clear U.S. Reactors Sales, Assoc.
PRESS, Oct. 29, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2558503. Chinese President Jiang Zemin
pledged to terminate assistance to Iran's nuclear program in October 1997. See R. Jeffrey
Smith, China's Pledge to End Iran Nuclear Aid Yields US. Help, WASH. POST, Oct. 30,
1997, at A15. See also China Ready to End NuHelp for Iran, ASSOc. PRESS, Oct. 25, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 7129734. Iran also reportedly attempted to purchase nuclear tech-
nology from South Africa and Kazakhstan. See Report: Iran Trying to Buy South African
Nuclear Technology, ASSOC. PRESS, Nov. 24, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4893813. See
also Pentagon: Iran Has No Soviet Nukes, ASSOc. PRESS, Apr. 9, 1998, available in 1998
WL 7184550; Pentagon: No Evidence To Support Report Iran Got Soviet Nukes, ASSOC.
PRESS, Apr. 9, 1998, available in 1997 WL 6650352; Report: Iran Has Nuclear Warheads,
Assoc. PRESS, Apr. 9, 1998.
144. See Iran to Begin Operating First Nuclear Power Plant, ASSOc. PRESS, July 7,
1997, available in 1997 WL 4873948. See also Ukraine Vows Not to Sell Turbines For
Iranian Reactor, ASSOC. PRESS, Apr. 15, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4862194. The con-
tract for the construction of the nuclear power plant is estimated to be worth $800 million
to Russia. See Iran May Purchase Russia Missles, ASSOc. PRESS, Feb. 25, 1998, available
in 1997 WL 8151007. See also Ukraine Bows to U.S. Pressure, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 1998,
at A. 15. The United States opposed construction of the plant, maintaining that training
and technology supplied for it could be used to build nuclear weapons. Iran to Begin Op-
erating First Nuclear Power Plant, supra. See also U.S. Still Opposed To Russian Role In
Iran Project, ASSOC. PRESS, Feb. 23, 1998, available in 1997 WL 6642670; U.S. Wins
Ukrainian Pledge On Nuclear Export Controls, Dow JONES NEWS SERV., Mar. 6, 1998.
Iran has denied allegations that is developing nuclear weapons, pointing to its status as a
signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. See Iranian Leader Urges Exchanges
with U.S., supra note 123, at Al. See also Murphy, supra note 1, at Cl.; U.S. Can't 'Di-
vide and Rule,' supra note 138, at C4. However, John Holum, the director of the U.S.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, has estimated that Iran will be able to deploy
nuclear weapons by 2007. See Iran Running Into Difficulties In Push For Nuclear Capa-
bility, ASSOC. PRESS, May 4, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4864763.
145. See Thomas W. Lippman, U.S. Imposes Sanctions On China Firms, WASH. POST,
May 23, 1997, at Al. See also U.S. To Punish Chinese For Chemical Weapons Shipments
to Iran, ASSOc. PRESS, May 22, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4867904. Iran has denied
that it is attempting to produce chemical weapons and has ratified the Chemical Weapons
Convention. See Iran Signs Pact On Nerve Gas, ASSOC. PRESS, Nov. 10, 1997, available in
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weapons including anti-ship cruise missiles from China' 46 and missiles,
missile technology, tanks, helicopters and submarines from Russia. 147
Finally, Iran's hostility to the Middle East peace process has
thwarted improvement in its relations with the United States. At the
recent summit of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, Khamenei
derided the Middle East peace process as "unjust, arrogant, contemptu-
ous and illogical."'148 These sentiments were echoed by Foreign Minister
Kharrazi who condemned the peace process for its purported failure to
adequately address issues concerning Palestinian self-determination,
repatriation of refugees and liberation of occupied territories. 149 How-
ever, Khatami recently indicated that, although he believes that peace
in the Middle East is not attainable without adequately addressing the
rights and aspirations of the Palestinians, Iran would not interfere in
the peace process and would "leave the Palestinians to decide their
fate.' 150 U.S. foreign policy analysts have chosen to focus on Khatami's
1997 WL 8406504.
146. See Thomas W. Lippman, U.S. Confirms China Missile Sale to Iran, WASH. POST,
May 31, 1997, at A15. Chinese President Jiang Zemin pledged to discontinue sales of
such missiles to Iran in October 1997. See China Promises To Halt Missile Sales To Iran,
Assoc. PRESS., Oct. 18, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2556113. China reaffirmed this
pledge in January 1998. See Cohen Says China Hardens Promise To End Missile Sales To
Iran, ASSOc. PRESS, Jan. 20, 1998, available in 1997 WL 6637990. See also Cohen Warns
China On Iranian Threat to Gulf Shipping, ASSOc. PRESS, Jan. 19, 1998, available in
1997 WL 7377515.
147. Russia reportedly sold Iran the technology necessary to produce SS-4 missiles
which have a range of 1250 miles and carry a standard warhead equivalent to 3000
pounds of dynamite. See Russia Government Aids Iran In Missile Manufacture, Dow
JONES TELERATE ENERGY SERV., Aug. 25, 1997. See also Moscow Has Received A Diplo-
matic Warning, ASSOC. PRESS, Feb. 12, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2499834. Russia also
reportedly transferred technology to Iran to permit it to develop a smaller liquid-fuel mis-
sile with a range of eight hundred miles and a payload of 1550 pounds. See Iran Said to
be Building Missile, ASSOC. PRESS, Jan. 7, 1998, available in 1997 WL 6636433. See also
Russia Helping Iran Get Missile To Hit Israel, DOW JONES NEWS SERV., Sept. 21, 1997;
Russia Security Service: Iran Failed To Get Missile Know-How, DOw JONES NEWS SERV.,
Oct. 2, 1997. Russia agreed to restrict the transfer of ballistic missile technology to Iran
in January 1998. See U.S. Keeps After Russia To Halt Flow Of Missile Technology to Iran,
WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 1998, at A9. See also U.S., Russia to Step Up Efforts Against Iran
Missile Program, Dow JONES COMMODITIES SERV., Jan. 17, 1998. Iran has also pur-
chased three submarines, tanks, helicopters and hundreds of anti-aircraft missiles from
Russia in recent years. See Russia Arms Merchants Selling Missiles To Iran, ASSOC.
PRESS, Apr. 16, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2517553.
148. Lancaster, supra note 118, at Al. See also Anton LaGuardia, Iran Shows Deep
Splits over the West at Islamic Summit, DAILY TELEGRAPH (LONDON), Dec. 10, 1997, at 13,
available in 1997 WL 2357745.
149. See Iranian Minister: U.S. Can't 'Divide and Rule,' supra note 138, at C4.
150. Iran Pres.-Elect Policy Change, 'No Sign Of U.S. Change,' Dow JONES NEWS
SERV., May 27, 1997. See also Iranian President Takes Plea For Rapprochement To
American Public, ASSOC. PRESS, Jan. 7, 1998, available in 1997 WL 6636549; Iran's
Leader Backs Closer Ties to U.S, supra note 125; Mending Ties With U.S., Iranian Presi-
dent Calls For Dialogue, supra note 128.
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
conciliatory remarks rather than Khamenei's inflammatory statements
and have characterized such remarks as "a nuanced change in a posi-
tive direction."1 51
In response to these events and perceived Iranian intransigence,
the United States imposed numerous economic sanctions upon Iran
prior to the enactment of ILSA. As previously noted, President Jimmy
Carter declared a national emergency with respect to Iran pursuant to
IEEPA on November 14, 1979.152 As a result of President Carter's Or-
der, approximately $12 billion in Iranian government bank deposits,
gold and other properties in the United States were blocked, including
$5.6 billion in deposits and securities held by overseas branches of U.S.
banks. 153 The assets freeze was subsequently expanded to a full trade
embargo, which remained in effect until the signing of the Algiers Ac-
cords on January 19, 1981.154 Pursuant to the Accords, most Iranian as-
sets in the United States were freed from future blockage, the trade
embargo was rescinded 155 and attachments that U.S. persons had se-
cured against Iranian assets in the United States were canceled in or-
der that said assets could be returned to Iran. 15 6 Claims of U.S. nation-
als against Iran or Iranian entities for products shipped or services
rendered prior to the imposition of the embargo and for uncompensated
151. Washington Has Muted Praise For Iran Leader On Mideast Peace, Dow JONES
INT'L NEWS SERV., Dec. 17, 1997. The cited characterization of Khatami's remarks was
that of deputy State Department spokesman James Foley. See also U.S. Encouraged by
Iran's Overture, Assoc. PRESS, Feb. 2, 1998, available in 1997 WL 7382079.
152. See Exec. Order No. 12,170, supra note 132. Sections 1702(a)(1)(A) and (B) of
IEEPA provide as follows:
At the times and to the extent specified in section 1701 of this title [unusual
and extraordinary threats to the national security, foreign policy or economy
of the United States], the President may... investigate, regulate or prohibit
any transactions in foreign exchange, transfers of credit or payments be-
tween, by, through, or to any banking institution, to the extent that such
transfers or payments involve any interest of any foreign country or a na-
tional thereof, the importing or exporting of currency or securities; and in-
vestigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any
acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation,
importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or
privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which
any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest; by any person, or
with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(A)-(B) (1994).
153. See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, IRAN: WHAT
You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 3 (1998) (visited Oct. 18, 1998)
<http://www.treas.gov/ofac/tlliran.pdf> [hereinafter IRAN: WHAT You NEED TO KNOW].
154. See Exec. Order No. 12,205, 3 C.F.R. 248 (1981) as amended by Exec. Order No.
12,211, 3 C.F.R. 253 (1981).
155. See Exec. Order No. 12,282, 3 C.F.R. 113 (1982).
156. See Exec. Order No. 12,276, 3 C.F.R. 104 (1982). See also Exec. Order No. 12,277,
3 C.F.R. 105 (1982); Exec. Order No. 12,278, 3 C.F.R. 107 (1982); Exec. Order No. 12,279,
3 C.F.R. 109 (1982); Exec. Order No. 12,280, 3 C.F.R. 110 (1982); Exec. Order No. 12,281,
3 C.F.R. 112 (1982).
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expropriation of property within Iran were to be resolved in the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal established pursuant to the Accords.157
Economic sanctions upon Iran were re-imposed by the Reagan Ad-
ministration. As a result of Iran's continued sponsorship of terrorist
groups, on October 29, 1987, President Ronald Reagan issued Executive
Order 12,613 imposing an import embargo on Iranian-origin goods and
services. 158 This Order prohibited the importation of Iranian-origin
goods and services either directly or through third countries. 159 Fur-
thermore, U.S. persons were prohibited from providing financing for
prohibited import transactions 160 and engaging in any transactions re-
lated to goods or services of Iranian origin.161
Further economic sanctions were imposed by the Clinton Admini-
stration. In response to Conoco, Inc.'s execution of a $550 million con-
tract to develop Iran's offshore Sirri A and E oil and gas fields, Presi-
dent Clinton issued Executive Order 12,957 on March 15, 1995.162 This
Order declared a national emergency with respect to Iran pursuant to
IEEPA163 and prohibited the financing, management or supervision by
U.S. persons of the development of Iranian petroleum resources. 64
Conoco was thereby forced to abrogate its development contract with
Iran1 65
The Clinton Administration imposed tighter restrictions upon Iran
two months later after determining that Iran was persisting in its sup-
port of international terrorism and attempts to acquire weapons of
mass destruction and presented a threat to the continuation of the Mid-
dle East peace process. As a result, President Clinton issued Executive
157. See Exec. Order No. 12,283, 3 C.F.R. 114 (1982). See also Exec. Order No. 12,294,
3 C.F.R. 139 (1982). Thirty-four of the 3,952 cases filed with the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal remain pending as of the time of preparation of this article. See Iran-
Money Claims Against U.S. Still Unresolved, PERISCOPE-DAILY DEF. NEWS CAPSULES,
Apr. 20, 1998, available in 1998 WL 8152041.
158. See Exec. Order No. 12,613, 3 C.F.R. 256 (1988). See also Iranian Transactions
Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 560.101-807 (1997). The statutory basis for President Reagan's
Order was Section 505 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of
1985 which provides, in part, that "[tihe President may ban the importation into the
United States of any good or service from any country which supports terrorism or ter-
rorist organizations or harbors terrorists or terrorist organizations." International Secu-
rity and Development Cooperation Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2349aa-9(a) (1994).
159. See Exec. Order No. 12,613, supra note 158, § 1. See also Iranian Transactions
Regulations, supra note 158, § 560.201. Materials utilized in news publications and pe-
troleum products refined from Iranian crude oil in a third country were exempted from
the Order's import prohibition. See Exec. Order, supra note 158, § 2(a)-(b).
160. See Iranian Transactions Regulations, supra note 158, § 560.201.
161. See id. § 560.206.
162. See Exec. Order No. 12,957, supra note 19.
163. See IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. § 1703(c). See also IRAN: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW, supra
note 153, at 1.
164. See Exec. Order No. 12,957, supra note 19, § 1. See also Iranian Transactions
Regulations, supra note 158, §§ 560.206, 209(a)(1) and (b)(1).
165. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-523(1) at 9 (1996).
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Order 12,959 on May 6, 1995.166 This Order prohibited the export of
goods and services to Iran 167 as well as continuing the prohibition upon
the import of goods and services of Iranian origin. 168 U.S. persons, in-
cluding foreign branches of U.S. banks and trading companies, were
also prohibited from engaging in any transactions, including those in-
volving purchases, sales, transportation, financing or brokering, related
to goods or services of Iranian origin. 169 New investments by U.S. per-
sons in Iran or in property owned or controlled by the Government of
Iran were also prohibited. 170 Additionally, the Order prohibited U.S.
banks, including foreign branches, from servicing accounts of the Ira-
nian government, including banks owned or controlled by the govern-
ment or persons in Iran. 171 Finally, the Executive Order also closed the
166. See Exec. Order No. 12,959, 3 C.F.R. 356 (1995).
167. See id. § 1(b). See also Iranian Transactions Regulations, supra note 158, §
560.204. Excepted from this prohibition were feed grains, rice, wheat, cotton, peanuts,
tobacco, dairy products and oilseeds provided that the underlying contracts for their ex-
portation to Iran were in existence prior to May 7, 1995 and delivery occurred prior to
February 2, 1996. See Iranian Transactions Regulations, supra note 158, § 560.520(a)-(c).
Additionally, gifts valued at less than one hundred dollars, donations of articles intended
to alleviate human suffering and informational materials were excepted from the export
prohibition. See id. §§ 560. 506, 210(b), 210(c) and 523. Services provided by nonresident
U.S. persons outside of the United States were also excepted from the export ban. See id.
§ 560.410(d). However, services provided by a foreign branch of a U.S.-incorporated firm
were deemed to be exported from the corporation's home office in the United States. See
id. § 560.410(a)(3).
168. See Exec. Order No. 12,959, supra note 166, § l(a). See also Iranian Transactions
Regulations, supra note 158, § 560.201.
169. See Exec. Order No. 12,959, supra note 166, § l(f). See also Iranian Transactions
Regulations, supra note 158, § 560.206. These prohibitions also applied to transactions by
U.S. persons in locations outside of the United States with respect to goods or services
which the U.S. person knew, or had reason to know, were of Iranian origin or controlled
by the government of Iran. See Iranian Transactions Regulations, supra note 158, §
560.411(a)-(b). However, U.S. persons could engage in transactions in third countries
necessary to sell, store or maintain goods located in a third country which were legally
acquired by the U.S. person prior to the issuance of the Order on the condition that the
transactions did not result in an importation into the United States. See id. §
560.518(b)(1)-(2).
170. See Exec. Order No. 12,959, supra note 166, § 1(e). See also Iranian Transactions
Regulations, supra note 158, § 560.207. Included within this prohibition were commit-
ments of funds or other assets, loans and extensions of credit. See Iranian Transactions
Regulations, supra note 158, §§ 560.316 (a)-(b) and 560.317. Letters of credit and other
financing arrangements with respect to trade contracts in force and effect as of May 6,
1995 were excepted from this prohibition provided that the transactions contemplated
therein were completed prior to June 6, 1995. See id. § 560.210(e). However, standby let-
ters of credit which served as security for services rendered after June 6, 1995 could not
be renewed nor payment made after that date without the authorization of the Depart-
ment of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control. See id.
171. See Iranian Transactions Regulations, supra note 158, § 560.517(a). However,
U.S. banks were authorized to pay interest, deduct reasonable and customary service
charges and process transfers related to exempt transactions. See id. § 560.517(a)(1)-(2).
U.S. banks could also handle so-called "u-turn" transactions which were defined as trans-
actions to cover payments involving Iran that were by order of a third country bank for
payment to another third country bank provided they did not directly credit or debit an
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loophole by which foreign affiliates of U.S. oil companies purchased ap-
proximately twenty-five percent of Iran's oil exports for overseas
trade.172
Under the Shah's regime, Iran's economy rapidly industrialized and
experienced high rates of growth. 173 However, Iran's post-revolutionary
economy is under the strict control of the government. The Iranian Con-
stitution requires the creation and implementation of "a correct and just
economic system in accordance with Islamic criteria in order to create
welfare, eliminate poverty and abolish all forms of deprivation with re-
spect to food, housing, work, health care and the provision of social in-
surance."'17 4 In order to achieve these goals, the Iranian Constitution
creates private and cooperative economic sectors in the fields of agricul-
ture, small industry, trade and services. 175 Additionally, despite its rec-
ognition of private property rights, 76 the Constitution provides for state
ownership of all economic sectors deemed vital to state security. 77 As a
result, Iran annulled all pre-revolution contracts in the oil, gas and pet-
rochemicals industries and placed these industries under state supervi-
sion. 178 The Iranian government also nationalized the banking and in-
surance industries as well as all enterprises having more than one
thousand employees. 179
The Iranian economy which emerged from the revolution and the
eight year war with Iraq suffered from several serious problems. 180 De-
spite its high literacy rate, 8 1 the population is plagued by high levels of
Iranian account. See id. § 560.516(a)(1). U.S. banks were also permitted to handle non-
commercial family remittances involving Iran provided that the transfers were routed to
or from non-U.S. non-Iranian offshore banks. See id. § 560.516(a)(4).
172. See Exec. Order No. 12,959, supra note 166, § 5. See also Iranian Transactions
Regulations, supra note 158, at § 560.513.
173. See IRAN: STATE DEP'T NOTES, supra note 40, at 6.
174. IRAN CONST., § 1, art. 3.
175. See id. § 4, art. 44.
176. See id. § 4, art. 47.
177. See id. Included in these designated economic sectors are foreign trade, power
generation, radio, television, telegraph and telephone services and transportation. See id.
178. See Oil and Gas, at 1 (visited Sept. 20, 1998) <http://www.salamiran.org/iraninfo/
state/government/energy/oilgas/html>.
179. See Iran Economic Overview 1, (visited Sept. 20, 1998)
<http://www.salamiran.orgtiraninfo/economy/overview/html>.
180. See An Air of Optimism in Iran, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 1997, at Al. See also IRAN:
STATE DEP'T NOTES, supra note 40, at 6. The Iran-Iraq war commenced in September
1980 with Iraq's invasion of Iran and ended with the implementation of a cease-fire in
August 1988.
181. An estimated 79.3 percent of Iran's 62.4 million citizens are literate. See Iran's
Key Economic Indicators 1, (visited Sept. 20, 1998)
<http://www.salamiran.orgiraninfo/economy/trends/key.html>. See also U.S. ENERGY
INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, IRAN REPORT (April 1997)
<http://www.eia.doe.gov/emu/cabs/iran.html> (on file with author) [hereinafter IRAN: EIA
REPORT].
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unemployment estimated at thirty to forty percent.18 2 Estimates re-
garding the rate of inflation range from twenty-four percent to thirty-
five percent. 8 3 These deficiencies, when combined with the weakened
state of the economy, have resulted in more than twenty billion dollars
of external foreign debt. 8 4
Iran's largest economic sector and source of foreign revenue are the
oil, gas and petrochemicals industries. Iran is the second largest oil
producer in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
and accounts for approximately five percent of global oil output.18 5
Iran's oil reserves account for nine percent of global reserves 86 and are
the third largest in the world. 8 7 Although production of oil is less than
seventy percent of its former total during the Shah's regime, 88 Iran still
produces 3.76 million barrels of oil per day, of which 3.65 million bar-
rels per day are crude oil.189 Iran's onshore fields produce approximately
3.2 million barrels per day' 90 while its offshore fields produce 550,000
182. See Peter W. Rodman, Dialogue with Iran?, WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 1997, at A13.
See also IRAN: STATE DEP'T NOTES, supra note 40, at 6.
183. See Khatami Promises More Democracy, supra note 104. See also Faruqi, supra
note 104. Recent estimates by the Iranian Government place the annual rate of inflation
at twenty-five percent. See Iran's Key Economic Indicators, supra note 181, at 1. How-
ever, the U.S. Energy Information Administration estimated the annual rate of inflation
to be 35.6 percent for fiscal year 1996. See IRAN: EIA REPORT, supra note 181, at 1.
184. Iran's total external foreign debt is estimated at $20.3 billion. See Iran: EIA Re-
port, supra note 181, at 1. In March 1998, the Iranian Central Bank placed Iran's foreign
debt at $16.8 billion. See Khatami: Iran Bracing For Lower Revenues From Tumbling Oil
Prices, ASSOC. PRESS, Mar. 15, 1998, available in 1998 WL 6645526. In late 1996, Iran
rescheduled ten billion dollars of this debt which eased its repayment schedule estimated
at in excess of four billion dollars annually. See id.
185. See IRAN: EIA REPORT, supra note 181, at 1 and 4. OPEC consists of Iran, Algeria,
Indonesia, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates
and Venezuela. See Iran Hopes to Hold Back Increase in OPEC Oil-Production Quota,
DOW JONES ONLINE NEWS, Nov. 27, 1997.
186. See IRAN: EIA REPORT, supra note 181, at 1, 4. Iran's proven oil reserves are 88
billion barrels. See id. Proven and possible reserves total 140 billion barrels. See id. at 4.
Most of Iran's reserves are located in onshore fields in the Khuzestan region and beneath
the Persian Gulf. See id.
187. See IRAN: STATE DEP'T NOTES, supra note 40, at 3.
188. See Diplomacy with Iran, WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 1997, at A16. Iran's crude oil pro-
duction capacity in the mid-1970s was in excess of 7 million barrels per day. See IRAN:
EIA REPORT, supra note 181, at 5.
189. See IRAN: EIA REPORT, supra note 181, at 5. Iran's OPEC crude oil production
quota for the first half of 1997 was 3.6 million barrels per day. Id. This quota was in-
creased to 3.942 million barrels per day for the first half of 1998. See OPEC Dec Output-3:
Table Of Output Estimates, DOW JONES ENERGY SERV., Jan. 9, 1998. Iran's present sus-
tainable production capacity is 3.9 million barrels per day. See IRAN: EIA REPORT, supra
note 181, at 5. The Iranian Government has forecast that crude oil production will grow
by 3.7 percent annually. See Oil and Gas, supra note 178, at 1. However, industry ob-
servers estimate Iran's sustainable production capacity will not be able to rise above four
million barrels per day. See IRAN: EIA REPORT, supra note 181, at 5. Current daily world
output of oil is 70 million barrels. See Greg Myre, Companies Scramble In New Rush For
Oil In Caspian Sea, ASSOC. PRESS, Oct. 13, 1997, available in 1997 WL 14397544.
190. See IRAN: EIA REPORT, supra note 181, at 5. Approximately 2 million barrels per
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barrels per day.19' Iran has the capacity of processing 1.2 million bar-
rels per day through its eight operational refineries.' 92 In addition, Iran
exports 2.6 million barrels of oil per day.' 93 Iranian oil export revenues
were approximately $18 billion in 1996' 94 which constituted eighty-one
percent of Iran's total export revenues.' 95
Iran's natural gas and petrochemicals industries are also worthy of
note. Exceeded only by Russia, Iran possesses an estimated 742 trillion
cubic feet of natural gas reserves, fifteen percent of the world's entire
reserves. 96 Iran produces approximately 2.8 trillion cubic feet of natu-
ral gas annually, 1.3 trillion cubic feet of which is marketed.' 97 Iran's
production of natural gas is expected to rise sharply in the near future
as additional reserves are discovered and the 328 trillion cubic foot
South Pars gas field is further developed. 198 Iran's petrochemicals in-
dustry is the second largest in the Middle East after Saudi Arabia.' 99
Iran's eleven petrochemical complexes have a capacity of ten million
tons per year with plans to expand to sixteen million tons by 2000 and
thirty million tons by 2020.200
Despite its internal difficulties and tightening U.S. sanctions,
Iran's economy showed improved performance in 1995 and 1996. Gross
domestic product for both years grew in excess of four percent annu-
ally.20 1 Additionally, Iran acquired $5 billion in credits and loans from
day of onshore production was exported by Iran in 1996. See id.
191. See id. at 6. Offshore production has grown considerably since 1989 when such
capacity was 202,000 barrels per day. See Oil and Gas, supra note 178, at 1. This rapid
increase is due, in part, to foreign investment which Iran permits in its offshore oil sector.
Iran's onshore oil sector remains closed to foreign investment. See IRAN: EIA REPORT,
supra note 181, at 6. Iran hopes to raise its offshore production to one million barrels per
day by 2000. See id.
192. See IRAN: EIA REPORT, supra note 181, at 8. Iran has imported refined products
since 1982. See id. However, the new Bandar Abbas refinery located near the Strait of
Hormuz is expected to generate annual refined product exports totaling $1.75 billion an-
nually in the near future. See id.
193. See id. at 1. The remaining 1.2 million barrels of daily production are consumed
domestically. See id. Iran's major crude oil customers in 1997 were Japan (35%), South
Korea (10%), the United Kingdom (10%), Turkey (3%), the Republic of China (3%), India
(2%), Brazil (2%), Thailand (1%), Malaysia (1%) and Pakistan (1%). See id.
194. See id. at 1-2.
195. See id. at 1-2.
196. See id. at 1, 9. See also Iran Says Gas Project Oppossed by U.S. Will Earn $45
Billion, Assoc. PRESS, Oct. 12, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4887770; U.S. Investigating
Iranian Gas Deal, supra note 30. NIOC estimates Iran's natural gas reserves at 900 tril-
lion cubic feet. See IRAN: EIA REPORT, supra note 181, at 9.
197. See IRAN: EIA REPORT, supra note 181, at 1, 9.
198. See id. at 9.
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. According to U.S. Government sources, Iran's gross domestic product grew an es-
timated 4.1 percent in 1996. See IRAN: EIA REPORT: supra note 181, at 1. However, the
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European countries that have been utilized to finance much-needed im-
provements to Iran's economic infrastructure. 202 Furthermore, U.S. ef-
forts to persuade its allies to economically isolate Iran met with failure.
U.S. allies did not join the trade and investment ban or abandon their
policy of constructive engagement through the maintenance of the so-
called "critical dialogue."20 3 Iranian trade with Europe, the Middle East
and Asia continued to flourish despite the imposition of U.S. sanc-
tions. 204 Of particular irritation to the United States was the growing
trade between Iran and members of the European Union. Thirty-three
percent of Iran's foreign trade is with Germany, Italy and France and
accounts for more than three billion dollars annually. 20 5 Increasing
trade and export revenues, especially in the oil, gas and petrochemical
industries, allowed Iran to post a trade surplus in excess of $8 billion in
1996.206 These developments led the U.S. Congress to conclude that the
existing sanctions regime failed to adequately isolate Iran from the
global economy and modify the behavior of U.S. allies.20 7
As a result of these perceived failures, ILSA was introduced in the
U.S. Senate as Senate Bill 1228 on September 8, 1995 and in the U.S.
House of Representatives as House Bill 3107 on March 19, 1996.208 As
Iranian Government claimed a six percent growth rate for 1996. See Iran's Key Economic
Indicators, supra note 181, at 1. Iran's gross domestic product for 1996 was an estimated
$710.4 billion. See IRAN: EIA REPORT, supra note 181, at 1.
202. See IRAN: EIA REPORT, supra note 181, at 2.
203. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-523(I) at 10 (1996). See also Robert Wierlaard, Ties Won't
Stop, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Apr. 29, 1997, available in 1997 WL 3936437. The European
Union's policy of "critical dialogue" is contrary to U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf which is
based upon the "dual containment" of Iran and Iraq through economic isolation and the
threat of military deterrence. See William Drozdiak, EU Nations' Envoys Going Back to
Iran; Vote Spurns U.S. Appeal For Firm Stand On Iran, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 1997, at
A15.
204. Iran's major trading partners are Germany, Italy, France, the United Kingdom,
the Netherlands, Spain, Japan and Turkey. See IRAN: EIA REPORT, supra note 181, at 1.
Iran's major export products are petroleum and related products, carpets (which account
for forty percent of non-oil export revenues) and pistachio nuts. See id. at 1-2. See also
Nora Boustany, EU Nut Ban Irks Iran, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 1997, at A31. Iran's major
imported products consist of machinery, military equipment, metals, foodstuffs, pharma-
ceuticals and technical services. See IRAN: EIA REPORT, supra note 181, at 1.
205. See Iran Ignoring U.S. Trade Sanctions, supra note 33. Germany is Iran's largest
Western trading partner with trade between the two countries valued at $1.8 billion. See
Drozdiak, supra note 203, at A15, available in 1997 WL 3670417. See also Wierlaard.,
supra note 203; Iraqis Wish Saddam A Happy Birthday..., WASH. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1997,
at A15. Germany is also one of Iran's leading creditors with loans totaling in excess of
$2.9 billion. See EU to Send Ambassadors Back to Iran, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 30, 1997, avail-
able in 1997 WL 3543986.
206. See IRAN: EIA REPORT, supra note 181, at 2.
207. See id. However, a NIOC executive admitted that U.S. sanctions have had a det-
rimental effect upon the Iranian economy especially in the area of foreign investment in
the oil and gas industries. See id. at 2.
208. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-523(1), at 13-14 (1996); see also supra text accompanying
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set forth above, the bills received little publicity until the June 25, 1996
bombing of the U.S. military housing complex in Dhahran, Saudi Ara-
bia and the July 17, 1996 explosion of Trans-World Airlines Flight 800
off the coast of Long Island, New York. 20 9 In the aftermath of these
events, the bill proceeded quickly through the U.S. Congress which re-
jected concerns regarding its extraterritorial reach and economic cost.2 10
The bill was approved by the Senate on July 16, 1996 and by the House
of Representatives on July 23, 1996.211 President Clinton signed ILSA
into law on August 5, 1996.212
As previously noted, international reaction to the adoption of ILSA
was universal, immediate and hostile. 213 Most of the opposition centered
around the provision requiring the President to impose economic sanc-
tions upon persons whose investments in Iran exceed $40 million in any
twelve month period and directly and significantly contribute to the en-
hancement of Iran's ability to develop its petroleum resources. Re-
sponses to ILSA included the issuance of condemnations and threats to
enact retaliatory legislation and initiate dispute resolution proceedings
pursuant to GATT.214
The reaction of private industry to ILSA was more divided. Some
private enterprises took notice of the Act's provisions and moved to
bring their policies into compliance. For example, in August 1996, Aus-
tralian industrial conglomerate Broken Hill withdrew from a $3 billion
pipeline project to transport Iranian natural gas to Pakistan and In-
dia.215 The Japanese construction firm JGC withdrew from onshore
natural gas projects in Iran.216 According to the U.S. State Department,
the threat of sanctions set forth in ILSA has discouraged foreign in-
vestment in eleven oil and gas projects in Iran.217 ILSA has also sharply
curtailed Iran's ability to obtain long-term capital to finance expansion
of its oil, gas and petrochemicals industries.218
note 4.
209. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
210. See H.R. REP. No. 104-523(), at 20-22. These concerns were expressed by Repre-
sentative Lee H. Hamilton (Democrat, Indiana) and James P. Moran (Democrat, Vir-
ginia). Despite the rejection of their concerns by Congress, Representatives Hamilton
and Moran voted in favor of ILSA. See id. at 22.
211. See H.R. REP. No. 104-523(I), at 11.
212. See Pianin, supra note 8, at A8.
213. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
214. See id.
215. See IRAN: EIA REPORT, supra note 181, at 3. See also U.S. Economic Offensive
Against Iran's Energy Industry is Bearing Fruit, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 1997, at A8.
216. See U.S. Economic Offensive Against Iran's Energy Industry is Bearing Fruit, su-
pra note 215, at AS.
217. See U.S. Won't Bar Pipeline Across Iran, WASH. POST, July 27, 1997, at Al.
218. See U.S. Economic Offensive Against Iran's Energy Industry is Bearing Fruit, su-
pra note 215, at AS. British Petroleum executive John Browne has stated that the threat
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Conversely, the vast majority of private enterprises chose to ignore
ILSA and risk the imposition of sanctions. Several European companies
registered their disapproval of ILSA by proceeding with investments in
Iran's petrochemicals industries. In May 1997, the British petroleum
firm Pell Frischmann, in conjunction with the Canadian petroleum firm
Bow Valley, was awarded a $140 million contract to develop Iran's
Balal oil field located in the Persian Gulf.219 On September 28, 1997,
Total SA of France announced the creation of an international consor-
tium with Russia's natural gas monopoly, Gazprom, 220 and Malaysia's
Petronas 221 to develop Iran's South Pars natural gas field. 222 The con-
sortium's total investment in the project is expected to exceed two bil-
lion dollars. 223 Total also entered into negotiations to develop Iranian oil
of U.S. sanctions has "definitely limited investments" in Iran. Id. Mohsen Yahyavi of the
Iranian parliament's oil committee has admitted that ILSA is partially responsible for
decreased foreign interest in Iran's oil and gas industries. See id.
219. The Iranian Oil Ministry awarded the development contract on May 10, 1997.
See U.S. Ponders Sanctions for Oil Deal in Iran, WASH. POST, May 14, 1997, at A9. Until
the imposition of U.S. sanctions, ARCO had been negotiating for the development rights
to the 120 million barrel Balal field. See IRAN: EIA REPORT, supra note 181, at 6.
220. Gazprom is the leading producer of natural gas in the world and is Russia's larg-
est company. See Russia's Gazprom Cancels Loan Deal Over Criticism Of Iran Venture,
DOW JONES NEWS SERV., Dec. 18, 1997. Gazprom produces twenty-five percent of the
world's natural gas and accounts for six to eight percent of Russia's gross domestic prod-
uct. See id. The Russian government maintains a forty percent stake in Gazprom's own-
ership. See U.S. Investigating Iranian Gas Deal, supra note 30.
221. Petronas is Malaysia's national oil company. See Malaysian Company Says Work
In Iran Will Go Despite U.S. Protests, ASSOc. PRESS, Nov. 17, 1997, available in 1997 WL
4892905. Petronas' President Hassan Marican has characterized the sanctions set forth
in ILSA as an affront and interference in Petronas' internal affairs. See id.
222. See Harry Dunphy, U.S. Opposes Pipeline, ASSOc. PRESS, Oct. 23, 1997, available
in 1997 WL 4889311. See also Iran Gas Deal Defies U.S. Sanctions, PITT. POST-GAZETTE,
Sept. 30, 1997, at A4, available in 1997 WL 11849331; Iran Says Gas Project Opposed by
U.S. Will Earn $45 Billion, supra note 196. Iranian officials have estimated that the
South Pars field can produce as much as two billion cubic feet of natural gas and 75,000
barrels of liquefied gas worth $1.5 billion annually by 2002. See Iran's Oil Minister in
Moscow To Boost Ties, ASSOC. PRESS, Nov. 13, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4892439. See
also Iran Says Gas Project Oppossed by U.S. Will Earn $45 Billion, supra note 196. Iran's
deputy oil minister Hadi Nejad- Hosseinian has estimated that gas sales revenues will
exceed $45 billion over the life of the field. See id.
223. See Russia, Iran Sign Gas Project Pact, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 1997, at A27. Total
maintains a forty percent interest in the consortium while Gazprom and Petronas each
maintain a thirty percent ownership interest. See Iran Says Gas Project Oppossed by U.S.
Will Earn $45 Billion, supra note 196. The consortium has encountered some difficulty in
obtaining financing for the project. The French government has refused to provide official
credits to finance the project. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-523(I), at 10 (1996). However, some
financial assistance from the French government will undoubtedly be forthcoming
through its .9 percent ownership interest in Total. See U.S. Investigating Iranian Gas
Deal, supra note 30. Gazprom has also had difficulty in obtaining financing. In Novem-
ber 1997, Gazprom postponed a $3 billion bond offering designed to raise capital for its
Iranian ventures. See Russian Gas Deal With Iran Is Put On Hold, ST. LOUIS-DISPATCH,
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fields in partnership with NIOC.224 On October 1, 1997, another French
oil company, Elf Aquitaine, announced that it was negotiating with the
Iranian government for the acquisition of production rights to the
Doroud oil field located in the Persian Gulf.225 Additionally, in Novem-
ber 1997, Germany's Siemens Corporation was commissioned by the
Iranian government to study the feasibility of an oil pipeline between
Kazakhstan and Iran. 226
Several non-European firms also chose to ignore the threat of sanc-
tions pursuant to ILSA. On September 24, 1997, the Chinese National
Petroleum Company, the state oil company of the Peoples' Republic of
China, purchased a controlling interest in the second largest oil field in
the newly-independent Central Asian republic of Kazakhstan. 227
China's $9.5 billion bid proved more attractive to the government of Ka-
zakhstan than those submitted by American companies such as Amoco,
Unocal, Texaco and Exxon in part because China promised to construct
an oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to refineries in northern Iran.228 Addi-
tionally, Chinese oil officials have agreed to form a joint venture with
NIOC to explore offshore deposits in Iran and China and to upgrade
Chinese refineries in order to process more Iranian oil.229
Turkey also ignored ILSA's call for further isolation of Iran by
agreeing in August 1996 to purchase 140 billion cubic feet of Iranian
natural gas annually commencing in 1998.230 The agreement called for
Nov. 12, 1997, at A10, available in 1997 WL 3377730. Gazprom cited unfavorable market
conditions as the reason for the postponement. See id. However, the participation of U.S.
investment bank Goldman, Sachs as lead underwriter for the transaction which could in
turn trigger sanctions under ILSA may have played a role in the postponement. See id.
224. See Total Chairman Says He's Negotiating With Iraq And Iran, ASSOc. PRESS,
July 2, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4873315. The development contract presently under
negotiation has a purported value of $3.5 billion dollars. See id.
225. See Avoiding Brawl? U.S. And EU Cautious Over Gas Deal With Iran, ASSOC.
PRESS, Oct. 5, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4886567. See also Elf Aquitaine Exploring Oil
Deals With Iran And Iraq, ASSOC. PRESS, Oct. 1, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4886125.
The Doroud field currently produces 170,000 barrels of oil per day. See IRAN: EIA
REPORT, supra note 181, at 7. NIOC hopes to reinject natural gas into the field to in-
crease its recoverable reserves by 600 million barrels and raise daily oil output to 290,000
barrels per day. See id. The estimated cost of the project is $530 million. See id.
226. See David B. Ottaway & Dan Morgan, U.S. Backs Non-Iranian, 'Eurasian' Corri-
dor West for Caspian Sea Oil, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 1997, at A37.
227. See David B. Ottaway & Dan Morgan, China Pursues Ambitious Role in Oil Mar-
ket, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 1997, at Al.
228. See id. See also David B. Ottaway & Dan Morgan, Deal Tests U.S. Policy on Te-
hran, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 1997, at Al. The Chinese National Petroleum Company's bid
also included a promise to construct a $3.5 billion, 1800 mile pipeline from Kazakhstan to
China. See Ottaway & Morgan, supra note 227, at Al.
229. See Ottaway & Morgan, supra note 227, at Al.
230. See Thomas W. Lippman, U.S. Decries Turkey's Gas Deal with Tehran, WASH.
POST, Aug. 13, 1996, at Al. See also Iran Signs $20 Billion Gas Deal, ASSOc. PRESS, Aug.
12, 1996, available in 1996 WL 2175459.
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the joint construction of a 328 mile pipeline from Tabriz in western Iran
to Erzurum in eastern Turkey at a cost of $400 million to be divided
equally between the countries. 231 The total value of Turkish purchases
of Iranian gas throughout the twenty-two year term of the agreement is
estimated at $23 billion. 232 Turkey and Iran also signed numerous ac-
cords in December 1996 granting each other most favored nation trad-
ing status and promoting bilateral investment. 233 In addition, Iran and
Pakistan continued to discuss the construction of a gas pipeline from
the South Pars gas field in Iran to Karachi, 234 and construction com-
menced on a $135 million gas pipeline from Iran to Armenia.235
The resource-rich fledging republics of Central Asia also ignored
ILSA's prohibitions. 236 Kazakhstan concluded an agreement for crude
231. See Turkey To Receive Iranian Natural Gas In 1998, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Nov. 5,
1996, available in 1996 WL 1217302L Plans called for the pipeline to reach an ultimate
length of 680 miles to the Turkish coast at an additional cost of one billion dollars. See
Iran Signs $20 Billion Gas Deal, supra note 230. Botas, the state-owned Turkish oil com-
pany, opened the bidding process for construction of the pipeline in early 1997. See IRAN:
EIA REPORT, supra note 181, at 11.
232. See Lippman, supra note 230, at Al. Pursuant to the agreement, Iran was sched-
uled to begin shipping 105 billion cubic feet of natural gas a year through the pipeline by
1998 with deliveries rising to 350 billion cubic feet in 2005. See id. However, construc-
tion of the proposed pipeline had not yet commenced, and substantial obstacles remained
to the completion of the project as of the time of the preparation of this article. See Kelly
Couturier, Turkey Aims To Satisfy Its Fuel Needs, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 1997, at A17.
233. See Ignoring U.S., Turkey and Iran Sign Trade Accords, WASH. POST, Dec. 22,
1996, at A31.
234. See IRAN: EIA REPORT, supra note 181, at 11. Construction of the $3 billion, 1.6
billion cubic feet per day pipeline was proposed in an January 1995 agreement between
the countries dated January 1995. See id. However, a final agreement had not been ne-
gotiated at the time of the preparation of this article. See id.
235. See id. In mid-1995, Iran and Armenia signed a renewable fifteen year contract
whereby Iran agreed to supply 100 million cubic feet of natural gas per day to Armenia.
See id. Construction of the pipeline necessary to accomplish these deliveries is underway,
and shipments of gas are expected to commence in 1999. See id.
236. The oil and gas deposits located in the newly-independent republics of Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan rival those of the Middle East. Current in-
dustry estimates place oil reserves in the region at 200 billion barrels worth $4 trillion at
current market prices. See Myre, supra note 189. The Persian Gulf contains approxi-
mately 670 billion barrels of oil. See id. Bordering the western shore of the oil-rich Cas-
pian Sea and possessing the enormous Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli oil field, Azerbaijan has
proven crude oil reserves of 3 billion barrels with estimates of ultimate reserves as high
as 40 billion barrels. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, AZERBAIJAN:
ECONOMIC AND TRADE OVERVIEW 2 (visited Oct. 13, 1998)
<http://www.itaiep.doc.gov/bisnis/country/azecon.html>. Bordering the northern and
eastern shores of the Caspian Sea and possessing the lucrative Tenghiz oil field, Ka-
zakhstan produced 27 million tons of crude oil in 1997. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
COUNTRY COMMERCIAL GUIDE: KAZAKHSTAN 1 (visited Oct. 13, 1998)
<http://www.itaiep.doc.gov/bisnis/country/kzccg.html>. Turkmenistan also borders the
eastern shore of the Caspian Sea and possesses the fourth largest natural gas reserves in
the world estimated at 98 to 155 trillion cubic feet, 1.2 trillion cubic feet of which was
produced in 1996. See U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION: TURKMENISTAN
REPORT 3, 5 (visited Oct. 13, 1998) <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/turkmen.html>.
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oil exchanges with Iran in May 1996.237 In May 1997, Turkmenistan
signed an agreement to sell three billion cubic feet per day of natural
gas to Turkey. 238 Gas will be transported through a two thousand mile
long pipeline between the two countries including a 788 mile section
through northern Iran.239 The pipeline will be constructed at a cost of
$1.6 billion.240 The initial 125 mile segment carrying natural gas from
Korpedzhe, Turkmenistan to Kord Kuy in northeastern Iran was acti-
vated on December 29, 1997.241 Future expansion of the pipeline to
Europe is anticipated in the next several years.242
Faced with international furor and confusion, the Clinton admini-
stration investigated several of these transactions in order to determine
their compliance with ILSA. However, despite promises to "fully and
completely" enforce ILSA, the Clinton administration has failed to im-
pose sanctions upon a single foreign firm maintaining or proposing in-
vestments in Iran.243 The United States failed to sanction Pell
Frischmann or Bow Valley for their contract with NIOC to develop the
Turkmenistan also possesses 1.5 billion barrels of proven oil reserves with crude oil pro-
duction of 88,000 barrels per day. Id. Landlocked Uzbekistan is among the world's top
ten producers of natural gas and produced more than 8 million tons of crude oil in 1995.
See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, UZBEKISTAN: ECONOMIC OVERVIEW 3 (visited Oct. 13, 1998)
<http://www.itaiep.doc.gov/bisnis/country/uzecon.html>.
237. See Kazakhstan Starts Shipping Oil Through Iran, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Jan. 18,
1997, available in 1997 WL 2042671. See also IRAN: EIA REPORT, supra note 181, at 4.
Under the ten year term of the agreement, Kazakhstan agreed to ship oil by tanker to
Iranian refineries on the coast of the Caspian Sea in exchange for the option of lifting ei-
ther Iranian light or heavy blend crude oil at Iran's Kharg Island facility in the Persian
Gulf. Shipments were to total two million to six million tons annually. See Report Says
Kazakhstan, Iran Temporarily Cease Oil Swap, DOW JONES ONLINE NEWS, Oct. 22, 1997.
However, the agreement was suspended by Iran in October 1997 due to concerns about
the quality of the oil received by Iran from Kazakhstan. See id.
238. See U.S. Won't Bar Pipeline Across Iran, supra note 217, at Al.
239. See id. The transaction involves a "gas swap" whereby Turkmenistan would
pump gas into Iran, and Iran would send an equal amount of Iranian gas to Turkey. Id.
Iran would reap transit fees for allowing gas to flow through its territory. Id.
240. Id. See also Clinton Won't Oppose Pipeline Through Iran, ASSOC. PRESS, July 27,
1997, available in 1997 WL 3504218.
241. See Alexander Vershinin, Iran-Turkmenistan Gas Line Opens 125 Mile Line,
ASSoc. PRESS, Dec. 30, 1997, available in 1997 WL 14978140. The $200 million cost of
the initial 125 mile segment was financed by NIOC (80%) and the Turkmen government
(20%). See IRAN: EIA REPORT, supra note 181, at 11.
242. See Turkmenistan, Iran and Turkey Reach Caspian Gas Agreements, ASSOC.
PRESS, Dec. 28, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4898580. Iran, Turkey and Turkmenistan
executed an agreement providing for the extension of the pipeline to Europe on December
28, 1997. See id. The leading candidate to construct the pipeline is a consortium com-
prised of Italy's Snamprogetti, Gas de France and the British-Dutch energy conglomerate
Royal Dutch Shell. See U.S. Won't Bar Pipeline Across Iran, supra note 217, at Al.
243. See Iran-France Pact Viewed as Affront to U.S. Sanctions, ASSOC. PRESS, Oct. 6,
1997, available in 1997 WL 2485305.
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Balal oil field.244 After receiving threats of retaliation from the Euro-
pean Union,245 President Clinton elected not to impose sanctions upon
Total for its participation in the consortium to develop Iran's South
Pars natural gas field. 246 The United States also failed to sanction Gaz-
prom for its role in the South Pars consortium after receiving protests
from the Russian government 247 and Gazprom's cancellation of a No-
vember 1994 agreement with the Export-Import Bank that guaranteed
$750 million in financing for purchases of equipment and services from
American companies.248 Additionally, after condemning Turkey's
agreement to purchase Iranian natural gas,249 the United States re-
fused to sanction the proposed alternate Turkmenistan-Turkey pipeline
route through Iran on the bases that the agreement predated the en-
actment of ILSA,250 the project did not facilitate Iranian gas produc-
tion 25 1 and Iran was paying for the portion of the pipeline passing
through its territory. 252 Rather, the Clinton administration praised the
project as delivering "Central Asian energy resources to the market in a
way that minimizes assistance to Iran."253 The Clinton Administration
subsequently condemned the project based upon the benefits that the
pipeline could confer on Iran.254 However, the Administration again re-
244. See U.S. Ponders Sanctions for Oil Deal in Iran, supra note 219, at A9.
245. See Casert, supra note 33. Sir Leon Brittan, the European Union's foreign trade
minister, stated that Total was "fully entitled" to enter into the agreement, and any inter-
ference by the United States would "set in motion a chain of events which could seriously
damage the wider relationship." Casert, supra note 32. The French government con-
demned the purported extraterritorial reach of ILSA and issued a statement that applica-
tion of the law to Total "would have serious consequences on international trade." France
Cautions U.S. Against Sanctions Over Natural Gas Deal With Iran, ASSOC. PRESS, Sept.
29, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4885627.
246. See Dan Balz, U.S. Eases Stand on Cuba, Iran Sanctions; Helms Condemns,
Europe Hails Move, WASH. POST, May 19, 1998, at A15. The Clinton Administration
elected to exert more pressure on the European Union to condemn Iranian acts of terror-
ism. See U.S. Not Eager to Enforce Sanctions Over Iran Gas Deal, ASSOC. PRESS, Oct. 3,
1997, available in 1997 WL 4886537. U.S. State Department spokesman James Rubin
rationalized this decision by stating that "[t]he objective of the legislation is not to impose
sanctions ... [but rather] to get other countries, in Europe in particular, to work with us
on the subject of tightening up the pressure on Iran." Thomas W. Lippman, U.S. Defers
Sanctions on Iran Gas Deal, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 1997, at Al.
247. See Iran's Oil Minister in Moscow To Boost Ties, supra note 222. Boris Nemtsov,
Russia's first deputy prime minister, stated that the Russian government would fully
support Gazprom's participation in the South Pars consortium. See id.
248. See Russia's Gazprom Cancels Loan Deal Over Criticism Of Iran Venture, supra
note 220.
249. See Lippman, supra note 230, at Al.
250. See U.S. Closely Watches Plan For Natural Gas Pipeline Through Iran, AGENCE
FR.-PRESSE, Dec. 29, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13462550.
251. See Ottaway & Morgan, supra note 228, at Al.
252. See Thomas W. Lippman, New Iran Leader Provides Opportunity for Change; But
Khatami Indicates No Muting of Hostility, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 1997, at A23.
253. See Clinton Won't Oppose Pipeline Through Iran, supra note 240.
254. See U.S. Affirms Opposition to Energy Pipelines Crossing Iran, Dow JONES INT'L
NEWS, Jan. 19, 1998.
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fused to sanction any of the parties to the project. Additionally, the
Clinton administration expressed support for a multi-billion dollar
pipeline stretching westward from Kazakhstan across the Caspian Sea
to Azerbaijan and Georgia. 255
Domestic reaction to the Clinton administration's failure to impose
sanctions pursuant to ILSA has been mixed. Several members of Con-
gress expressed disappointment and outrage at President Clinton's re-
luctance to impose sanctions. The chief Congressional critic was one of
ILSA's namesakes, Senator Alfonse M. D'Amato of New York. Senator
D'Amato condemned Turkey's contract to purchase natural gas from
Iran as clearly within ILSA's parameters and "a direct challenge to
[U.S.] policy of economically isolating Iran."256 Senator D'Amato also
criticized the Clinton Administration's refusal to sanction the Turk-
meni-Turkish pipeline agreement as "send[ing] a message of weakness
to Iran," and undermining U.S. efforts to persuade its European allies
to join the economic embargo on Iran.257 Additionally, Senator D'Amato
demanded the imposition of sanctions against Total for its investment
in the South Pars gas field stating that the Administration's failure to
take "decisive action... undercut long-standing policy against Iranian
terrorism" and opened the floodgates for foreign investment in Iran's oil
and gas industries. 258 The Clinton Administration was also condemned
as overly sensitive to the negative reaction of U.S. allies regarding
ILSA.259 Finally, the decisions not to vigorously implement ILSA were
further condemned as failing to force Iran and its leaders to "actually
pay a real economic price for their sponsorship of international terror-
ism." 260 According to the Clinton Administration's critics, the Khatami
administration in Tehran had not yet earned a reprieve from U.S. eco-
nomic sanctions. 261
255. See Ottaway & Morgan, supra note 226, at A37. See also Thomas W. Lippman,
Clinton Meets with Turkmen President, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 1998, at A14.
256. Lippman, supra note 230, at Al.
257. Lippman, supra note 252, at A23.
258. Thomas W. Lippman, U.S. Defers Sanctions on Iran Gas Deal, WASH. POST, Oct.
4, 1997, at Al. See also Sanctions On France, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 1997, at A24, charac-
terizing the failure to impose sanctions on Total as inviting "a painful blow to [U.S.] inter-
est and pride." See also John Lancaster, Tehran Reacts Coolly to Sanctions Waiver,
WASH. POST, May 20, 1998, at A19; Thomas W. Lippman, Senators Ask Sanctions Over
Iranian Gas Deal, WASH. POST, May 9, 1998, at A20; Thomas W. Lippman, U.S. Aides
Still Divided Over Sanctions on Foreign Investors in Iran, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 1998, at
A33.
259. See Stephen S. Rosenfeld, Bridging the Atlantic Divide, WASH. POST, Aug. 9,
1996, at A17. Rosenfeld concludes that "a little tension with the allies over something
extremely important where the United States has a strong position and has showed pa-
tience may not be such a bad thing after all .... [s]uch [tension] can be justified in the
face of a clear and politically uncluttered terrorist menace." Id. See also U.S. Aides Still
Divided Over Sanctions on Foreign Investors in Iran, supra note 258, at A33.
260. U.S. Ponders Sanctions for Oil Deal in Iran, supra note 219, at A9 (quoting Hil-
lary Mann, an analyst employed by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy).
261. See Peter W. Rodman, Why Ease Up on Iran?, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 1996, at A25.
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However, the Clinton administration's decision was not subject to
universal condemnation. Richard N. Haass, the director of foreign policy
studies at the Brookings Institution, praised President Clinton's failure
to impose sanctions as a prudent decision designed not to send "a hos-
tile signal to the new leadership in Tehran at a time when the United
States might usefully explore establishing a dialogue."262 The Admini-
stration's decision was also praised as a recognition of the general inef-
fectiveness of unilateral economic sanctions as well as Iran's ability to
escape the harshest consequences of such sanctions. 263 Additionally, the
imposition of sanctions were also condemned as harmful to the interests
of American businesses operating overseas as well as relations between
the United States and its European and Asian allies. 264 Regardless of
their bases for praising the Clinton administration's restraint in refus-
ing to implement ILSA, all of the commentators agreed that a reas-
sessment of U.S. policy towards Iran is long overdue. 265
III. PROVISIONS OF THE IRAN AND LIBYA SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996
ILSA provides for three specific methods for accomplishment of the
purposes set forth in Section I of this article.266 Initially, Section 4(a)
urges the President to immediately commence diplomatic efforts in ap-
propriate international forums and in bilateral negotiations to establish
a multilateral sanctions regime against Iran including limitations upon
foreign investments in Iran's oil, gas and petrochemicals industries. 267
ILSA provides that the President's efforts in this regard be consistent
with U.S. policy towards Iran which, according to Congress, includes
the retardation of the development of "Iran's ability to explore for, ex-
tract, refine or transport by pipeline [its] petroleum resources." 268 Sec-
tion 2 sets forth four goals which should underlie the President's mul-
tilateral and bilateral efforts. Initially, the President's efforts should be
designed to inhibit Iran's development of weapons of mass destruction
and associated delivery systems. 269 Secondly, the President's efforts
Rodman is director of national security programs at the Nixon Center for Peace and Free-
dom.
262. Richard N. Haass, Sanctions-With Care, WASH. POST, July 27, 1997, at C9.
263. See Shaul Bakhash, From Iran, an Understated Overture, WASH. POST, Dec. 18,
1997, at A27.
264. See Thomas W. Lippman, Politicians at Odds on Sanctions Policy, WASH. POST,
May 19, 1998, at A17. See also Robin Wright, U.S. Losing Support in 'Containing' Iraq
and Iran, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1997, at Al.
265. See Haass, supra note 262, at C9. See also Bakhash, supra note 263, at A27;
Wright, supra note 264, at Al.
266. See supra notes 9-19 and accompanying text.
267. See ILSA, Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 4(a), 110 Stat. 1541, 1542-43 (1996).
268. See id. § 3(a). Section 14(15) defines "petroleum resources" as "petroleum and
natural gas resources." See id. § 14(15).
269. See id. § 2(1).
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should attempt to inhibit the Iranian Government's support of acts of
international terrorism. 270 Congress specifically determined that Ira-
nian sponsorship of such acts endanger the national security and for-
eign policy interests of the United States and those members of the in-
ternational community which share U.S. strategic and foreign policy
interests. 271 Thirdly, Congress urged the President to strive to deny
Iran the financial resources necessary to sustain its nuclear, chemical,
biological and ballistic missile weapons programs as well as its support
for international terrorism. 272 Finally, ILSA calls upon the President to
endeavor to terminate the continuing use of diplomatic facilities and
quasi-governmental institutions by the government of Iran to promote
acts of international terrorism and assist in its nuclear, chemical, bio-
logical and ballistic missile weapons programs. 273 Other than the
United Nations, ILSA does not identify the international forums in
which such efforts are to occur and leaves the means by which its goals
are to be accomplished to presidential discretion.2 7 4
The second method by which ILSA seeks to accomplish its purposes
is through increased consultation between the President and Congress
regarding U.S. policy towards Iran. ILSA requires four separate consul-
270. See id. § 14(1) defines an "act of international terrorism" as follows:
Act of International Terrorism - The term "act of international terrorism"
means an act which is violent or dangerous to human life and that is a viola-
tion of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State or that would be
a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States
or any State; and which appears to be intended to intimidate or coerce a ci-
vilian population; to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or
coercion; or to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kid-
napping.
See id. § 14(1).
271. See id. § 2(1).
272. See id. § 2(2). Congress was particularly concerned about Iran's efforts to develop
nuclear weapons. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text. Section 14(13) defines
a "nuclear explosive device" as follows:
Nuclear Explosive Device - The term "nuclear explosive device" means any
device, whether assembled or disassembled, that is designed to produce an
instantaneous release of an amount of nuclear energy from special nuclear
material (as defined in Section 11 (aa) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954) that
is greater than the amount of energy that would be released from the detona-
tion of one pound of trinitrotoluene (TNT).
See ILSA, Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 14(13), 110 Stat. 1541, 1550 (1996).
273. See ILSA, § 2(3). Section 14(10) defines "Iran" as the Iranian Government as well
as any of its agencies or instrumentalities. See id. § 14(10).
'Iranian diplomats, representatives and quasi-governmental institutions' are
defined as including 'employees, representatives or affiliates of Iran's For-
eign Ministry, Ministry of Intelligence and Security, Revolutionary Guard
Corps, Crusade for Reconstruction, Qods (Jerusalem) Forces, Interior Minis-
try, Foundation for the Oppressed and Disabled, Prophet's Foundation, June
5th Foundation, Martyr's Foundation, Islamic Propagation Organization and
the Ministry of Islamic Guidance.'
See id. § 14(11).
274. See id. § 4(a).
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tations between the executive and legislative branches regarding U.S.
policy towards Iran. Initially, Section 4(b) requires the President to re-
port to appropriate Congressional committees on the success of his bi-
lateral and multilateral efforts to economically isolate Iran pursuant to
Section 4(a).275 The initial report must be filed with Congress no later
than one year from the date of ILSA's enactment with subsequent re-
ports to be filed on a periodic basis. 276 Each report must identify those
countries which have undertaken measures to deter Iranian support for
international terrorism, its acquisition of weapons of mass destruction
and development of its petroleum resources.277 The report must include
a description of each listed countries' anti-Iranian measures. 278 Addi-
tionally, the report must include a list of those countries which have not
adopted such measures and the President's recommended course of ac-
tion with respect to such countries. 279
Additionally, the President was required to file an interim report
on multilateral sanctions against Iran with appropriate Congressional
committees no later than ninety days after ILSA's enactment.280 This
report was required to address three separate issues. Initially, the re-
port was required to determine the existence of "legislative or adminis-
trative standards providing for the imposition of trade sanctions on per-
sons or their affiliates doing business or having investments in Iran" in
the member states of the European Union, the Republic of Korea, Aus-
tralia, Israel and Japan. 281 Secondly, the report was required to deter-
mine the extent and duration of the application of sanctions against
Iran by any of the above-listed countries.282 Decisions of the World
Trade Organization or its predecessor organization regarding the com-
patibility of such sanctions with the dictates of international trade as
set forth in GATT was the third and final topic for inclusion within the
report required by Section 4(e).283
The third instance of legislatively-mandated consultation between
the President and Congress concerns the imposition, delay and waiver
of sanctions. Section 9(a)(4) of ILSA requires the President to report to
Congress no later than ninety days after electing to impose sanctions
275. See id. § 4(b). "Appropriate Congressional Committees" are defined as "the Com-
mittee on Finance, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Ways and Means,
the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, and the Committee on International
Relations of the House of Representatives." See id. § 14(2).
276. See id. § 4(b).
277. See id. § 4(b)(1).
278. See id.
279. See id. § 4(b)(2).
280. See id. § 4(e).
281. See id. § 4(e)(1). Noticeable by its absence was any reference to legislative and
administrative standards providing for the imposition of trade sanctions against Iran by
Canada, the U.S. largest trading partner.
282. See id. § 4(e)(2).
283. See id. § 4(e)(3).
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pursuant to Section 5.284 This report must disclose the status of consul-
tations with the foreign government possessing primary jurisdiction
over the sanctioned person and the reasons supporting any delays in
the actual enforcement of sanctions. 285 Additionally, Section 9(c)(1) re-
quires the President to submit a report to the appropriate Congres-
sional committees prior to waiving the initial or continued imposition of
sanctions. 286 A waiver of sanctions pursuant to this section become ef-
fective no less than thirty days after the President determines and re-
ports to Congress that the waiver is necessary to serve the national in-
terests of the United States. 287 The report must contain "a specific and
detailed rationale" for the waiver including a description of the conduct
that resulted in the threatened or actual imposition of sanctions. 28 8 In
the case of a foreign person, the report must also contain an explanation
of the President's efforts "to secure the cooperation of the government
with primary jurisdiction over the sanctioned person to terminate or, as
appropriate, penalize the activities that resulted in the [actual or
threatened imposition of sanctions] .,289
The final instance when consultations are required between the ex-
ecutive and legislative branches concerns the President's initiatives to
further isolate Iran in the international community. In order to "con-
tribute to [Congress'] ability to evaluate the effectiveness of [ILSA],"290
the President is required to transmit a report to Congress no later than
six months after the enactment of ILSA and every six months thereafter
describing his efforts to initiate a multilateral campaign to pressure
Iran to cease its support of acts of international terrorism and develop-
284. See id. § 9(a)(4).
285. See id.
286. See id. § 9(c)(1).
287. See id. According to Congress, the national interests of the United States include:
cases in which imposition of sanctions would threaten U.S. intelligence
sources and methods, where a particular sanction would raise significant is-
sues under the international obligations of the U.S., and where international
cooperation in pursuit of the goals of the bill could be jeopardized, rather
than assisted, through unilateral U.S. action, or where sanctions would lead
to unacceptable costs to U.S. economic interests.
See H.R. REP. No. 104-523(11), at 18 (1996).
288. See ILSA, § 9(c)(2)(A).
289. Id. § 9(c)(2)(B). Section 14 defines "persons" to include natural person, corpora-
tions, business associations, partnerships, societies, trusts, nongovernmental entities, or-
ganizations or groups, governmental entities operating as business enterprises and any of
their successors. See id. § 14(A)-(C). "U.S. persons" are defined as U.S. citizens in the
case of natural persons and corporations or other legal entities organized pursuant to the
laws of the United States or any of its States or territories if U.S. citizens "own, directly or
indirectly, more than fifty percent of the outstanding capital stock or other beneficial in-
terest" in the entity. See id. § 14(17)(A)-(B). "Foreign persons" are defined as all persons
who do not meet the requirements set forth in the definition of U.S. persons. See id.
§14(7)(A)-(B).
290. H.R. REP. No. 104-523(11), at 18.
1998
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLYV
ment of weapons of mass destruction. 291 Additionally, the President's
report is required to detail his efforts to persuade other countries to re-
duce the presence of Iranian diplomats and representatives within their
respective jurisdictions and expel any such persons who participated in
the seizure of the U.S. embassy and ensuing hostage crisis.2 92 The
President's report must also describe the extent to which the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency has established regular inspections of all
nuclear facilities in Iran 293 and Iran's use of its diplomats and represen-
tatives to promote acts of international terrorism and further its devel-
opment of weapons of mass destruction.294 Finally, this section requires
the President to ensure the continued transmittal to Congress of reports
concerning Iran's military capabilities 295 and its support for acts of in-
ternational terrorism as part of the State Department's annual report
on terrorism. 296
The third method by which ILSA seeks to accomplish its objectives
is clearly the most controversial. Section 5(a) provides for the imposi-
tion of economic sanctions upon persons who, with actual knowledge,
make an investment of $40 million or more in any twelve month period
which directly and significantly contributes to the enhancement of
Iran's ability to develop its petroleum resources. Recognizing the Presi-
dent's primary responsibility for the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs, this
section grants "broad latitude" to the President in determining under
what circumstances sanctions would be appropriate and their ultimate
form and implementation.2 97 Nevertheless, Congress fully expected the
complete and timely implementation of sanctions having a "demonstra-
ble impact" upon all persons engaging in conduct in violation of ILSA. 2
98
Section 5(a) requires the imposition of two or more sanctions enu-
merated in Section 6 if the President determines that a person has,
with actual knowledge, made an investment 299 of $40 million or more
291. See ILSA, § 10(a)(1).
292. See id. § 10(a)(2).
293. See id. § 10(a)(3).
294. See id. § 1O(a)(4).
295. See id. § 10(b)(1). This report is required by Section 601(a) of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act of 1978 and Section 1607 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1993. See 22 U.S.C. § 3281 (1994) and Pub. L. No. 102-484, 106 Stat. 2571
(1992).
296. See ILSA, § 10(b)(2).
297. H.R. REP. NO. 104-523(1), at 14 (1996).
298. Id. at 15, 17.
299. The term "investment" is defined as:
any of the following activities if such activity is undertaken pursuant to an
agreement, or pursuant to the exercise of rights under such an agreement,
that is entered into with the Government of Iran or a nongovernmental en-
tity in Iran.. . on or after the date of enactment of this Act: The entry into a
contract that includes responsibility for the development of petroleum re-
sources located in Iran... or the entry into a contract providing for the gen-
eral supervision and guarantee of another person's performance of such a
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that directly and significantly contributed to the enhancement of Iran's
ability to develop 300 its petroleum resources.30 ' The prohibited invest-
ment may be in one lump sum or may consist of any combination of in-
vestments of at least $10 million each which in the aggregate equal or
exceed $40 million in any twelve month period.30 2 In order to qualify as
sanctionable conduct, the investment must have occurred on or after
the date of ILSA's enactment.30 3 The amount of the $40 million "in-
vestment trigger" is lowered to $20 million dollars in any twelve month
period with respect to the nationals of all countries other than those
designated by the President pursuant to Section 4(c) 30 4 at any time after
the President has submitted his initial report to Congress as required
by Section 4(b).305 This $20 million investment may also be in one lump
sum or may consist of a combination of investments of at least $5 mil-
lion each which in the aggregate equal or exceed $20 million in any
twelve month period. 306
Section 5(c) identifies two classifications of persons subject to the
imposition of sanctions. Initially, sanctions must be imposed against
any person the President determines to have engaged in an investment
in Iran prohibited by Section 5(a).30 7 The President may also impose
sanctions upon any person he determines to be a successor entity, par-
ent, subsidiary or affiliate of a sanctioned person. 308 However, prior to
imposing sanctions against a parent or subsidiary, the President must
find that the parent or subsidiary, with actual knowledge, made a pro-
hibited investment in violation of Section 5(a). 30 9 With regard to affili-
ates, the President must not only find the existence of a prohibited in-
vestment made with actual knowledge but must also conclude that the
contract; The purchase of a share of ownership, including an equity interest,
in that development; The entry into a contract providing for the participation
in royalties, earnings or profits in that development, without regard to the
form of the participation. The term "investment" does not include the entry
into, performance or financing of a contract to sell or purchase goods, serv-
ices or technology.
See ILSA, § 14(9).
300. The terms "develop" and "development" of petroleum resources are defined as "the
exploration for, or the extraction, refining or transportation by pipeline of, petroleum re-
sources." See id. § 14(4).
301. See id. § 5(a).
302. See id.
303. See id.
304. See infra notes 338-40 and accompanying text. The President must identify for
Congress all countries which are exempt from the lowered "investment trigger" estab-
lished by Section 4(d)(1). See ILSA, § 4(d)(1).
305. See ILSA, § 4(d)(1). See also supra notes 295-99 and accompanying text.
306. See ILSA, § 4(d)(1).
307. See id. § 5(c)(1).
308. See id. § 5(c)(2)(A)-(C).
309. See id. § 5(c)(2)(B).
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affiliate is controlled by the sanctioned person. 310 A list of such sanc-
tioned persons and prohibited investments must be published on a peri-
odic basis in the Federal Register.3 1 Additionally, concerned persons
may request an advisory opinion from the Secretary of State as to
whether a proposed investment violates ILSA's prohibitions. 312 Good
faith reliance upon an opinion which determines that the proposed in-
vestment does not violate ILSA exempts the requesting party from
sanctions based upon its subsequent participation in the investment. 31 3
The President's decision to impose sanctions is not subject to judicial
review. 314
Once the President determines that the imposition of sanctions is
appropriate, he must impose two of the six sanctions listed in Section 6.
The actual sanctions selected are subject to the President's exercise of
discretion. 315 The available sanctions may be categorized in four sepa-
rate classifications. The first and largest classification consists of prohi-
bitions involving financial institutions. 316 Initially, the President may
instruct the Export-Import Bank of the United States to reject any
guarantee, insurance, extension of credit or participation in the exten-
sion of credit in connection with the export of any goods or services to
any sanctioned person. 317 Additionally, the U.S. Government may pro-
hibit any U.S. financial institution 31S8 from making loans or providing
credits to sanctioned persons totaling more than $10 million in any
twelve month period.3 19 Loans or credits to persons engaged in activities
to relieve human suffering are exempted from this prohibition if such
loans or credits are to be utilized for such humanitarian purposes. 320
If the sanctioned person is a financial institution, the U.S. Govern-
ment may impose one or both of two available sanctions. Initially, the
U.S. Government may bar the Federal Reserve System and the Federal
310. See id. § 5(c)(2)(C).
311. See id. § 5(d)-(e).
312. See id. § 7.
313. See id.
314. See id. § 11. Congress did not believe judicial review to be prudent given the care-
ful and deliberate fashion in which sanctions are imposed pursuant to the Act and the ne-
cessity of timely implementation given the serious national security risk posed by Iran.
See H.R. REP. NO. 104-523(I), at 17 (1996).
315. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-523(11), at 17.
316. See ILSA, § 6 (1), (3) and (4).
317. See id. § 6(1).
318. The term "financial institution" is defined to include:
(A) a depository institution (as defined in section 3(c)(1) of the Federal De-
posit Insurance Act), including a branch or agency of a foreign bank (as de-
fined in section l(b)(7) of the International Banking Act of 1978); (B) a credit
union; (C) a securities firm, including a broker or dealer;
(D) an insurance company, including an agency or underwriter; and (E) any
other company that provides financial services.
See id. § 14(5).
319. See id. § 6(3).
320. See id.
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Reserve Bank of New York from designating or permitting the con-
tinuation of a sanctioned financial institution as a primary dealer in
U.S. Government debt instruments.321 In addition, a sanctioned finan-
cial institution may not serve as an agent of the U.S. Government or
serve as a repository for U.S. Government funds. 322 The imposition of
both of these sanctions against a financial institution constitutes two
separate sanctions. 323
The second, third and fourth classifications consist of procurement
and trade sanctions. The U.S. Government may be prohibited from pro-
curing, or entering into any contract for the procurement of, any goods
or services from a sanctioned person.324 Additionally, the President may
order the U.S. Government to deny permission, authority or a license to
export any goods or technology to a sanctioned person pursuant to the
Export Administration Act of 1979,325 the Arms Export Control Act 326
and the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.327 The U.S. Government may also
refuse to grant a license for the export of any goods or services to a
sanctioned person pursuant to any other federal statute that requires
its prior review and approval. 328 Finally, the President may impose
sanctions, as appropriate, to restrict imports with respect to a sanc-
tioned person in accordance with IEEPA3 29
ILSA provides the President with considerable discretion to waive,
delay or grant exceptions to the imposition of sanctions. Section 5(f) of
ILSA sets forth numerous instances when the President may except
persons from the imposition of sanctions on the basis of national secu-
rity. Specifically, the President is not required to apply or maintain
sanctions in the case of existing procurement contracts, subcontracts
and options for goods and services utilized for national defense and es-
sential to U.S. national security.330 Government procurement contracts,
subcontracts and options are also immune from sanctions if the Presi-
dent determines that the person subject to sanctions is the sole source
supplier of essential goods or services and there are no readily or rea-
321. See id. § 6(4)(A).
322. See id. § 6(4)(B).
323. See id. § 6(4).
324. See id. § 6(5).
325. See id. § 6(2)(i). See also Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. §
2405 (1998).
326. See ILSA, § 6(2)(ii). See also Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751-2756
(1994).
327. See ILSA, § 6(2)(iii). See also Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2023
(1994).
328. See ILSA, § 6(2)(iv).
329. See id. § 6(6). In order to invoke sanctions pursuant to this section of ILSA, a na-
tional economic emergency must be declared by the President pursuant to sections §
1702(a)(1)(A)-(B) of IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. (1998). See also H.R. REP. No. 104-523(11), at 17
(1996).
330. See ILSA, § 5(f)(1)(A).
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sonably available alternate sources. 33 1 Additionally, the President may
provide an exception for goods and services essential to national secu-
rity under defense co-production agreements. 332
Section 5(f) sets forth numerous other grounds for Presidential ex-
ceptions from the imposition of sanctions. In the case of government
procurement of non-defense related products, the President may pro-
vide for an exception for goods of any foreign country or instrumentality
as provided pursuant to the Trade Agreements Act of 1979. 333 Products,
technology and services provided under contracts entered into prior to
the date of publication of the name of the sanctioned person in the Fed-
eral Register are also excepted from the application of sanctions. 334
Sanctions also may not be applied to contracts for spare and compo-
nents parts, information and technology essential to U.S. products or
production.335 Additionally, sanctions are not required to be imposed
upon contracts for the routine servicing and maintenance of products to
the extent that alternative sources are not readily or reasonably avail-
able. 336 Finally, contracts for medicines, medical supplies and other
humanitarian items are exempt from the imposition of sanctions.337
Two separate sections of ILSA grant authority to the President to
waive the application of sanctions. Section 4(c)(1) provides for the
waiver of sanctions by the President with respect to nationals of a coun-
try that has agreed to undertake substantial measures that will inhibit
Iran's support of international terrorism, development and acquisition
of weapons of mass destruction and utilization of its diplomats and rep-
resentatives to achieve these objectives. 338 The President must notify all
appropriate Congressional committees of his intention to grant such a
waiver thirty days prior to its effective date.339 The granting of a waiver
pursuant to Section 4(c)(1) also exempts nationals of such countries
from application of the enhanced sanctions regime set forth in Section
4(d).340 The President may also waive the initial or continued imposition
of sanctions thirty days or more after determining and certifying to
Congress that the waiver is in the national interest of the United
States.341 The President must provide "a specific and detailed rationale"
for this waiver. 342 In this regard, the President's certification to Con-
331. See id. § 5(f)(1)(B).
332. See id. § 5(f)(1)(C).
333. See id. § 5(f)(2). See also Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2518(4)(A)-
(D), 2511 (b)(1)-(4) (1994).
334. See ILSA, § 5(f)(3).
335. See id. § 5(f)(4)-(6).
336. See id. § 5(f)(4)(C).
337. See id. § 5(f)(7).
338. See id. § 4(c)(1).
339. See id. § 4(c)(2).
340. See id. § 4(d)(1). See also supra notes 304-06 and accompanying text.
341. See ILSA, § 9(c)(1).
342. See id. § 9(c)(2).
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gress must contain a description of the conduct at issue and U.S. efforts
to obtain the cooperation of the government exercising jurisdiction in
the case of a foreign person.343 In addition, the report must provide an
estimate as to the significance of the conduct at issue to Iran's ability to
develop its petroleum resources and contain a statement as to the likely
U.S. response to future conduct by the sanctioned person in contraven-
tion of the Act.344
Finally, Section 9(a) of ILSA establishes circumstances when the
President may delay the imposition of sanctions. If the President de-
termines that sanctions are appropriate pursuant to Section 5(a), he is
instructed to immediately initiate consultations with the government
exercising primary jurisdiction over the sanctioned person regarding
the basis for his decision. 345 In order to increase the likelihood of a suc-
cessful conclusion to these consultations, the President may delay the
imposition of sanctions for up to ninety days. 346 Following the conclu-
sion of such consultations, the President must immediately impose
sanctions unless he determines and certifies to Congress that the gov-
ernment possessing primary jurisdiction over the sanctioned person has
taken "specific and effective actions" to resolve U.S. concerns. 347 These
actions may include the imposition of appropriate sanctions by the for-
eign government in order to terminate the prohibited involvement of
the sanctioned person in Iran.348 If the foreign government initiates
such "specific and effective actions," the President may suspend the im-
plementation of sanctions for an additional ninety days upon further
certification to Congress. 349 In any event, the President is required to
submit a report to the appropriate Congressional committees on the
status of consultations with foreign governments and the basis for any
delays within ninety days of the decision to impose sanctions pursuant
to Section 5(a).350
Sanctions may also terminate as a result of Iran's actions or by op-
eration of law. Section 8(a) provides for the termination of sanctions
when ILSA's objectives are met. Two separate determinations must be
made in order for ILSA's objectives to be deemed to have been met.
First, the President must determine and certify to Congress that Iran
has ceased its efforts to manufacture or acquire weapons of mass de-
struction.351 Second, the President must certify to Congress that Iran
343. See id. § 9(c)(2)(A)-(B).
344. See id. § 9(c)(2)(C)-(D).
345. See id. § 9(a)(1).
346. See id. § 9(a)(2).
347. See id.
348. See id.
349. See id. § 9(a)(3).
350. See id. § 9(a)(4).
351. See id. § 8(a)(1)(A)-(C). Included within the term "weapons of mass destruction"
are nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as ballistic missiles and related
launch technology. Id.
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has been removed from the list of countries providing sponsorship and
support for international terrorism compiled pursuant to Section 6(j) of
the Export Administration Act of 1979.352 If these two conditions are
satisfied, the President is released from his obligation to impose sanc-
tions.
Sanctions may also terminate by operation of law. Section 9(b)(1)
provides that sanctions shall remain in effect for a period of not less
than two years from the date of their imposition. 353 Alternatively, sanc-
tions may be lifted if the President certifies to Congress that the sanc-
tioned person has ceased to engage in the activities which led to their
imposition. 3 4 However, the President must receive "reliable assur-
ances" that the sanctioned person will not knowingly make prohibited
investments in Iran in the future. 355 Even if the President makes these
determinations, the sanctions must remain in effect for at least one
year. 356 In any event, Section 13(b) provides that ILSA shall cease to be
effective five years from the date of its enactment.357
IV. THE IRAN AND LIBYA SANCTIONS ACT: SERVING U.S. INTERESTS?
Despite its purported purposes of serving the national security in-
terests of the United States and moderating Iranian behavior through
multilateral political pressure and unilateral economic sanctions, ILSA
does not serve U.S. international and national interests. The Act is in-
consistent with the U.S.'s long-standing opposition to secondary boy-
cotts and jeopardizes the leadership role of the United States in inter-
national affairs. Further, the isolationist policy toward Iran expressed
in the Act will fail without the cooperation of the international commu-
nity. In addition, the Act serves to exclude American companies from
significant portions of the lucrative Middle Eastern oil and gas indus-
tries and subjects such companies to the threat of foreign retaliation.
The Act may also serve to discourage reform in Iran by fostering con-
tinued hostility toward the United States and stoking Iranian nation-
alism. Finally, the Act minimizes potential American influence upon fu-
ture events in Iran.
Initially, ILSA is inconsistent with the long-standing opposition of
the United States to secondary boycotts. 358 For example, in 1950, the
352. See id. § 8(a)(2). See also Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. §
2405(0) (1998).
353. See ILSA, § 9(b)(1).
354. See id. § 9(b)(2).
355. See id.
356. See id.
357. See id. § 13(b). Congress concluded that "[flive years is adequate time to gauge its
effectiveness at achieving [Congress'] objectives." H.R. REP. NO. 104-523(11), at 19 (1996).
Congress will reevaluate ILSA's provisions at the end of five years based upon Iran's be-
havior and ILSA's perceived effectiveness. See id.
358. A "secondary boycott" consists of restrictions upon international trade directed at
VOL. 27:1
MEDDLING WITH THE MULLAHS
Arab League Council, the executive branch of the Arab League, 359 rec-
ommended that member states compile a blacklist of third country
ships that carried Jewish immigrants or military cargo to Israel. 360 The
boycott was subsequently expanded to include all firms making a "ma-
terial contribution to the strength of Israel."361 "Material contributions"
were defined as the establishment of plants in Israel, the use of an
agent or principal office located in Israel and actions taken to develop
Israel's natural resources. 362 Entry into a partnership with an Israeli
company, holding shares of an Israeli company, supplying advice or
technical assistance to Israeli manufacturing plants and permitting an
Israeli company to use the name or trademarks of a foreign company
were also defined as "material contributions." 363 The armaments, tour-
ist, petroleum, insurance and banking industries were excepted from
the boycott. 364 Non-Israeli companies engaging in these activities were
prohibited from doing business with members of the Arab League or
companies located therein.365 The United States opposed the boycott on
the bases that it targeted an important ally and violated international
law. 366 ILSA is completely contrary to this policy of active opposition to
secondary boycotts.
ILSA also jeopardizes the leadership role of the United States in in-
ternational affairs and institutions. For example, in 1993, the United
States implemented the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) with two of its largest trading partners, Canada and Mex-
ico. 367 Article 301 of Chapter Three of NAFTA requires the United
States, Canada and Mexico to accord national treatment to each other's
one country as well as other countries and businesses located therein doing business and
maintaining relations with the primary target of the boycott. See JOHN H. JACKSON &
WILLIAM J. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 951-52
(2d ed. 1986).
359. The Arab League was organized in 1945 by Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi
Arabia, Syria and Yemen.
360. See NORMAN VANDER CLUTE, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE ARAB BOYCOTT 12 (1977).
361. Id. at 16. See also EDWARD HOTALING, THE ARAB BLACKLIST UNVEILED 18-26
(1977).
362. See VANDER CLUTE, supra note 360, at 16-17.
363. See id. at 16.
364. See id. at 17. Exceptions to the boycott are permitted where the "higher interests
of an Arab state require them." Id.
365. The resolutions of the Arab League have no legal force and effect until League
member states adopt internal laws and procedures implementing the resolutions. As
such, there is considerable variance among Arab states with regard to the boycott, and
each state maintains its own rules with regard to the enforcement of the boycott within its
territory.
366. See HOTALING, supra note 361, at 18-26. See also Lippman, supra note 18, at Al.
367. See North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. §§
3301-473 (1994).
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goods in accordance with Article III of GATT.368 In this regard, Article
301 of NAFTA incorporates by reference GATT's national treatment
provisions. 369 NAFTA defines "national treatment" as "treatment no
less favorable than the most favorable treatment accorded by such state
or province to any like, directly competitive or substitutable goods, as
the case may be, of the Party which it forms a part."37 0
Exceptions to the requirement of national treatment are governed
by Chapters Eight and Twenty-One of NAFTA. Article 802 of Chapter
Eight of NAFTA incorporates the emergency actions provisions of Arti-
cle XIX of GATT.37 1 Chapter Twenty-One of NAFTA incorporates Article
XX of GATT setting forth general exceptions to the contracting parties'
obligations. Specifically, Article 2101(1) of NAFTA provides, in part,
that "[flor purposes of ... [t]rade in [g]oods ... GATT Article XX and its
interpretive notes ... are incorporated into and made a part of this
Agreement."372 Additionally, Article 2102(1) of NAFTA provides for an
368. See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8-Dec. 17, 1992, ch. 3, art.
303(1), 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA]. Article 303(1) specifically pro-
vides, in part, that "[e]ach Party shall accord national treatment to the goods of another
Party in accordance with Article III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), including its interpretive notes." See id.
369. See id. Article III, § 2 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade provides in
part that, "[tihe products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the terri-
tory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal
taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indi-
rectly, to like domestic products." General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947,
61 Stat. A-11, A-18, 62 U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter GATT]. In addition, Article III, § 4 of
GATT provides in part that:
[t]he products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the ter-
ritory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less fa-
vourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of
all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering
for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.
Id. art. III, § 4.
370. NAFTA, supra note 368, ch. 3, art. 301, § 2.
371. Article 802, § 1 of NAFFA provides in part that, "[e]ach Party retains its rights
and obligations under Article XIX of GAIT." Id. ch. 8, art. 802, § 1. Article XIX, § 1, cl. a
of GATT provides in part that:
[ilf, as a result of unforeseen developments ... any product is being imported
into the territory of that contracting party in such increased quantities and
under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic pro-
ducers in that territory of like or directly competitive products, the con-
tracting party shall be free ... to suspend the obligation in whole or in part
or to withdraw or modify the concession.
GATT, supra note 369.
372. NAFTA, supra note 368, ch. 21, art. 2101, § 1. Article XX of GATT provides in
part that:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries ... or a disguised restriction on international trade,
nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or en-
forcement by any contracting party of measures: necessary to protect public
morals; necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; relating
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exception for the maintenance of national security. 373
However, Section 6(6) of ILSA provides that one of the penalties
which the President may impose is a restriction upon imports. 374 This
penalty violates the national treatment provisions of Article 301 of
NAFTA. Goods originating from foreign persons deemed by the Presi-
dent to have knowingly made investments in excess of $40 million in
any twelve month period that directly and significantly contributed to
Iran's ability to develop its petroleum resources may be absolutely and
completely excluded from the U.S. marketplace. Although U.S. compa-
nies are subject to broad prohibitions upon conducting business with
Iran, they are not subject to the same punishment as foreign firms
deemed to have improperly invested in Iran, specifically, the absolute
exclusion of their products from the U.S. marketplace. As a result, ILSA
violates the national treatment provisions of NAFTA by granting an un-
fair advantage to U.S. goods through the exclusion of goods originating
from sanctioned persons.
Section 6(6) requires that any restriction which the President
places upon imports must comply with the provisions of IEEPA. In or-
der to invoke this Act, the President must find that there exist "unusual
and extraordinary threats to the national security, foreign policy or
economy of the United States."375 Any restriction upon imports imposed
by the President pursuant to ILSA must also comply with Article 2102
of NAFTA which relates to national security exceptions. However, all
to the importation or exportation of gold or silver; necessary to secure com-
pliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provi-
sions of this Agreement... ; relating to the products of prison labour; im-
posed for the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or
archaeological value; relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural re-
sources...; involving restrictions on exports of domestic materials necessary
to ensure essential quantities of such materials to a domestic processing in-
dustry.. . as part of a governmental stabilization plan...; essential to the
acquisition or distribution of products in general or local short supply....
GATT, supra note 369.
373. See NAFTA, supra note 368, ch. 21, art. 2102. Article 2102 provides in part that:
nothing in this Agreement shall be construed:
to prevent any Party from taking any actions that it considers necessary for
the protection of its essential security interests relating to ... transactions
in ... goods, materials, services and technology undertaken directly or indi-
rectly for the purpose of supplying a military or security establishment,
taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations, or relat-
ing to the implementation of national policies or international agreements
respecting the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explo-
sive devices; or to prevent any Party from taking action in pursuance of its
obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security.
NAFTA, supra note 368.
374. See ILSA, Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 6(6), 110 Stat. 1541, 1546 (1996).
375. IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a) (1998).
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but two of the national security exceptions set forth in Article 2102 are
inapplicable to import restrictions which may be imposed pursuant to
ILSA. Specifically, the import restrictions which may be imposed pur-
suant to ILSA do not relate to trafficking in armaments 376 and nuclear
weapons. 377 Additionally, any such restrictions would not be designed to
prevent Canada or Mexico from violating their obligations to maintain
international peace and security pursuant to the United Nations Char-
ter.37
8
Such import restrictions may come within the exception permitting
restrictions to prohibit the direct or indirect supplying of military or
other security establishments379 However, utilization of this provision
to support restrictions imposed upon imports as a result of investments
by foreign persons in Iran's oil and gas industries is weak absent over-
whelming evidence that revenues derived by Iran from these industries
are flowing directly to the military or other related institutions. Sanc-
tions imposed in the absence of such evidence serve to criminalize all
economic activity which results in revenues which may be used by the
Iranian government for military purposes.
The other NAFTA provision which may support import restrictions
imposed pursuant to ILSA permits restrictions imposed in time of an
"emergency in international relations."380 However, it is unclear
whether the definition of "international emergency" contained within
NAFTA is identical to that contained within IEEPA such that all "in-
ternational emergencies" declared pursuant to IEEPA would automati-
cally constitute emergencies pursuant to NAFTA. In any event, it can-
not be argued in good faith that NAFTA's national security exception
was intended to permit a declaration of emergency lasting nineteen
years as has been the case regarding U.S.-Iranian relations. Such an
interpretation by the United States would constitute a perversion of the
intended meaning of the term "international emergency" and would
permit the national security exception to swallow NAFTA's free trade
provisions wholesale.
NAFTA also contains provisions regarding government procure-
ment. Specifically, the United States, Canada and Mexico granted na-
tional treatment to each other's goods and service suppliers in matters
of government procurement pursuant to Article 1003.381 In addition to
376. See NAFTA, supra note 368, ch. 21, art. 2102, § 1, cl. b(i).
377. See id. ch. 21, art. 2102, § 1, cl. b(iii).
378. See id. ch. 21, art. 2102 § 1, cl. c.
379. See id. ch. 21, art. 2102, § 1, cl. b(i).
380. Id. ch. 21, art. 2102, § 1, cl. b(ii).
381. See id. ch. 10, art. 1003, § 1, cl. a-b. Article 1003 provides in part that:
[w]ith respect to [government procurement] ... each Party shall accord to
the goods of another Party, to the suppliers of such goods and to service sup-
pliers of another Party, treatment no less favorable than the most favorable
treatment that the Party accords to: (a) its own goods and suppliers; and (b)
goods and suppliers of another Party.
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the national emergency exception set forth in Article 2102(1), Article
1018 provides for exceptions to national treatment in the field of gov-
ernment procurement on the bases of essential security interests 382 and
the protection of public safety and morals, human, animal or plant life
or health and intellectual property.38 3 However, Section 6(5) of ILSA
permits the President to prohibit the U.S. Government from procuring,
or entering into any contract for the procurement of, any goods or serv-
ices from a sanctioned person. 38 4 There are no factual or procedural re-
quirements which the President must meet prior to the imposition of
this sanction other than a determination that the sanctioned person
knowingly made an investment in Iran's oil and gas industries in an
amount in excess of that permitted by law. Section 6(5) of ILSA violates
Article 1003(1) as it fails to treat sanctioned foreign persons in the same
manner as U.S. persons who would be subject to the procedures and
protections afforded in a federal debarment proceeding prior to the im-
position of such a penalty.38 5
Furthermore, the exceptions set forth in Articles 1018(1) and
2102(1) are inapplicable. Initially, the essential security interests ex-
ception contained within Article 1018(1) is inapplicable as it only grants
an exception for government procurement of goods essential for national
security or defense purposes. Procurement sanctions imposed pursuant
to Section 6(5) of ILSA are not imposed to protect domestic producers of
goods essential to the defense of the United States but, rather, are im-
posed in retaliation for investments by foreign persons in a long-
standing enemy of the United States. The national emergency exception
set forth in Article 2102(1) is equally inapplicable as it is unclear
whether an international emergency deemed to exist under U.S. law is
sufficient to support the adoption of emergency measures pursuant to
NAFTA. In any event, as set forth above, it can not be contended in
good faith that the national security exceptions contained within
See id. This national treatment requirement applies to contracts with federal governmen-
tal entities in excess of $50,000 for goods and services and $6.5 million for construction
services. See id. ch. 10, art. 1001, § 1, cl. c(i). For governmental enterprises, these
amounts are $250,000 and $8 million respectively. See id. ch. 10, art. 1001, § 1, cl. c(ii).
382. See id. ch. 10, art. 1018, § 1. Article 1018(1) provides, in part, that a party may
deviate from NAFTA's government procurement requirements when it is "necessary for
the protection of its essential security interests relating to the procurement of arms, am-
munition or war materials, or to procurement indispensable for national security or for
national defense purposes." See id.
383. See id. ch. 10, art. 1018, § 2, cl. a-c. Article 1018, § 2 also provides for an excep-
tion to NAFTA's government procurement requirements for goods and services of handi-
capped persons, philanthropic institutions and prison labor. See id. ch. 10, art. 1018, § 2,
cl. d.
384. See ILSA, Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 6(5), 110 Stat. 1541, 1546 (1996).
385. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6106 (1994). See also Exec. Order No. 12, 549, 3 C.F.R. 189
(1987); Exec. Order No. 12, 689, 3 C.F.R. 235 (1989), reprinted in 31 U.S.C. § 6106.
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NAFTA may be interpreted to encompass an international emergency
declared by only one country in the entire world for an unbroken nine-
teen year period.
ILSA also poses a threat to U.S. leadership in GATT and the WTO.
In 1994, the United States ratified the Uruguay Round of multilateral
trade negotiations pursuant to GATT. Among its many provisions, the
Uruguay Round created the WTO. The Uruguay Round delegated to the
WTO the duty of enforcement of member states' obligations pursuant to
GATT.386 With regard to imports, these obligations include those set
forth in Article III which requires that contracting parties accord na-
tional treatment to each other's goods. 38 7 Exceptions to national treat-
ment are set forth in Articles XIX, XX and XXI. Article XIX permits the
implementation of temporary emergency measures in the event of un-
foreseeable import surges which cause or threaten to cause serious in-
jury to domestic producers.3 88 Article XX sets forth a wide range of cir-
cumstances which justify the imposition of measures in deviation from
the requirements of GATT.389 Finally, Article XXI provides for an excep-
tion to GATT for national security purposes. 390
The import sanction provided for in Section 6(6) of ILSA violates
Article III of GATT for the same reason it violates Article 301 of
NAFTA. Furthermore, none of the exceptions provided in Article XXI of
GATT are applicable. Article XXI's exceptions for confidential informa-
tion, fissionable materials, armaments and compliance with the United
Nations Charter do not provide justification for ILSA's import sanc-
tion.391 The only possibly applicable exception is that provided for ac-
tions taken in times of an emergency in international relations.392 How-
ever, it is unclear whether the definition of "international emergency"
contained within GATT is identical to that contained within the IEEPA.
Furthermore,-as stated above, Article XX's national security exception
386. See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, Final
Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
Apr. 15, 1994, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144 (1994).
387. See supra note 369 and accompanying text.
388. See supra note 371 and accompanying text.
389. See supra note 372 and accompanying text.
390. Article XXI of GATT provides in part that:
[n]othing in this Agreement shall be construed (a) to require any contracting
party to furnish any information the disclosure of which it considers contrary
to its essential security interests; or (b) to prevent any contracting party
from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its
essential security interests (i) relating to fissionable materials . . . (ii) relat-
ing to the traffic in arms... (iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in
international relations; or (c) to prevent any contracting party from taking
any action in pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter
for the maintenance of international peace and security.
GATT, supra note 369, art. XXI.
391. See id.
392. See id. art. XXI(b)(iii).
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was not intended to support a unilateral declaration of an international
emergency lasting nineteen years.
U.S. obligations pursuant to GATT also include those set forth in
the Agreement on Government Procurement. 393 The provisions of
GATT's Agreement on Government Procurement is almost identical to
that set forth in the previously-cited sections of NAFTA. Article III of
this Agreement requires that contracting parties grant national treat-
ment to products, services and suppliers originating from all other con-
tracting parties. 394 Article XXIII of the Agreement creates exceptions to
its national treatment requirement for essential security purposes 395
and the protection of public morals and safety, human, animal and
plant life and health and intellectual property. 396 The procurement
sanction set forth in Section 6(5) of ILSA violates the Agreement on
Government Procurement for the identical reason it violates Article
1003(1) of NAFTA. 397 Furthermore, the national security exception set
forth in Article XXIII of the Agreement on Government Procurement
393. See Agreement on Government Procurement (1994) (visited Sept. 17, 1998)
<http://www.wto.org/wto/govt/agreem.html>.
394. Article III(1) of the Agreement on Government Procurement provides in part that:
[w]ith respect to all laws, regulations, procedures and practices regarding
government procurement covered by this Agreement, each party shall pro-
vide immediately and unconditionally to the products, services and suppliers
of other Parties offering products or services of the Parties, treatment no less
favourable than: that accorded to domestic products, services and suppliers;
and that accorded to products, services and suppliers of any other Party.
Id. art. III(1)(a)-(b). This national treatment requirement applies to contracts with U.S.
federal governmental entities in excess of 130,000 Special Drawing Rights (SDR) for goods
and services and five million SDR for construction services. See id. Annex 1. These
amounts are 355,000 and five million SDR for sub-central governmental entities and
250,000 and five million SDR for all other public enterprises or authorities which procure
in accordance with the Agreement. See id. Annexes 2 and 3. Special Drawing Rights are
an international reserve asset used as the International Monetary Fund's official unit of
account. Its value is based on a trade-weighted basket of major currencies. See U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 2 THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE:
URUGUAY ROUND FINAL ACT SHOULD PRODUCE OVERALL U.S. ECONOMIC GAINS 155, n. 29
(1994). One SDR was equal to U.S.$1.37 at the time of preparation of this article. See
Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 393, at Annex 1.
395. Article XXIII(l) of the Agreement on Government Procurement provides that:
[n]othing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent any Party from
taking any action or not disclosing any information which it considers neces-
sary for the protection of its essential security interests relating to the pro-
curement of arms, ammunition or war materials, or to procurement indis-
pensable for national security or national defense purposes.
Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 393, art. XXIII(1).
396. Article XXIII(2) of the Agreement on Government Procurement provides, in part,
that "nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent any Party from imposing or
enforcing measures necessary to protect public morals, order or safety, human, animal or
plant life or health or intellectual property." Id. art. XXIII(2). Article XXIII also permits
exceptions to national treatment for products or services of handicapped persons, philan-
thropic institutions and prison labor. See id.
397. See supra note 385 and accompanying text.
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does not provide justification for ILSA's procurement sanction for the
same reasons set forth with regard to Articles 1018(1) and 2102(1) of
NAFTA.
The United States received negative reactions to these potential
violations of NAFTA and GATT from Canada and the European Union.
As previously noted, Canada amended its Foreign Extraterritoriality
Act to provide for fines or prison terms for company managers who
comply with orders entered pursuant to ILSA.398 The European Union
filed a formal protest to ILSA with the United States on August 8,
1996. 399 European Union officials warned the United States that the
imposition of sanctions against European firms transacting business in
Iran would seriously damage relations and could lead to the enactment
and enforcement of retaliatory measures against American business in-
terests. 400 The European Union also threatened to initiate a challenge
to ILSA before the WTO.401 Representatives of the United States and
the European Union immediately entered into discussions to resolve
their dispute regarding the compatibility of ILSA with GATT.402 Al-
though the negotiators failed to meet their self-imposed deadline of Oc-
tober 15, 1997 for resolution of the dispute, the parties agreed to con-
tinue discussions. 40 3 As part of this agreement, the European Union
agreed to refrain from filing a complaint with the WTO as long as the
United States refrained from imposing sanctions upon European firms
pursuant to ILSA.404 Discussions between the United States and the
European Union are ongoing at the time of preparation of this article. 405
The very existence of the dispute over the compatibility of ILSA
with GATT is not in and of itself troubling. 40 6 Trade disputes between
countries arise and are resolved on a routine basis in this era of global
commerce. The troubling aspect of this dispute is the potential Ameri-
398. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
399. See U.S. Law Punishing Foreign Firms Draws Fire from EU, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 9,
1996, available in 1996 WL 2698903.
400. See Blustein, supra note 6.
401. See Casert, supra note 33.
402. See Raf Casert, EU, U.S. Fail to Settle Trade Dispute Over Cuba, Libya, Iran,
Assoc. PRESS, Oct. 15, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2555359.
403. See id.
404. See id.
405. U.S. representatives have indicated that exemptions could be granted to compa-
nies based in European Union countries if such countries adopted measures demonstrat-
ing support for U.S. efforts to contain Iran other than ILSA. See Lippman, supra note
246, at Al.
406. But see Casert, supra note 32, wherein Sir Leon Brittan, the European Union's
chief trade negotiator, warned that ILSA "creates tension between Europe and the United
States which makes it more difficult to work together to achieve shared political objectives
in Iran." Id. See also Archie M. Bolster, The Way to Win in Iran, WASH. PoST, Nov. 10,
1997, at A20, wherein the author states that "continued emphasis on sanctions against
Iran involving punishment of foreign firms that trade there... would bring about [unfor-
tunate] 'tensions with allies and strategic partners."'
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can reaction to any complaint which the European Union may file with
the WTO challenging ILSA. In response to a complaint filed by the
European Union challenging the compatibility of the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996407 with GATT, the Clinton Admini-
stration stated that the WTO was an inappropriate forum for the reso-
lution of political disputes such as exist with regard to U.S. policy to-
ward Cuba, 408 and the decision to proceed with such a case would pose
"serious risks" for the future of the WTO. 40 9 As such, the Clinton Ad-
ministration announced its intention to boycott any hearing held upon
the European Union's complaint. 410
As noted by the WTO Director-General Renato Ruggiero, the WTO
dispute panel procedure is "the only rules-based system with enforce-
ment capacity" in the field of international trade.411 An American deci-
sion not to comply with an adverse decision of a dispute panel which
may be formed to review ILSA could undermine the effectiveness of the
WTO. 4 12 A potential U.S. challenge to the formation of such a panel
could undermine GATT's dispute resolution procedures, deny the WTO
institutional credibility and render the institution moribund.
The inconsistent use and application of boycotts by the United
States also threatens its leadership role in international affairs. For ex-
ample, the United States maintains an embargo against North Korea
but nevertheless has provided it with aid in the form of food.413 Further,
the United States has, in the past, imposed or threatened to impose
sanctions against countries engaged in human rights violations but, at
the same time, has ignored equally egregious violations in other coun-
tries. For example, the United States imposed sanctions against South
Africa in protest of its policy of apartheid but elected to ignore human
rights violations in Guatemala, the Dominican Republic and South Ko-
407. See Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C. §§
6021-6091 (1996). Otherwise known as the Helms-Burton Act after its chief legislative
sponsors, the Act imposes numerous sanctions upon foreign companies transacting busi-
ness in Cuba utilizing personal and real property expropriated from Americans by the
Castro regime including civil liability in U.S. federal courts and the exclusion of such per-
sons from the United States. See id. §§ 6082, 6091.
408. See Slobodan Lekic, U.S. Refuses to Recognize Trade Dispute Panel on Cuba,
Assoc. PRESS, Feb. 20, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4856941.
409. Id.
410. See Paul Blustein & Anne Swardson, U.S. Vows to Boycott WTO Panel; Move Es-
calates Fight with European Union Over Cuba Sanctions, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 1997, at
Al, available in 1997 WL 9335994.
411. See Elizabeth Wise, EU Plans New Attack on U.S. Laws, USA TODAY, Oct. 17,
1996, available in 1996 WL 2072282.
412. See id. Julius Katz, a former deputy U.S. trade representative, has characterized
the U.S. announced position to boycott the dispute resolution panel proceeding as one
which "runs a major risk of tearing down the WTO." See Blustein & Swardson, supra
note 410.
413. See Donald L. Losman, A Look at ... The Case Against Sanctions: Good Intentions
Gone Bad; Punitive Trade Embargoes are Appealing But They Don't Achieve our Goals,
WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 1996, at C3.
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rea. 414 The abandonment of sanctions against the Peoples' Republic of
China imposed after the Tienanmen Square massacre in favor of a pol-
icy of "critical dialogue" is another example of the inconsistency of U.S.
sanctions policy. 415
The use of sanctions by the United States in the Middle East has
also been plagued by inconsistency. Perhaps the best recent example of
this inconsistency is U.S. policy towards Sudan. In April 1996, Presi-
dent Clinton signed the Antiterrorism Act of 1996 into law. 4 16 Section
321(a) of the Act bars Americans from engaging in financial transac-
tions with governments on the U.S. list of states accused of supporting
international terrorism. 41 7 Sudan is included on this list due to its ac-
tive support of Islamic extremist groups and harboring of terrorists.418
Nevertheless, on August 23, 1996, the Treasury Department granted an
exemption to Occidental Petroleum Corporation permitting it to join
Canada's Arakis Energy Corporation in the development of fields in
southern Sudan containing an estimated 3.5 billion barrels of oil.419 The
Clinton Administration's attempt to distinguish between the exemption
granted to Occidental and U.S. policy toward Iran was factually defi-
cient.420 Although Occidental was subsequently excluded from partici-
414. See id. Other potential targets of unilateral American sanctions include Indone-
sia, Nigeria, Pakistan and Turkey based primarily on these countries' abysmal human
rights records. See Paul Blustein, Burma Campaign Has Business Fighting Trend To-
ward Sanctions, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 1997, at Cl, available in 1997 WL 9337742. The
United States presently maintains a trade embargo, export or import restrictions or other
forms of economic sanctions on seventy-three countries. This proliferating use of eco-
nomic sanctions has been credited with "creating regulatory chaos, confusion about objec-
tives, strains in relations with allies and sometimes counterproductive responses - often
without achieving the purpose for which the sanctions were designed." U.S. Rethinking
Economic Sanctions; State Dept. Team Weighs Costs, Impact of Trade Restrictions, WASH.
POST, Jan. 26, 1998, at A6, available in 1998 WL 2464160.
415. See Losman, supra note 413, at C3. See also Barry Schweid, Albright Asks EU to
Curb Trade, ASSOc. PRESS, Apr. 28, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4863925.
416. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2332
(1994).
417. Section 321(a) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 pro-
vides in part that:
[e]xcept as provided in regulations issued by the Secretary of Treasury, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, whoever, being a United States per-
son, knowing or having reasonable cause to know that a country is desig-
nated under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act ... as a country
supporting international terrorism, engages in a financial transaction with
the government of that country, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for
not more than 10 years or both.
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2332d(a) (1994).
418. Sudan has been described as trailing only Iran as a training ground for Islamic
extremists involved in attacks upon pro-U.S. interests in the Middle East such as the at-
tempted assassination of Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in
June 1995. See David B. Ottaway, U.S. Eased Law on Terrorism to Aid Oil Firm; Exemp-
tion Let Occidental Seek Major Deal in Sudan, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 1997, at Al.
419. See id.
420. State Department officials defended the exemption on the existence of relations
MEDDLING WITH THE MULLAHS
pation in this project by the Sudanese Government in November 1996,
the Treasury Department's waiver may establish a precedent for U.S.
companies seeking to conduct business in similarly-listed countries in
the future.421
Recent U.S. policy toward Iran is plagued with this same inconsis-
tency. Despite the characterization of current Iranian policies as a seri-
ous threat to U.S. national security interests, ILSA fails to sanction ex-
isting investments in Iran 422 and requires artificially high levels of
investment before penalties may be triggered. 423 ILSA is also rife with
provisions granting exceptions, waivers and delays from the imposition
of penalties.424 Perhaps most instructive is the complete failure of the
Clinton Administration to utilize ILSA against a single foreign firm.
Furthermore, despite the existence of ILSA's sanctions regime and
growing American concerns about Iran's influence in Europe, the Mid-
dle East and central Asia, the United States failed to condemn Iranian
violations of the Bosnian arms embargo425 and welcomed Iranian efforts
to negotiate an end to ongoing hostilities in Afghanistan. 426
The use of sanctions similar to those contained within ILSA pres-
ents a "slippery slope" for the current and future administrations. At
the time of his signature of ILSA, President Clinton failed to clearly ar-
ticulate when sanctions are a legitimate tool of U.S. foreign policy.427 In
between the United States and Sudan and the absence of such relations with Iran. See id.
However, Sudan is a close ally of Iran, actively supports Islamic extremist causes and,
according to a spokesman for the State Department's Office of Counter-Terrorism, has not
ceased its support of acts of international terrorism since the enactment of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. See id.
421. See id. Representative William McCollum (Republican, Florida) characterized the
exemption as a violation of Congress' intent in enacting the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 and a potential precedent for American companies seeking ex-
emptions from future administrations. See id.
422. See ILSA, Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 5(a), 110 Stat. 1541, 1546 (1996).
423. See id §§ 4(d)(1), 5(a).
424. See id. §§ 4(c), 5(f), 9(a), 9(c).
425. See U.S. Warned of Iran Efforts to Build Influence in Bosnia, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 28,
1997, at 11, available in 1997 WL 3615309. Iran is alleged to have supplied hundreds of
millions of dollars of weapons to Bosnia during its war with Serbia. Id.
426. See Busy are the Peacemakers, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 1998, at A27. Iran is part of
the so-called "Six Plus Two" seeking to broker a peace agreement amongst the warring
factions in Afghanistan. The other members of the group are the United States, Russia,
Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and the Peoples' Republic of China. Id.
See also Barbara Crosette, U.S., Iran Talk Relations Show Signs of Thaw; Washington
Works with Tehran to End Afghans' Civil War, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 15, 1997, at 3, available in
1997 WL 16808162. State Department official Karl Inderfurth stated that "[the United
States is] hopeful that the Iranians will play a constructive role in bringing their influ-
ence to bear to see the fighting stop and negotiations begin for the establishment of a
broad-based government in Afghanistan." Id.
427. See Clay Chandler, U.S. Expects Furor Over Trade Sanctions at Summit, WASH.
POST, June 27, 1996, at A20.
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order to address this uncertainty, on January 7, 1998, the Clinton Ad-
ministration announced guidelines governing, the utilization of eco-
nomic sanctions by the United States. 428 These guidelines provided, in
part, that the United States should only resort to sanctions after the
failure of other diplomatic options. 429 Additionally, international sup-
port and participation should be sought prior to undertaking unilateral
measures. 430 Finally, the guidelines provide that sanctions should be
carefully designed to avoid unnecessary hardships to innocent par-
ties.431
ILSA violates several of these guidelines. Initially, although the
Clinton Administration as well as its predecessors attempted to per-
suade U.S. allies such as the member states of the European Union to
discontinue their policy of "critical dialogue" with the Iranian govern-
ment, there is no evidence that the United States discussed the specific
provisions of ILSA with its European allies prior to its enactment.
Rather, ILSA provided for such dialogue only after its enactment and
prior to the actual imposition of penalties upon foreign firms. 432 There is
also no evidence that the Clinton Administration tried the most direct
diplomatic option of all prior to the enactment of ILSA - specifically the
initiation of dialogue with Iran. Rather, the Clinton Administration and
Congress rushed ILSA through the legislative process after the terrorist
attack in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia and the downing of Trans-World Air-
lines Flight 800. 4 3 3 Additionally, as previously noted, there is a complete
lack of support for ILSA in the community of nations. 434 This lack of
support is echoed in the international business community which has
continued to conduct business with Iran in a largely unfettered fash-
ion.435 Finally, the sanctions imposed by ILSA place unnecessary hard-
ships upon innocent third parties. NIOC's qualifications as an innocent
third party may be questioned due to the role of the Iranian Govern-
ment in its ownership and operations. However, foreign persons en-
gaging in good faith business transactions in Iran in strict compliance
with their national laws may qualify as innocent third parties.
The U.S. leadership role in international affairs is threatened
through the appearance of weakness if the Clinton Administration con-
tinues in its failure to impose sanctions pursuant to ILSA. Despite as-
428. See Stuart E. Eizenstat, Undersecretary for Economic, Agricultural and Business
Affairs, Remarks before the North American Committee of the National Policy Association
(Jan. 7, 1998) (visited Sept. 13, 1998) <http://www.state.gov/www/policyremarks/
980107_eizenpolicyassoc.html>. See also Sanctions Policy Review, WASH. POST, Jan. 8,
1998, at A22.
429. Eizenstat, supra note 428.
430. See id.
431. See id.
432. See supra notes 267, 345-47 and accompanying text.
433. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
434. See supra notes 28-39 and accompanying text.
435. See supra notes 219-42 and accompanying text.
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surances that it would fully and completely implement ILSA,436 the
Clinton Administration failed to impose sanctions against numerous
companies from throughout the world which have invested or agreed to
invest billions of dollars in the Iranian oil, gas and petrochemicals in-
dustries. 437 These failures, when combined with the Administration's
apparent willingness to waive other sanctions legislation as evidenced
by its conduct in relation to the Sudan,438 do not indicate an active en-
forcement policy during ILSA's remaining three-year term. Every new
investment in Iran's oil and gas industries constitutes a "direct chal-
lenge" to the policy of Iranian isolation,439 and every concomitant U.S.
failure to impose sanctions "sends a message of weakness to Iran."4 40
While the Clinton Administration continues to give lip service to sanc-
tions, Iran continues to develop its oil and gas industries and expand its
influence in the Middle East and central Asia.441 In this regard, Iranian
actions speak louder than idle American threats.442 An effective sanc-
tions policy should grant the executive branch considerable latitude and
not have the imposition of sanctions as its sole focus. 443 However, a pol-
icy which contains severe penalties that are never imposed is no deter-
rent at all. The net effect of such a policy is to undermine the credibility
of the policymaker. 444
ILSA also fails to serve the U.S. international interests as it bases
American foreign policy on the further isolation of Iran which will fail
without the support of the international community. Initially, although
politically popular,445 economic sanctions are generally ineffective as a
weapon against unpopular regimes. For example, the United Nations
imposed numerous economic sanctions on Saddam Hussein's Iraq sub-
sequent to its invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, but none of these
sanctions achieved the goal of forcing an Iraqi withdrawal. Indeed, it
has been noted that had the sanctions been given six to twelve months
to achieve effectiveness, the Gulf War and the plunder of Kuwait may
have been prolonged, Iraqi military positions would have been rein-
436. See U.S. Sanctions may Backfire on Russia-Iran Oil Deal, Dow JONES ENERGY
SERV., Oct. 16, 1997.
437. See supra notes 243-55 and accompanying text.
438. See supra notes 416-21 and accompanying text.
439. Lippman, supra note 230, at Al.
440. Lippman, supra note 252, at A23.
441. See IRAN: EIA REPORT, supra note 181, at 2, 4 and 11. See also Iran Economic
Overview, supra note 179, at 2.
442. See Iran Fights Back at U.S. Moves to Isolate It, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 1996, at
A24.
443. See Haass, supra note 262, at C9. See also Lippman, supra note 246, at Al.
444. See U.S. Ponders Sanctions for Oil Deal in Iran, supra note 219, at A9. See also
U.S. Aides Still Divided Over Sanctions on Foreign Investors in Iran, supra note 258, at
A33.
445. Richard N. Haass characterized sanctions as offering "U.S. policymakers and
members of Congress an attractive compromise between doing nothing and sending in the
Marines." Haass, supra note 262, at C9.
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forced, and the coalition may have fallen apart.446 Further, Saddam
Hussein remains firmly entrenched in power seven years after the end
of the Gulf War. Other examples demonstrating the general ineffective-
ness of economic sanctions include North Korea and Cuba where dicta-
torial Communist regimes remain in power despite over forty-six and
thirty-six years of U.S. sanctions respectively. 447 The U.S. military,
rather than economic sanctions, brought down the dictatorships of
Manuel Noriega in Panama and Rauol Cedras in Haiti. Economic sanc-
tions have proven to be "an imprecise and expectably ineffective tool" of
American foreign policy.448
As specifically applied to Iran, U.S. economic sanctions have an in-
consistent record of effectiveness. Although the U.S. sanctions regime
has tightened the availability of credit to Iran, 449 depressed the value of
it currency 450 and discouraged some foreign investment, 45 1 it has not
achieved the desired effect of wholesale modification of Iranian behav-
ior.452 Furthermore, it bears to note that other factors such as the ab-
sence of favorable terms and the availability of projects in other coun-
tries posing fewer risks have contributed to difficulties Iran has
experienced in obtaining credit and attracting investments in its oil and
gas industries. 45 3 Despite these difficulties, Iran has "managed to blunt
446. See Losman, supra note 413, at C3.
447. According to former U.S. Trade Representative Carla A. Hills, unilateral trade
sanctions against dictatorial regimes serve only to "impoverish people [without affecting]
the tyrant [who] doesn't care about the people." U.S. Rethinking Economic Sanctions;
State Dept. Team Weighs Costs, Impact of Trade Restrictions, supra note 414, at A6.
448. Georgie Anne Geyer, Castro Owes Clinton a Thank-You Letter, CHI. TRIB., Nov.
22, 1996, at 31, available in 1996 WL 2729273. See also Panel Approves Sanctions for
Foreign Firms Investing in Iran, supra note 18, at Al. Lawrence S. Eagleburger, who
served as Secretary of State under President George Bush, characterized secondary boy-
cotts as "nuts... an exercise in American imperialism ... [serving only to] get our allies
mad at us." Chandler, supra note 3, at A20. Additionally, President Clinton recently
noted that "automatic sanctions legislation" such as ILSA and the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 predicates American foreign policy upon dishonesty by
placing "enormous pressure on whoever is in the executive branch to fudge an evaluation
of the facts" in order to support a decision to avoid the imposition of sanctions which do
not enjoy support in the international community. Michael Kelly, Foreign Affairs Fudge
Factor, WASH. POST, May 6, 1998, at A19.
449. See Diplomacy with Iran, supra note 188, at A16.
450. See Rodman, supra note 261, at A25.
451. See supra notes 215-18 and accompanying text. See also IRAN: EIA REPORT, su-
pra note 181, at 3.
452. See Thomas W. Lippman, Critics Want U.S. to Reevaluate 'Dual Containment'
Policy on Iran and Iraq, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 1997, at A33. See also U.S. Economic Offen-
sive Against Iran's Energy Industry is Bearing Fruit, supra note 216, at A8. According to
the State Department's 1996 report entitled "Patterns of Global Terrorism," Iran remains
"the premier state sponsor of international terrorism and is deeply involved in the plan-
ning and execution of terrorist acts." David B. Ottaway, U.S. Considers Slugging it out
with International Terrorism, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 1996, at A25.
453. See U.S. Economic Offensive Against Iran's Energy Industry is Bearing Fruit, su-
pra note 216, at A8.
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the worst effects of American sanctions."45 4 Iran's gross domestic prod-
uct and international trade continue to grow, and foreign credit remains
available. 455 Additionally, as previously noted, investment in Iran's oil
and gas industries is booming. 456 These transactions are substantial
with potential investments and revenues totaling several billion dol-
lars. Perhaps most importantly, these investments have emanated from
throughout the world, from friend and foe alike as far afield as Europe,
Asia and North America. 45 7 U.S. prospects for blocking future invest-
ments and inflicting further damage upon the Iranian economy appear
"bleak."458 As a result, several respected figures in U.S. foreign policy
including Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft and Richard Murphy
have called for ILSA's scrapping and gradual reconciliation through the
forging of economic ties.459
Current U.S. policy also fails to recognize the geopolitical signifi-
cance of Iran. Encompassing over 600,000 square miles, Iran's location
casts it as an important player in Near Eastern affairs. 460 To the north,
Iran borders upon the oil-laden Caspian Sea, the new frontier in inter-
national petroleum exploration.461 Iran's northern boundaries also
touch upon the central Asian republics of Azerbaijan and Turkmeni-
stan, a contentious area in which the West, Iran and Russia are all jos-
tling for influence. 462 Western attempts to remove these largely land-
locked fledging republics from Russia's sphere of influence will not meet
with success if they are denied ties to Iran and the Persian Gulf.463 To
the west, Iran borders upon Turkey, a staunch U.S. ally plagued with
political unrest and economic upheaval.464 Iran also shares its western
border with Saddam Hussein's Iraq, an international pariah with con-
tinuing dreams of expansion to which Iran may serve as a valuable
counterweight. 465 Iran's proximity to the Strait of Hormuz to its south
grants it a potential chokehold on oil shipments originating in the Per-
454. Bakhash, supra note 263, at A27.
455. See supra notes 201-06 and accompanying text.
456. See supra notes 219-42 and accompanying text.
457. Stuart E. Eizenstat acknowledged that the conflict in policies between the United
States and the rest of the world on Iran has created "great complexities in implementing
an appropriate sanctions policy." Wright, supra note 264, at Al.
458. U.S. Isolated in Iran Policy, Assoc. PRESS, Dec. 6, 1997, available in 1997 WL
11923607.
459. See Lippman, supra note 452, at A33.
460. See EU Returns Envoys to Iran--with Conditions, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 30,
1997, available in 1997 WL 3285650.
461. See James Meek, China Joins Scramble for Black Gold, GUARDIAN, Sept. 29,
1997, available in 1997 WL 2402872.
462. See Ottaway & Morgan, supra note 226, at A37.
463. See Drozdiak, supra note 203, at A15.
464. See Couturier supra note 232, at A17; Lippman, supra note 230, at Al.
465. See Mr. Khatami's Speech, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 1998, at A24. See also Thomas
L. Friedman, New U.S. Ties With Iran Would Rattle Saddam, DENVER POST, Jan. 7, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 6098418.
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sian Gulf.46 6 Iran's southern boundaries also place it in uncomfortable
proximity to vital U.S. allies in the Gulf such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
Bahrain, Qatar and Oman. 467 Finally, Iran's eastern boundaries with
Pakistan and Afghanistan provide it with the potential to influence the
discordant voices of Islam emanating from these countries as well as
blunt growing Chinese efforts to extend its sphere of influence in cen-
tral Asia. 468 Those countries which choose to overlook or disregard
Iran's strategic role in Near Eastern affairs do so at their own peril. In
this regard, current U.S. policy on Iran could use a healthy dose of "re-
alpolitik."
In any event, ILSA will not succeed without international coopera-
tion which has not been forthcoming. The State Department has con-
ceded that the response of U.S. allies to ILSA has been "disappointing
and lukewarm."469 The U.S. drive to further isolate Iran is widely per-
ceived by the international community as originating not from concerns
regarding terrorism or opposition to the Middle East peace process but,
rather, from wounded American pride resulting from the Iranian hos-
tage crisis nineteen years ago. 470 As a result, American efforts to isolate
Iran are crumbling. U.S. allies have condemned ILSA471 while private
industry has ignored American pleas to refrain from investing in Iran's
oil and gas industries. 472 These policies and U.S. failure to impose sanc-
tions are likely to result in further investment in Iran's oil and gas in-
dustries as other foreign companies scramble to avoid exclusion from
the market.473 Such defections, and their likely continuation in the fu-
ture, have left the United States alone in its attempts to isolate Iran.
Tensions arising from these defections may make it more difficult for
the United States to work with its allies to attain their shared political
objectives in Iran. Ultimately, this tension may also prove fatal to
ILSA's success.
International opposition to ILSA is primarily based upon the per-
ceived extraterritorial application of U.S. law.474 Although they ac-
466. The Persian Gulf and the surrounding countries account for approximately thirty-
one percent of the world's total oil production and have sixty-three percent of the world's
proven resources. See Iran Physical Background. Location (visited Sept. 16, 1998)
<http://www.salamiran.org/Iraninfo/General/Geography>.
467. See Fouad, supra note 36.
468 See Ottaway & Morgan, supra note 227, at Al. See also Deal Tests U.S. Policy on
Tehran, supra note 228, at Al.
469. See Rosenfeld, supra note 259, at A17. Assistant Secretary of State Martin Indyk
conceded that the lack of international support and cooperation with regard to ILSA could
prove fatal to the accomplishment of its purposes. See U.S. Decision on Total Sanctions
"Imminent, "AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, May 14, 1998, available in 1998 WL 2281135.
470. See Sanctions on France, supra note 258, at A24.
471. See supra notes 28-39 and accompanying text.
472. See supra notes 219-42 and accompanying text.
473. See Christopher Bums, U.S., E.U. Use Caution Over Total-Iran Natural Gas
Deal, Dow JONES NEWS SERV., Oct. 5, 1997.
474. Hugo Paemen, the European Commission ambassador to the United States, char-
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knowledge that the United States is entitled to disagree with their at-
tempts to engage Iran, the international community has balked at
ILSA's perceived imposition of American foreign policy on a global
scale. 475 This imposition of American will is particularly irksome as it
penalizes foreign firms for engaging in commercial activities which are
lawful in their home countries. 476 As a result, ILSA has been subject to
sharp criticism from U.S. allies. Lionel Jospin, the French foreign min-
ister, scoffed at ILSA's purported extraterritorial reach stating that
"[n]obody accepts that the United States can pass a law on a global
scale."477 Germany's foreign minister Klaus Kinkel characterized ILSA
as a "reproach [of the European Union] for following its economic inter-
ests."478 Hassan Marican, the President of Malaysia's state-owned oil
company Petronas, criticized the Act as an attempt to interfere with his
company's right to choose with whom to transact business.479 Leveling
perhaps the strongest criticism of ILSA outside of Iran, South African
President Nelson Mandela condemned the United States for its "arro-
gance [in] dictat[ing] where [the international community] should go or
which countries should be our friends."480 It has been aptly noted that
the symbolism which the United States attempts to project through the
use of secondary boycotts such as ILSA - "that of a nation standing for
high moral principles - is regularly transmuted .... [into a foreign]
view [of the United States] as a bully who insists on getting its way."48 1
As the German newsmagazine Der Spiegel noted in a recent cover story:
[as] American idols and icons are shaping the world from Katmandu to
Kinshasa, from Cairo to Caracas .... [t]he Americans are acting, in
the absence of limits put to them by anybody or anything, as if they
own a blank check in their 'McWorld.' Strengthened by the end of
communism and an economic boom, Washington seems to have aban-
doned its self-doubts from the Vietnam trauma. America is now the
Schwarzenegger of international politics: showing off its muscles, ob-
trusive, intimidating.482
acterized ILSA as "an extreme case of extraterritorial legislation." Blustein, supra note 6,
at A25.
475. See EU Protests Law on Iran, Libya Sanctions, supra note 29.
476. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-523(I), at 20 (1996).
477. U.S. Must Grin and Bear it When Allies Dance with Foes, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Oct.
2, 1997, available in 1997 WL 6859439. Jospin further stated that, "American laws apply
only in the United States. They do not apply in France." Id.
478. Drozdiak, supra note 203, at A15. See also EU to Send Ambassadors Back to
Iran, supra note 205.
479. See Petronas says Iran Venture with Total, Gazprom to Continue, AFX, Nov. 16,
1997, available in 1997 WL 18133501.
480. William Drozdiak, Even Allies Resent U.S. Dominance, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 1997,
at Al.
481. Losman, supra note 413, at C3.
482. Drozdiak, supra note 480, at Ai.
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Such perceptions serve to create international resistance to Ameri-
can foreign policy objectives. Such a perception clearly does not further
U.S. international interests.
The response of other countries to ILSA also sets dangerous prece-
dents for their future relations with the United States. 48 3 A unanimous
European Union expressed "deep concern" regarding ILSA's enactment
and reserved the right to retaliate against the United States in defense
of its economic interests in Iran.48 4 Subsequent to the issuance of these
threats, the European Union prepared and studied measures for eco-
nomic retaliation against the United States to be imposed in the event
of ILSA's implementation. 48 5 These measures would bar European com-
panies from complying with American legislation deemed to have an
improper extraterritorial effect and place restrictions upon the import
of American goods and services. 48 6.Perhaps more troubling is the possi-
bility of "quiet, carefully targeted reprisals" against American compa-
nies.48 7 Such retaliation could consist of unofficial attempts to discour-
age consumption of American imports or the awarding of government
contracts to American businesses. These concerns led the European-
American Chamber of Commerce to denounce ILSA as "antithetical to
U.S. economic interests" and serving to increase the risk of European
retaliation which commenced with the enactment of the Helms-Burton
Act sanctioning trade with Cuba. 488 Indeed, as Lee H. Hamilton, the
ranking Democrat on the House International Relations Committee has
noted, the United States has "opened a whole new ball game here...
[which] could easily come back to bite us."489
ILSA also encourages American trading partners to enact similar
legislation and, in so doing, perhaps reopen old wounds relating to per-
ceived past injustices. In addition to the previously-noted Arab boycott
of Israel, 490 there are several other instances when sanctions similar to
483. In response to the Clinton Administration's announcement that it would investi-
gate Total's investment in Iran's South Pars natural gas field in September 1997, French
Foreign Ministry spokesman Jacques Rummelhardt stated that "the application of [ILSA]
would have serious consequences on international trade." U.S. Investigating Iranian Gas
Deal, supra note 30. See also U.S. Aides Still Divided Over Sanctions on Foreign Inves-
tors in Iran, supra note 258, at A33.
484. See Rick Atkinson, Divergent Policies Toward Iran Strain U.S.-German Relations,
WASH. POST, June 27, 1996, at A21. See also U.S. to Investigate Total's Deal with Iran,
supra note 33.
485. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
486. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-523(I), at 20 (1996). See also IRAN: EIA REPORT, supra
note 181, at 3.
487. Chandler, supra note 3, at A20.
488. Blustein, supra note 6, at A25.
489. Chandler, supra note 3, at A20. Representative Hamilton called for the resump-
tion of diplomatic relations and initiation of American-Iranian exchange programs in
April 1998. Afshin Valinejad, Tehran's Top Moderate Mayor Freed from Jail by Iran's Top
Cleric, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 16, 1998, available in 1998 WL 9129233.
490. See supra notes 359-66 and accompanying text.
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those contained in ILSA could be utilized by other countries to the po-
tential detriment of the United States. For example, the Peoples' Re-
public of China could place restrictions upon imports, investments and
government purchases from countries which maintain commercial rela-
tions with Taiwan. These restrictions could be justified on the basis that
commercial relations with Taiwan serve to strengthen its economic in-
frastructure and defense capabilities. Such a result could strengthen
Taiwan's status as a "renegade province," 491 thereby thwarting reunifi-
cation and presenting a national security risk to the Peoples' Republic
of China.
Such legislation could have severe consequences for American in-
dustry which trades over $57 billion of goods and services with the Peo-
ples' Republic of China annually. 492 In addition to the loss of current
markets, such legislation could also serve to exclude American compa-
nies from future business opportunities in the burgeoning Chinese
economy. 493 From a political standpoint, the exclusion of the United
States from the Chinese economy would greatly reduce any influence
the United States could exercise over a government in Beijing eager to
flex its growing economic and military might. Such restrictions could
also exacerbate the U.S. trade deficit with the Peoples' Republic of
China which grew to $33.8 billion in 1995. 4 94 Nor is such a scenario
limited to relations between the Peoples' Republic of China and Taiwan.
Any countries with political, economic or military axes to grind such as
India and Pakistan could impose such restrictions to discourage trade
with its enemies and retard their economic development.
In addition to the threat posed to American business interests by
the adoption of retaliatory measures by its trading partners, ILSA also
serves to exclude American companies from pursuit of lucrative oppor-
tunities in the Middle Eastern oil and gas industries. American compa-
nies are not only prohibited from pursuing opportunities worth billions
of dollars within Iran but are also excluded from opportunities which
491. The Peoples' Republic of China has never recognized the independence of Taiwan.
Rather, the government in Beijing deems Taiwan to be a " breakaway renegade province."
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TAIWAN: STATE DEPARTMENT NOTES (1995) (visited Sept. 16,
1998) <http://www.state.gov/wwwlbackgroundnotes/taiwan_971100_bgn.html> [hereinaf-
ter TAIWAN: STATE DEPARTMENT NOTES].
492. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, CHINA: STATE DEPARTMENT NOTES (1996) (vis-
ited Sept. 16, 1998) <http://www.state.gov/www/backgroundnotes/china_1196_bgn.html>
[hereinafter CHINA: STATE DEPARTMENT NOTES]. By contrast, United States-Taiwan
trade totaled $48 billion in 1996. See TAIWAN: STATE DEPARTMENT NOTES, supra note 491,
at 3.
493. The World Bank estimates that China's economic output will experience an an-
nual growth rate of eight to ten percent by the year 2000 and will equal $10 trillion annu-
ally by the middle of the next century. See CHINA: STATE DEPARTMENT NOTES, supra note
492, at 3. China's gross domestic product was estimated at $3.39 trillion in 1996 with an
annual growth rate of 9.7%. See World Factbook,
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/worldref/country/china.html>.
494. See CHINA: STATE DEPARTMENT NOTES, supra note 492, at 3.
1998
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
have Iranian connections. Furthermore, the sanctions required to be
imposed by the President and any retaliation in response thereto may
result in lost sales, profits and jobs for American companies. These con-
cerns were noted but ultimately disregarded by Congress in its rush to
address concerns regarding international terrorism in the wake of the
Khobar Towers bombing and the crash of Trans-World Airlines Flight
800. 4 95 Indeed, U.S. use of secondary boycotts and stringent economic
sanctions such as those contained in ILSA has become
"[i]ncreasingly... cavalier with scant regard to their actual impact on
American interests."496 Rather, the best chance of modifying Iranian
behavior while protecting American business interests abroad may be
"to resume arms-length commercial dealings with firms [in Iran] saving
demands for the international policy changes by [the Iranian] govern-
ment for the day when political dialogue can begin."49 7
Furthermore, attempting to fortify the failing policy of economic
isolation with extraterritorial penalties which primarily harm our allies
will only serve to place American businesses at a greater disadvantage
in penetrating the marketplace in a more moderate Iran in the future.
Commercial relations simply will not spring up overnight upon the in-
evitable resumption of diplomatic relations between the United States
and Iran. American businesses will find themselves engaged in fierce
competition with well-established foreign industries deeply rooted in
the Iranian economy. As in Vietnam, American industry will enter the
Iranian marketplace with a multiyear competitive disadvantage.
The current American policy towards Iran also fails to recognize
the positive influence that private businesses may exert toward encour-
aging the kinds of behavior that the United States deems appropriate.
Although no one would argue that the presence of American businesses
in Moscow or Beijing have had a quantifiable positive effect upon inter-
national relations and the state of human rights protections in these
countries, it remains inescapable that commercial relations bring people
of differing cultural and political backgrounds together. This fact has
been recognized in diplomatic circles for years, hence the inclusion of
495. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-523(I), at 21 (1996).
496. Haass, supra note 262, at C9. See also Losman, supra note 413, at C3. For ex-
ample, in April 1998, Mobil Corporation requested that the Clinton administration grant
it a license to trade one million barrels of crude oil generated from its operations in the
Burun oil field in Turkmenistan for crude oil located in Iranian facilities on the Persian
Gulf. See Mobil Seeks License for Oil Swap with Iran, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 1998, at Fl.
Mobil's partners in the operation, Monument Oil and Gas PLC of the United Kingdom
and BurrenVSTT of Bermuda, have utilized such trades with Iran to get crude oil pro-
duced from the field to market while Mobil has been required to ship its product by barge
across the Caspian Sea at considerable expense. Id. Economist Gary Hufbauer estimates
that sanctions cost U.S. businesses in excess of $20 billion per year on a global basis. See
A Case for Restraint on Trade Sanctions, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 8, 1998, available in 1998 WL
3908611.
497. Bolster, supra note 406, at A20.
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trade agreements and commercial exchanges in the process of normali-
zation of relations between countries. Such is the approach toward Iran
taken by the more-forward thinking U.S. allies such as the European
Union. Although it is unduly optimistic to conclude that an American
policy of commercial engagement would instantly abrogate almost
twenty years of innate suspicion and overt hostility, it most certainly
bodes better for the future of American-Iranian relations than the pres-
ent policy of stringent economic isolationism.
ILSA may also discourage reform by presenting the Iranian Gov-
ernment with expanded opportunities to appeal to Iranian nationalism
through renewed attacks upon the United States. Despite President
Khatami's proclamation of a new era for Iran upon his election, the true
meaning and implications of his surprising victory remain to be deter-
mined.498 Some analysts hailed Khatami's victory as evidence of an im-
minent collapse of Iran's particular blend of Islam and politics 499 while
others concluded that it raised questions about individual freedom, the
rule of law and the role of Islam in daily life.500 Less idealistic observers
noted that Khatami's election was merely a reflection of social realities
in a country where fifty percent of the population was born after the
Islamic revolution and has a lesser degree of devotion to its tenets. 501
Outwardly, the Clinton Administration exercised great restraint and
characterized Khatami's election as a "hopeful development" which it
would monitor with "a great deal of interest."5 2 What can be concluded
with some degree of certainty is that Khatami's election represented a
crushing blow to the previously-unchallenged power of the conservative
mullahs and their hard-line supporters.5
0 3
498. See Anwar Faruqi, Khatami's Victory a New Stage in Battle of Moderate, Hardlin-
ers, ASSOC. PRESS, May 25, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4868019.
499. See Islam's Political Football, ECONOMIST, Dec. 13, 1997, available in 1997 WL
17832709.
500. See Iran's Vote Sends Unusual Message, supra note 107.
501. See Darius, Bazargan, Iran: Regime Must Win Over the Youth to Survive, INTER
PRESS SERV., Apr. 15, 1997, available in 1997 WL 7074812.
502. See John F. Harris, Clinton 'Hopeful' But Skeptical on New Iranian Leader,
WASH. POST, May 30, 1997, at A27. However, it bears to note that, in August 1997, the
Clinton Administration relayed a message to Iran through Swiss diplomatic channels
proposing face-to-face discussions between the U.S. and Iranian Governments. See U.S.
Proposed Direct Talks in Overture to Iran, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 1998, at Al.
503. See Anwar Faruqi, President-Elect Visits Shrine of Khomeini, ORANGE COUNTY
REGISTER, May 27, 1997, available in 1997 WL 7425325. However, other commentators
are less optimistic about the Khatami Administration and its purported moderate tenden-
cies. Achraf Pahlavi, the twin sister of Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, the last Shah of Iran,
stated that "it is a mistake to see [Khatami's] election [as] a promise of imminent change
in Iran." Achraf Pahlavi, Engaging with Iran is not the Answer, WASH. POST, Aug. 7,
1997, at A22. Khatami remains an advocate of the Islamic revolution, albeit a more
broad-minded advocate than his predecessors. See Lancaster, supra note 117, at A29. As
a result, some commentators have concluded that Iran will not modify its behavior in any
significant manner thereby providing justification for the lifting of U.S. economic sanc-
tions. See also A 'Moderate' in Tehran, WASH. POST, May 26, 1997, at A18.
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Although Iran's conservative clergy have suffered a string of de-
feats culminating in Khatami's call for dialogue with the United States
and the questioning of its legitimacy in governmental affairs, they re-
main a powerful force. 50 4 As a result, "a now-scarcely concealed struggle
for the future of the Iranian revolution" is occurring between the arch-
conservative clerical establishment and moderate supporters of Presi-
dent Khatami.50 5 Despite the overwhelming nature of his electoral vic-
tory, Khatami's triumph in this struggle is far from assured. The Is-
lamic Consultative Assembly remains firmly in the control of religious
conservatives 506 and Khatami's political allies have been subject to at-
tack.5 07 Most importantly, Ayatollah Khamenei, the supreme religious
leader and highest ranking government official, has strongly rejected
Khatami's calls for dialogue with the United States. 50 8 Iran's media re-
flect this division of opinion as conservative newspapers condemned any
resumption of relations with the United States while other publications
characterized Khatami's remarks as a precursor to the resumption of
diplomatic relations.50 9
The outcome of President Khatami's initiative defies easy predic-
tion. At the very least, such a dialogue would be a major setback to the
conservative clergy and could alter the balance of power in favor of
504. For example, conservative opponents of President Khatami made gains in par-
liamentary by-elections held in March 1998. See Opposition Candidates Gain in Iran, S.F.
CHRON., Mar. 15, 1998, at A-13. See also Lancaster, supra note 99, at A1O; Iran's New
President Breaks Taboo by Re-examining Policy on U.S., DES MOINES REGISTER, Jan. 7,
1998, available in 1998 WL 3187022.
505. Mr. Khatami's Speech, supra note 465, at A24. See also Iran President Backs Tol-
erance, ASSOC. PRESS, Apr. 22, 1998, available in 1998 WL 6654118; Rossant, supra note
93; Iran: Pro-Khatami Backers Clash With Vigilantes, supra note 93.
506. See A Leading Hard-line Opponent of Iran's... ASSOC. PRESS, May 31, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 7418612. Ali Akbar Nateq-Nouri, Khatami's major opposition in the
presidential election, was re-elected to the speakership of the Assembly by a vote of 211 to
32. See id.
507. See An Air of Optimism in Iran, supra note 180, at Al. In December 1997, the Is-
lamic Consultative Assembly initiated the filing of corruption charges against Gholam
Hossein Karbaschi, the mayor of Tehran and a close political ally of Khatami. See id.
Karbaschi was subsequently detained upon orders from Ayatollah Mohammed Yazdi, the
conservative head of the judicial branch. See Hard-Liners Back Off on Tehran Mayor,
WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 1998, at A23. Karbaschi was released upon bail by order of Ayatol-
lah Klhamenei after thousands of his supporters clashed with Iranian riot police in the
streets of Tehran in April 1998. See Ex-Iran Leader Defends Tehran Mayor, ASSOC.
PRESS, Apr. 18, 1998, available in 1998 WL 6652839. See also Tehran Mayor Returns to
Work, ASSOc. PRESS, Apr. 15, 1998, available in 1998 WL 6653197.
508. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
509. The conservative newspaper Jomhuri Islami rejected any basis for the resump-
tion of dialogue with the United States stating that "[alny hands that reach out to Amer-
ica should be cut off." Iran's New President'Breaks Taboo by Re-examining Policy on U.S,
supra note 504. However, the conservative Tehran Times spoke favorably about the "re-
sumption of diplomatic ties." See Iranians React Cautiously to Khatami's Offer of Contacts
with Americans, ASSOC. PRESS, Jan. 8, 1998, available in 1998 WL 6636633. See also
Iran's Hard-line Press Speaks on Dialogue with Washington, ASSOC. PRESS, Dec. 17, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 4897177.
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moderate voices in Iran. 510 On the other hand, tougher economic sanc-
tions, including the actual implementation of ILSA, will send a hostile
signal to the Khatami Administration, strengthen the position of its op-
ponents and further radicalize Iranian behavior.5 1' Such a policy will
provide the Iranian Government with further opportunities to demonize
the United States and may re-ignite the strident anti-American pas-
sions prevalent in the years immediately following the Islamic revolu-
tion.51 2
At the very least, ILSA discourages the United States from success-
fully exercising future influence in Iran. Current U.S. policy towards
Iran and in the Middle East in general has limited the U.S. role in fu-
ture political dialogue in the region.5 1 3 Several other countries, some of
which are not welcome by the United States, are anxious to fill the vac-
uum created by the absence of American influence in Iran. The U.S.
diplomatic quarantine of Iran runs the risk forging closer ties between
Tehran and Moscow and increasing Russian influence in the region.5 1 4
Such a result is clearly contrary to American objectives of denying Rus-
sian access to the Persian Gulf and fostering separation between Russia
and its former satellite states in central Asia. 51 5 This vacuum could also
be filled by the Peoples' Republic of China. Although Chinese influence
in Iran may present a less likely scenario than that of Russia due to
geographic, cultural and political distance, Chinese efforts to advance
its objectives in central Asia through ambitious investments in Iran's oil
and gas industries should not be discounted.5 16
The European Union also stands willing to fill the void created by
the absence of American influence in Iran. Despite increased tensions
regarding Iranian complicity in terrorist attacks occurring in Europe,
the European Union recognized Iran's geopolitical importance and thus
refused to sever diplomatic relations.5' 7 As a result, the European Un-
ion has maintained its influence in Iran. Hoping to expand this influ-
ence in the coming year, the European Union declared a "new begin-
510. See Rodman, supra note 182, at A13.
511. See Bolster, supra note 406, at A20. See also Haass, supra note 262, at C9; Atkin-
son, supra note 484, at A21; Lippman, U.S. Aides Still Divided Over Sanctions on Foreign
Investors in Iran, supra note 258, at A33.
512. See Losman, supra note 413, at C3.
513. See Josef Federman, Momentum Gathering for Changes in U.S. Policy Toward
Iran, Assoc. PRESS, Jan. 24, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4853210.
514. See Drozdiak, supra note 203, at A15. See also EU Returns Envoys to Iran--with
Conditions, supra note 460.
515. See supra notes 475 and 476 and accompanying text. Tsalik Nayberg, the chief
representative of the U.S. oil company Unocal in Turkmenistan, has aptly noted in this
regard that "Russia's desire to control central Asia can be seen by a blind man." Myre,
supra note 189.
516. See supra note 448 and accompanying text.
517. See Afshin Valinejad, Iran Says German, Danish Ambassadors Not Welcome to
Return, Assoc. PRESS, Apr. 30, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4864238. See also EU Returns
Envoys to Iran--with Conditions, supra note 460.
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ning" in its relations with Iran in 1998 consisting of "substantial dia-
logue" concerning "critical topics."518 Although the ultimate success of
such efforts remain to be seen, the absence of American voices in this
dialogue can only serve to further isolate U.S. policy on Iran and erode
American influence in the region.
Additionally, ILSA could weaken the United States in the eyes of
the Iranian government if the Clinton Administration fails to follow
through on its threats to impose sanctions. As previously noted, the
Clinton Administration has failed to impose sanctions on a single per-
son since the enactment of ILSA two years ago.519 However, the threat
of sanctions never to be imposed loses credence and constitutes no pen-
alty or restraint upon future conduct at all.5 20 The repeated failure of
the United States to enforce ILSA may result in the loss of its restrain-
ing effect upon foreign investment in Iran's oil and gas industries and
Iranian behavior and diminution of American willpower in the eyes of
the regime in Tehran. 21 The non-implementation of the severe penal-
ties contained within Section 6 by a reluctant administration does little
more than make the United States appear indecisive and conflicted.
Such an appearance can hardly be expected to dissuade foreign busi-
nesses seeking to invest in Iran's oil and gas industries especially given
the enormous potential revenues at stake.
Finally, ILSA is an overreaction to the Islamic regime in Tehran.
This overreaction is most apparent in comparing the sanctions imposed
upon Iran with those imposed upon the Soviet Union during the Cold
War. For example, during the 1970s, American-Soviet relations were
under considerable strain as a result of the provision of Soviet weap-
onry to the Egyptian army during the 1973 Middle East War, the Soviet
intervention in the Angolan civil war, rising Soviet military expendi-
tures and human rights concerns. As a result, in 1975, the Soviet Union
was prohibited from receiving more than three hundred million dollars
in new credits from the Export-Import Bank without presidential and
congressional determinations that such new credits were in the national
interest of the United States.5 2 2 On August 1, 1978, President Jimmy
Carter placed all exports of oil and gas exploration and production
equipment to the Soviet Union on the Commodity Control List, thereby
requiring that all such exports receive a validated license from the U.S.
518. See Germany Wants "New Beginning" in Ties with Iran, ASSOc. PRESS, Jan. 9,
1998, available in 1998 WL 6636994. See also Seeing More "Constructive" Leadership, EU
Upgrades Iran Relations, Assoc. PRESS, Feb. 23, 1998, available in 1998 WL 7389330.
519. See notes 243-55 and accompanying text.
520. See notes 436-44 and accompanying text.
521. See notes 436-44 and 456-58 and accompanying text.
522. See Stanley J. Marcuss, New Light on the Export-Import Bank, in UNITED STATES
FINANCING OF EAST-WEST TRADE 266 (Paul Marer ed., 1975). The restriction also included
a total prohibition upon financing for fossil fuel production and a forty million dollar limit
upon credits for fossil fuel research and exploration while the three hundred million dollar
ceiling remained in force and effect. See id.
VOL. 27:1
MEDDLING WITH THE MULLAHS
Department of Commerce. 523 The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on
December 27, 1979 resulted in the imposition of further restrictions
upon trade with the Soviet Union. President Carter suspended all
shipments of grain to the Soviet Union beyond the eight million tons
provided for in the 1975 U.S.-Soviet Union grain trade agreement,
thereby blocking the sale of seventeen million tons of corn and wheat.524
President Carter also suspended the issuance of validated licenses for
export of high-technology products pending the drafting of new guide-
lines and invalidated all outstanding licenses. 525 Additionally, President
Carter imposed a quota upon American imports of Soviet ammonia and
banned the export of phosphates and related fertilizer products to the
Soviet Union.526 Finally, Aeroflot flights to the United States were se-
verely limited, and the Soviet fishing quota in American waters was re-
duced by 350,000 tons.527 As a result, American-Soviet trade declined
from 3.2 billion dollars in January through November 1979 to 1.2 billion
dollars during the same period in 1980.528
However, those sanctions pale when compared to the sanctions cur-
rently in place against Iran. As previously noted, these sanctions in-
clude complete prohibitions upon the import of Iranian-origin goods and
services into the United States as well the export of U.S.-origin goods
and services to Iran.5 29 U.S. persons are prohibited from making new
investments in Iran. 530 The involvement of a U.S. person in any trans-
action to develop Iran's petroleum resources is prohibited regardless of
its date of origin.531 U.S. financial institutions are prohibited from en-
gaging in any transaction related to goods or services of Iranian ori-
gin5 32 and servicing accounts controlled by the Iranian Government.533
These penalties are in addition to those imposed upon third persons
pursuant to ILSA.
523. See ERIK P. LINDELL, UNITED STATES REGULATION OF AMERICAN MULTI-
NATIONAL INVOLVEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION DURING DtTENTE 95-6 (1982). Despite
these restrictions, U.S. exports to the Soviet Union reached record levels in 1979 totaling
in excess of three and one half billion dollars. Additionally, in October 1975, the United
States and the Soviet Union signed a grain trade agreement whereby the Soviet Union
agreed to purchase a minimum of six million tons of corn and wheat from the United
States annually and an additional two million tons without prior consultation with the
U.S. Government. In September 1979, the Department of Agriculture approved the sale of
up to twenty-five million metric tons of corn and wheat to the Soviet Union, the largest
single grain purchase in American history. See id. at 98.
524. See SHAHEEN AYUBI ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IN UNITED STATES FOREIGN
POLICY 21 (1982).
525. See id. at 22.
526. See id.
527. See id.
528. See LINDELL, supra note 523, at 99.
529. See supra notes 158-61 and 167-68 and accompanying text.
530. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
531. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
532. See supra notes 160 and 169 and accompanying text.
533. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
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The charges against the government in Tehran are serious. Iran's
sponsorship of terrorist groups,5 34 efforts to acquire weapons of mass
destruction 535 and hostility to the Arab-Israeli peace process 536 are ma-
jor impediments to achieving peace and security in the Middle East and
fostering cordial relations amongst all peoples. As the sole remaining
superpower, the United States must accept the challenge to firmly ad-
dress and overcome these obstacles. However, a "head-in-the-sand" pol-
icy which fails to engage the cause of these impediments and alienates
U.S. allies is unrealistic and arrogant. For example, despite fighting an
eight year war which cost the lives of more than 58,000 Americans, the
United States recently began the process of normalization of diplomatic
and economic relations with Vietnam. 537 Furthermore, the United
States maintained diplomatic and economic dialogue with the former
Soviet Union even while relations were contentious, nuclear weapons
remained pointed at one another and each country pursued policies de-
signed to thwart the other in the international arena.53 Despite the se-
rious nature of Iran's aberrant behavior, it cannot be convincingly ar-
gued that the threat to world peace and global security posed by it
exceeds the one posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
V. CONCLUSION
The Islamic regime in Iran has been the bane of every U.S. presi-
dent for the last nineteen years. With the blessing of the Iranian Gov-
ernment, Islamic militants seized the American Embassy in Tehran and
held fifty-two Americans, as well as the Carter Administration, hostage
for 444 days. The hostage crisis humiliated the United States on an in-
ternational scale at a time when Cold War hostilities with the Soviet
Union were reaching new and dangerous levels. The hostage crisis also
polarized American opinions of Iran, and perhaps Islam in general, as
Americans were confronted with the nightly specter of burning flags
and chants of "Death to America." More than any other event, the hos-
tage crisis epitomized the alleged impotence of the United States during
the Carter years and succeeded in returning a Republican to the White
House.
However, the Reagan and Bush Administrations found themselves
equally incapable of quelling abhorrent Iranian behavior. Iranian spon-
sorship of acts of international terrorism continued unabated and in-
cluded alleged complicity in the bombings of the Marine barracks in
534. See supra notes 135-42 and accompanying text.
535. See supra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
536. See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
537. See Clinton to Open Full Economic Relations with Vietnam, AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, Dec. 18, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13456917. See also Clinton Waives Major
Curb on Trade with Vietnam, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 1998, at A6, available in 1998 WL-
WSJ 3485800.
538. See Rodman, supra note 182, at A13. See also Rodman, supra note 261, at A25.
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Beirut in October 1983 and Pan Am Flight 103 in December 1988 as
well as the seizure and protracted holding of Americans as hostages in
Lebanon. The Iranian military continued to grow in strength and posed
a threat to its weaker neighbors and shipping in the Persian Gulf.539
The Iranian Government expressed no reservations about flexing its
military might as evidenced by its cataclsymic eight year war with Iraq.
The Iranian Government also continued its efforts to export its revolu-
tionary blend of Islam and politics throughout the Middle East as evi-
denced by its sponsorship of a failed coup d'6tat in Bahrain in 1981 and
its efforts to topple the ruling monarchy in Saudi Arabia. American
humiliation at the hands of the Iranians also continued as attempts to
circumvent prohibitions upon armament shipments to Central America
through Iran by the Reagan Administration erupted into the Iran-
Contra affair. The scandal occupied much of President Reagan's time
and effort during his second term and left a permanent blemish upon
his record of achievement. Furthermore, the scandal badly damaged the
reputation of then-Vice President George Bush who incredulously in-
sisted he was "out of the loop" with regard to the American initiative to
Iran.
Although he has been able to avoid humiliation at the hands of the
Iranian Government, President Clinton has had little success in modi-
fying Iranian behavior. Iranian sponsorship of groups deemed to be ter-
rorist in nature by the United States is believed to be ongoing. Such
groups have been implicated in suicide bombings in Israel, assassina-
tions throughout Europe and the attack upon the U.S. military complex
in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Iranian efforts to develop chemical, nuclear
and biological weapons are ongoing, and the country is on the verge of
operating its first nuclear power plant. Iranian opposition to the Arab-
Israeli peace process has encouraged resistance to the process by ex-
tremist groups as well as many Palestinians. The Clinton Administra-
tion has managed to avoid the pitfalls which ensnared its predecessors
largely by eliminating dialogue, isolating the United States from con-
tact with Iran and adopting policies which operate as if the two coun-
tries exist in a vacuum.
Despite the best efforts of four U.S. administrations to bring about
the collapse of the Iranian Government through threats, sanctions and
economic isolation, the Islamic regime remains firmly in control in Te-
hran. The regime has outlasted three presidents and is well on its way
to outlasting a fourth president. The world has changed dramatically
during this period of time. The Soviet colossus to Iran's north has col-
lapsed into a rabble of fledging states vying for foreign aid on their un-
even courses to free market economies and democratic capitalism. Ira-
539. Iran's military consists of the Army (345,000 personnel), the Revolutionary Guard
(120,000 personnel), the Navy (18,000 personnel), the Air Force (30,000 personnel) and
the army reserves (350,000 personnel). Iranian defense spending totaled $4.7 billion in
fiscal year 1997. See IRAN: EIA REPORT, supra note 181, at 3.
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nian influence in the region in the absence of the deterrence of Soviet
military might will undoubtedly grow even as Russia scrambles to reas-
sert its regional dominance. The stakes mount when the region's fabu-
lous wealth of natural resources is added to the equation. In the nine-
teen years since the Islamic revolution, wars in Lebanon and Iraq have
been fought, previously unheard of alliances (such as Syrian participa-
tion in the Gulf War coalition) have been formed, Jordan, Israel and the
Palestinians have agreed to make peace (although implementation re-
mains problematic) and American influence and popularity have fluctu-
ated wildly. Yet, despite these occurrences, current U.S. policies toward
Iran remain rooted in the denial, exclusion and isolation of previous
administrations.5 40
The time has come for the United States to reevaluate its policies
toward Iran - including its use of economic sanctions - in light of current
political and economic realities in the Middle East.541 It is time for the
United States to consign the anger and frustration arising from the hos-
tage crisis and the Iran-Contra affair to the scrap heap of history. After
all, as noted by Richard Haass, "[f]oreign policy is not about poses nor is
it a form of therapy... [but rather it] is about promoting this nation's
interests."542 How best to reorient U.S. policy remains problematic and
beyond the scope of this article. However, at the very least, this reorien-
tation should consist of three specific initiatives by the United States.
Initially, the United States should actively pursue dialogue with
the Khatami Administration. 543 This dialogue should be initiated at the
lower echelon of the diplomatic corps such as at the deputy or undersec-
retary of state levels. 544 This dialogue should address all Iranian con-
cerns including past U.S. involvement in Iranian affairs, Iranian secu-
rity concerns and the U.S. sanctions regime. This dialogue should also
address American concerns regarding Iranian sponsorship of acts of in-
ternational terrorism, efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction,
opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process and regional security con-
540. See Wright, supra note 264, at Al.
541. See Murphy, supra note 1, at Cl. In this regard, Bruce Laingen, the senior U.S.
diplomat held during the hostage crisis, recently stated that "[If I had been told that
[Iranian-American relations] would be the same sixteen years later, I would have said,
'Don't be ridiculous."' Federman, supra note 513. See also Laura Myers, Former Hostages
Say it is Past Time to Patch Up Relations with Iran, ASSOc. PRESs, Feb. 9, 1998, available
in 1998 WL 6641040.
542. Haass, supra note 262, at C9.
543. See Robert S. Greenberger, Iran and the U.S. Could be Engaged in Early Stage of
a Change in Relations, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 1997, at A4, available in 1997 WL-WSJ
14177598. See also A Moderate Cleric's Stunning Victory in Iran, S.F. CHRON., May 28,
1997, at A18, available in 1997 WL 6698299. In this regard, U.S. Representative Lee H.
Hamilton stated that "the United States and Iran need to cool the rhetoric, end mutual
demonization, explore better ties and gradually establish a reliable and authoritative
dialogue." Lippman, supra note 452, at A33.
544. See Murphy, supra note 1, at Cl.
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cerns. 545
Secondly, the United States should reorient its policy toward Iran
from one of unilateral action to one of multilateral cooperation by com-
mencing efforts to forge a consensus on policy toward Iran with its al-
lies, especially the European Union.5 46 This consensus should "relate
diplomacy to reasonable pressures against Iran"547 by "setting concrete
standards for judging the actual efficacy of... dialogue [with Iran]
and... adopting a common policy based upon results."5 48 If Iranian
policies change during the course of this dialogue, the United States
and its allies should respond in accordance with the dictates of their
common policy. 549 In the case of the United States, these steps could in-
clude "reducing sanctions, permitting nonmilitary trade and allowing
U.S. firms into Iran. 550 The United States could offer assurances that it
would not enforce ILSA as an incentive to the European Union to enter
into discussions to forge a common policy on Iran. 551 The United States
should make it clear to its allies that it reserves the right to enforce
ILSA in the event that the parties fail to reach agreement on common
principles governing their relations with Iran.
Finally, there must be strict adherence to the principles contained
in any common policy. This policy must not reward Iran in the absence
of substantive behavioral alterations nor be subject to manipulation by
Iranian intransigence. 5 2 This is not to advocate the adoption of an in-
flexible common policy. The diplomatic realities of negotiation and com-
promise make the likelihood of achieving absolute agreement on all as-
pects of a common policy toward Iran most unlikely. Furthermore, an
inflexible policy toward Iran serves only to repeat the mistakes of recent
545. See A 'Moderate' in Tehran, supra note 503, at A18.
546. See Federman, supra note 513.
547. Henry A. Kissinger, No Deals with Iran, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 26, 1997, available
in 1997 WL 13067455.
548. Stephen S. Rosenfeld, What "Dialogue' With Iran?, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 1997, at
A29.
549. See Federman, supra note 513.
550. Lippman, supra note 452, at A33.
551. Such an assurance has been criticized as an abandonment of the U.S. policy of
isolation of Iran and a tacit admission of its failure. Such an admission would have the
effect of opening the floodgates as firms which may have been deterred by ILSA would
proceed with investments in the absence of penalties. See Rodman, supra note 182, at
A13. See also New Day Coming?, TIME, Jan. 19, 1998, at 35, available in 1998 WL
7694174; Lippman, U.S. Aides Still Divided Over Sanctions Against Foreign Investors in
Iran, supra note 258, at A33. However, such a result could be avoided by requiring U.S.
allies to temporarily suspend investments by their nationals in Iran during negotiations
to develop a common policy. Additionally, any U.S. assurance that ILSA would not be en-
forced during negotiations is different from a legislative repeal as it would allow subse-
quent prosecution against persons violating the Act during negotiations in the event of
their failure to generate a common policy. In any event, the floodgates are already open as
evidenced by the multibillion dollar investments which have flowed into Iran's oil and gas
industries due, in part, to the Clinton Administration's failure to enforce ILSA.
552. See Rodman, supra note 182, at A13.
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U.S. policies. However, once agreed upon, the parties to the common
policy must implement its dictates without question in order to avoid
the mistakes of the European Union's flabby policy of "constructive
dialogue."553
Nineteen years of hostility cannot be undone or healed overnight,
but efforts to reconcile the United States and Iran should commence
immediately. The results of these efforts cannot be predicted with any
degree of certainty. Dialogue may resolve U.S. differences with its allies
and restore opportunities for U.S. companies to participate in the Ira-
nian economy including the oil and gas industries. 554 The initiation of
dialogue may also serve to legitimize the moderate tone of the Khatami
administration and undercut the influence of Iranian hard-liners. 5 5 On
the other hand, full diplomatic relations may not be restored for years.
Economic relations may never be fully restored nor reach current levels
existing between Iran and the rest of the world. Iranian behavior may
never fully conform to international models of acceptable behavior let
alone U.S. models of such behavior. What is certain is that eventually,
either by design or as a result of an international crisis, the United
States and Iran will have to engage in direct dialogue. 5 6 Obviously, it
would be in the best interests of the United States to commence this
dialogue by design rather than in exigent circumstances thrust upon it
by the calamity of an international emergency. Until the United States
demonstrates the courage and fortitude to initiate such dialogue, it
cannot accurately determine the meaning of Khatami's election, evalu-
ate the discordant voices emanating from his government, gauge the
mood of the Iranian people or seek normalized relations. 557 Efforts to
commence this dialogue at the present time may fail, but it bears to
note that "even a hugely ambitious mission must begin with a first
step ."558
553. See EU To Press For Less Rigid Stance On Iran, supra note 130.
554. See Rodman, supra note 182, at A13.
555. See id.
556. See Bakhash, supra note 263, at A27.
557. See Murphy, supra note 1, at C1.
558. Bakhash, supra note 263, at A27.
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